

INFORMATION SERIES No. 3

INFORMATION ON THE PROBLEM
OF SECURITY (1917—1926)



BY THE SAME AUTHOR

Information on the Reduction of Armaments

By J. W. WHEELER-BENNETT, JUNR.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR NEILL MALCOLM,
K.C.B., D.S.O.

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ON THE
PROBLEM OF SECURITY
(1917-1926)

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

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OF EDUCATION 1916-1922

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INTRODUCTION

STUDENTS of politics and history will be grateful for this succinct and well-proportioned survey of the efforts which European statesmen have made within the last decade to solve the most serious of our international problems.

In the last analysis war generally results from a sense of insecurity. Countries suspect the intentions of their neighbours and pile up armaments against the evil day when the imputed malevolence of a rival will explode into hostilities. Armaments which are the result of fear on one side are met by armaments which are equally the result of fear on the other. The competition increases in severity. Suspicions multiply. The atmosphere of international affairs becomes charged with burning particles so that any little incident may provoke a catastrophe.

After the tragedy of the war it was on all hands regarded as the prime duty of statesmanship to substitute confidence for suspicion, and to create an international order in which disputes could be peaceably adjusted. The League of Nations was set up. The Covenant of the League should have sufficed to tranquillise the apprehensions of its signatories.

The Covenant, however, was not, in the event, sufficient. No sooner had the first Assembly of the League addressed itself to the problem of disarmament in Geneva than it became apparent that the Pact had not stilled the fears of France. That country had, indeed, emerged victorious from the struggle, but heavily wounded, and retaining, with the nervous psychology of an invaded people, a clear and well-grounded apprehension that in a future contest she would go down before her heavier adversary. Moreover, from the lips of Marshal Foch, her greatest soldier, France learnt that there was no security for her so long as an alien Power was in possession of the bridge-heads of the Rhine.

In reality, security is a state of mind ; so is insecurity.

None the less, these subjective feelings are important political facts. How can the insecurity of France be converted into a feeling of security ? That is the problem which dominates all other European questions ; for so long as France remains insecure she will not disarm, and, continuing in arms herself, arrests the whole movement towards disarmament elsewhere.

The contents of this volume present a clear and consecutive account of the successive efforts which have been made to reassure France. This narrative includes the abortive Anglo-American guarantees, the negotiations of Mr. Lloyd George's Government with the Governments of M. Briand and M. Poincaré for a British Treaty of Guarantee, the two successive schemes elaborated in the League of Nations which are known as the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol, and finally the proceedings which led to the Treaty of Locarno and the reception of Germany into the League.

This is a good terminus. A new period has now opened, more hopeful in the eyes of peace-loving men and women than any which has preceded it. There is now no reason why the secular rivalry for the Rhine valley which has plunged Europe again and again in bloodshed should continue to darken the prospect. There is no reason why the feud between France and Germany should be sustained. If the Treaties of Locarno are observed, if Germany does not reverse her freely-taken decision to accept her new frontier in the West and to renounce Alsace-Lorraine, France can reduce her armaments with security. In effect, the diplomatic conditions are at last created for a real and enduring peace in Western Europe.

H. A. L. FISHER.

PREFACE

THE whole problem of security, whether national or international, is the psychological outcome of a state of fear, or national hysteria—the fear of aggression or attack.

With the means of combating this fear history is full, and it is probable that, since it has its beginnings in the primary sense of self-preservation, the question of security formed the foundation of the earliest “foreign policy.”

To achieve security Ghengiz Khan, when he had conquered an enemy, caused the right hands of every male between the ages of twelve and thirty to be cut off. For the same reason the Percys and the Douglases in their endless border feuds cut off the two index fingers and thumb from the right hands of their prisoners, thereby rendering them useless as archers. This, then, provides the earliest policy of security—*the Policy of Mutilation*.

Modern diplomacy prior to the year 1925 had worked out three alternative schemes for security, and that all of them were worthless is proved by the ever-increasing armaments race which concluded in the cataclysm of 1914. The fact that the nations, despite their efforts for security, still felt bound to put their trust in larger and larger fighting forces, is a clear proof that the forces of fear, manifested in armaments, were still strongest in the world’s psychological composition.

The three plans referred to may be defined as follows :—

1. *The Policy of Devastation.* This may be looked upon as the logical successor to the more mediæval Policy of Mutilation.
2. *The Policy of Encirclement.* That is to say, the creating of buffer States between the potential enemies and the formation of alliances with neighbouring States if possible to encompass the possible aggressor.
3. *The Policy of Guarantee.*

The history of the long struggle between France and Germany, which is the classic instance of the need for security, provides admirable examples of the first and second of these policies. Perhaps the most historic event in any Policy of Devastation was the conduct of the French troops under Marshal Louvois, with the concurrence of Louis XIV, in laying waste the Lower Palatinate in 1689, for the purpose, not of loot and lust, but of rendering it *for an extended period* strategically useless to the forces of the Emperor; thereby securing, at least for a time, immunity of attack from that quarter.

This policy is obviously of so temporary a nature that it has been virtually abandoned, except in the case of actual warfare. Purely strategic examples are Hunter's raids into the Valley of Virginia in 1864 and the retreat of the German Army through Belgium and Northern France in the autumn of 1918.

Though of a different nature, the French occupation of the Ruhr may be placed in this category. A German psychologist has described it as a policy of moral devastation.

In the early nineteenth century we find Napoleon faced with the same problem of dealing effectively and permanently with a hostile Prussia. For this purpose he created the Confederation of the Rhine, a league of Rhenish princes, including the two Palatinates, and having himself as Protector. In addition to this he held the left bank of the Rhine. In order further to secure the isolation of Prussia he formulated the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, thereby making a vassal buffer State of it between his two enemies in the east. This action of Napoleon is an admirable illustration of what has been called the Policy of Encirclement, and it is particularly interesting to trace its direct effect upon the French post-war foreign policy, which envisaged a strong and Francophile Poland, and rendered half-hearted assistance to the Rhenish Separatist movement.

There remains the Policy of Guarantee, and of this the two best pre-war examples were the security and neutrality of

Belgium and Switzerland, guaranteed to them by the Great Powers, after they had been the battle-grounds of Europe and the playthings of international diplomacy for hundreds of years. Of the value of such a guarantee to Belgium history is witness, but it is also by far the most important of the three policies, since in it lies the germ of the final and new policy of security—the Policy of Mutual Guarantee, the Policy of Locarno.

The whole history of post-war European politics may be said to have been a desperate search after security—a search in which the hunters knew well that inevitable destruction awaited their failure.

The details of this search are given in the following pages: its gradual progress from the theory of a two- or three-party pact directed against another party; through the more universal plans propounded by the League of Nations; finally to the pact of specified but mutual guarantee achieved at Locarno.

The road to security is paved with more failures than successes, crimes have been committed in its name and great deeds have been done because of it. The end of the road has not been reached, but what is of very great importance is that it has been possible to find at last the Middle of the Road and to trace a line thence onwards, steering a course between the vain desire to destroy all one's enemies and the equally vain desire to make all one's enemies one's friends. This is what Locarno achieved: for the first time, perhaps, in the world's history it attempted to set the feet of the world upon this *via media* along the road of common sense.

The sincere thanks of the authors are due, and are here gratefully tendered, to those who have assisted in the preparation of this book, but more especially to the Intelligence Department of the League of Nations Union and to the Director of the Reference Service on International Affairs, Paris.

J. W. W.-B.
F. E. L.

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PART I

WESTERN EUROPE, 1917-1924

I

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE RHINE
FRONTIER, 1917-1920

1. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS, 1917-1918.

THE History of Security at the Peace Conference of Paris is synonymous with the history of France's struggle to regain in fact, if not in name, the frontier of the Rhine, of the greater part of which she had been deprived by the Peace of Vienna, 1815, and from which she had been finally ousted by the Treaty of Frankfort, 1871.

It had been long known that an issue of the World War favourable to the Allies would result in the return of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to France, who would thus once more become a Rhine Power. But this alone was not wholly acceptable to the French, who declared officially in 1917 that such a restitution must be made "not in the mutilated condition in which they were left by the Treaty of 1815, but with the frontiers as they existed before 1790. We shall thus have possession of the geographic and mineral basin of the Saar, the possession of which is essential to our industries, and the memory of the successive mutilations of our frontier must be obliterated." So wrote M. Briand, then Premier of France, to M. Cambon, Ambassador in London, on January 12, 1917.¹

Such feelings were natural enough on the part of the French, and, indeed, in the whole question of security the French arguments are so frankly plausible that it is difficult to maintain the right degree of detachment necessary for an impartial examination. The fact that France has been invaded three times within a century and twice within the

¹ See British Blue Book, *Papers Respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact (France, No. 1, 1924)*, Cmd. 2169, p. 2, No. 2.

last fifty years of that century, always by the same Power, always from the same direction, is an explanation of the French attitude, not only in Paris during the Conference, but throughout the six years which succeeded it. It explains, too, the very early efforts made by France to secure the approval by her Allies of such methods as she might think fit to remove the menace from her frontiers.

In fairness to France, too, it must be said at once that comparatively few Frenchmen favoured the annexation of the Rhenish provinces by France. It is true that in the first months of the war there was organised in Paris the *Comité de la Rive Gauche du Rhin*, which conducted a fierce propaganda and found support in high military quarters and in such journals as the *Écho de Paris* and the *Libre Parole*; it is true, also, that Marshal Foch declared that “*ce fleuve règle tout. Quand on est maître du Rhin, on est maître de tout le pays. Quand on n'est pas sur le Rhin, on a tout perdu*”¹; and that certain interviews given by him on these lines to certain British and American journalists during the Conference seriously embarrassed the course of negotiations. In the main, however, French public opinion and French politicians were content that the Rhine should remain a strategic frontier, but that it should be made altogether impossible for a Germany armed to stand *cap-à-pie* with a foot on either bank.

Once having adopted this principle, France maintained it stolidly from first to last, and in the face of the expressed opposition of all her Allies. From the earliest days of the war successive French Governments were active and emphatic upon this.

From the first France had the support of Russia in this project, and as early as February 24, 1916, in his instructions to M. Isvolsky, Ambassador in Paris, M. Sasonov, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed from Petrograd:—

¹ French Yellow Book, *Documents relatifs aux négociations concernant les garanties de sécurité contre une agression de l'Allemagne* (10 janvier, 1919-7 décembre, 1923), No. 13, p. 54.

At the forthcoming conference you may be guided by the following general principles . . . one must bear in mind that we are prepared to allow France and England complete freedom in drawing up the western frontier of Germany.¹

Early in the following year France began definitely to try and enlist the support of Great Britain and Russia in a project for separating the German territories west of the Rhine and erecting them into a buffer State under the tutelage of France. This exactly corresponded with Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine, and was naturally popular at the moment when the Napoleonic cult had reached its highest point since the fall of the Second Empire.

In pursuance of this policy M. Doumergue, then on a special mission to Russia, as reported by the Russian Foreign Minister (M. Pokrovsky) to the Ambassador in Paris on January 30, 1917, drew the attention of the Tsar to the French suggestion for the "political separation from Germany of the trans-Rhenish districts, and their organisation on a separate basis, in order that in future the River Rhine might form a permanent strategic frontier against a German invasion."² He endeavoured to secure the Imperial approval of this proposition, with the successful result that two days later (February 2, 1917) M. Pokrovsky, in a Note to the French Ambassador, declared that His Majesty and his Government were in full agreement with this Separatist programme, and that, further, they were prepared to support French occupation of this new autonomous district until "such time as the enemy States have completed and satisfied all conditions and guarantees indicated in the Treaty of Peace."³

In July of the same year M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, discussed the same question with Mr. Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, intimating that, although France has no wish for annexation, she would, however, "desire to see the territory to the west of the Rhine separated from the German Empire and erected into something

¹ British Blue Book, Appendix (i) to No. 4, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, Appendix (ii) to No. 4, p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, Appendix (iv) to No. 4, p. 7.

of the nature of a buffer State." He seems to have had no very warm welcome from the British Government, for in a letter to Lord Bertie, British Ambassador in Paris (July 2, 1917), Mr. Balfour remarks that he said "nothing to encourage this rather wild project," and added that he did not think that M. Cambon himself had much belief in it.¹ Some six months later, indeed, during the House of Commons debate of December 19th, which followed the publication by the *Manchester Guardian* of the Russian Documents already quoted, Mr. Balfour declared that "never did we desire and never did we encourage" the idea of the creation of a buffer State between France and Germany, and that it was "never part of the policy of His Majesty's Government."²

Thus matters stood at the close of 1917, and remained so till the preliminary discussions prior to the Peace Conference began in November 1918. Then once more the French Government put forward among their draft peace proposals claims for "guarantees regarding the left bank of the Rhine (military neutralisation without political interference)," and also emphasised the necessity of the occupation of German territory as guarantee for the execution of the treaty.³

2. THE OCCUPATION AND DEMILITARISATION OF THE RHINE ZONES.

The Peace Conference of Paris met for its first preliminary session on January 12, 1919, but prior to this Marshal Foch had drawn up a Memorandum dated January 10th for the use of the French Delegation. It was eventually presented with a covering note to President Wilson on March 14th.⁴ In this the Allied Commander-in-Chief gave eloquent reasons, historical, political, and strategic, for the maintenance of the strategic frontier of the Rhine in the interests of French security. This Memorandum gave no detailed plan for the control of the Rhineland, but ended with three cardinal conditions which

¹ British Blue Book, No. 3, p. 3.

² Ibid., No. 4, pp. 4-5.

³ Ibid., No. 8, p. 10.

⁴ Ibid., No. 9, pp. 10-24; French Yellow Book, No. 1, pp. 7-15.

the Marshal believed to be of absolute necessity for the basis of peace :—

1. To make it definitely impossible for Germany to gain a military footing or to conduct political propaganda in the Rhineland, which might even be protected by the creation of a neutralised zone on the right bank.
2. To ensure the military occupation by Allied forces of the Rhenish provinces on the left bank.
3. To safeguard the outlets essential to the economic activity of the Rhenish provinces on the left bank by associating the latter with the Western States in a common customs system.

M. Clemenceau entirely associated himself with these principles, and adopted them as a basis for a Memorandum on the fixation of Germany's western frontier at the Rhine, which was accordingly drawn up by M. André Tardieu and presented to the British and American Delegations on February 25th.¹

The Memorandum argued that the question of the Rhine was not purely French but of inter-Allied importance, and that therefore inter-Allied action should be taken ; it maintained that the present guarantees offered by the limitation of German armaments and the League of Nations were untried and inadequate ; it emphasised with redoubled eloquence the historic and strategic arguments of Marshal Foch, and finally it declared :—

1. That the western frontier of Germany must be fixed at the Rhine, and that the Rhineland should be declared both politically and economically autonomous of the Reich.
2. That the bridge-heads of the Rhine must be permanently occupied by an inter-Allied force.

In defence of these it was stated that no annexation of territory was implied, and a tentative suggestion was put forward in an annexe that the new State might be placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

This Memorandum was the subject of a series of consultations held on March 11th-12th between Mr. Philip Kerr (Great Britain), Dr. Mezes (United States), and M. Tardieu, who

¹ British Blue Book, No. 10, pp. 25-57; French Yellow Book, No 2, pp. 15-30.

elaborated and explained his thesis. It was during these discussions that the Anglo-American dislike of the policy of occupation became manifest.

From the first, as has been seen from Mr. Balfour's House of Commons statement in December 1917, the British Government had been opposed to the policy of a buffer State, or, indeed, of the cession by Germany of any territory save that to which she had no claim (e.g. Alsace and Lorraine). It was considered that separation of the Rhineland from Germany would set up just such another potential cause of war as that created in 1870. They were not dissuaded from this view by the argument of Marshal Foch that if left within the political boundary of the Reich the Rhineland would remain as German as Saxony, and hence as liable to be called upon in time of war. The United States delegates agreed with the British, and in these meetings which followed M. Tardieu's Memorandum Mr. Kerr demonstrated clearly that the British Government agreed neither to a permanent occupation of the bridge-heads nor to an independent Rhine State, for neither of which she saw the necessity in the event of Germany's being properly disarmed.¹

Here, however, the British and Americans found themselves in a quandary. Their sense of justice prompted them at one and the same time to oppose a permanent or a prolonged occupation of the Rhineland, and also to support their former ally in her struggle for security. Moreover, they knew that if defeated on this point the French would be the more obdurate in their claim to the incorporation of the Saar Basin in the new frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine.

At the close of the conversations of March 11th-12th a deadlock seemed inevitable, but on the morning of the 14th President Wilson arrived in Paris on his return from New York, and that afternoon the British and American chiefs made to M. Clemenceau a verbal offer, the details of which

¹ British Blue Book, Nos. 12 and 13, pp. 59-68. See also *The Truth about the Treaty*, by M. André Tardieu, chap. v, pp. 172-176 (Hodder & Stoughton).

are given elsewhere in this chapter, of a treaty of immediate assistance in the case of unprovoked aggression by Germany ; this proposal was to replace that of a thirty years' occupation of the Rhine by inter-Allied troops.

This offer, which M. Tardieu scornfully refers to as made by "Great Britain, with her century-old pride in her splendid isolation, and the United States, 'too proud to fight,' and separated from the rest of the world by Washington's farewell address and the Monroe Doctrine,"¹ was, however, too good a one to be refused lightly. M. Clemenceau, in a Note to the British and American Delegations, opened a new phase of negotiations, the object of which was to secure for France as much of her old demands as was possible without sacrificing this new offer.

The note in question, dated March 17th,² pointed out at some length that, despite the value of the offer of guarantee, there must always elapse a certain period between the act of aggression and the arrival of British troops in France, and a still longer period before the arrival of American troops, during both of which France must bear the brunt of a German invasion as she had done in August 1914. M. Clemenceau therefore claimed that in addition to the Anglo-American guarantee it was necessary for France—

1. That the left bank of the Rhine and the bridge-heads on the right bank be occupied for a period to be fixed in the Peace Treaty as one of the guarantees for the execution of the financial clauses.
2. That the whole of the left bank and the territory within fifty kilometres of the right bank be permanently demilitarised, and that any entry of a German armed force into this zone be considered an act of unprovoked aggression, in which case France must have the right immediately to occupy the line of the Rhine.
3. That by way of reparation France should occupy, *without annexation*, the Saar Basin.
4. That any act of aggression against Belgium should be considered an aggression against France.

¹ Tardieu, p. 177.

² British Blue Book, No. 15, pp. 69-76; French Yellow Book, No. 4, pp. 32-35.

There followed a month of anxious negotiations, during which the French subjected their Anglo-American Allies to a veritable volley of arguments. (On M. Tardieu's own showing Notes were despatched to President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George on March 19, 20, 22, 28 and 31, and on April 4, 5, 15, 16 and 19.)¹ Into this period of tangled proposals for French security it is impossible to go here in detail. Undoubtedly it was the darkest moment of the Peace Conference, and it was during this time that the rumour began to circulate that the *George Washington* had been summoned hurriedly to Brest with orders to keep steam up against an immediate departure of the President. Dramatic accounts of these days and of those which were their sequel, during which there was a panic for revision of the Treaty, are given by M. Tardieu and by Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, both active participants in the events they chronicle.²

Finally a compromise was reached on April 15th-18th, when first President Wilson and then Mr. Lloyd George accepted the French proposal for a temporary occupation of the left bank and bridge-heads of the Rhine in addition to the Anglo-American guarantee.³ This occupation was to be maintained for fifteen years, evacuation to be made by zones every five years, but only on condition that Germany faithfully and honourably complied with the terms of peace. Even at the end of fifteen years, if in the opinion of the Allies the guarantees against German aggression are not sufficiently strong, evacuation may be delayed indefinitely⁴; in conclusion, should Germany, after the completion of the evacuation, fail to fulfil the financial obligations entered into by the Treaty of Peace, the left bank shall be re-occupied not by France alone, but by all the Allies. In addition to this, in agreement with

¹ Tardieu, p. 186.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 182-201; Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. ii, pp. 42-126. See also British Blue Book, Nos. 16-20, pp. 76-93; French Yellow Book, Nos. 5-7, pp. 35-43.

³ Stannard Baker, vol. ii, p. 79. M. Tardieu gives date of President Wilson's acceptance as April 20th. See also British Blue Book, Nos. 21-23, pp. 93-97.

⁴ British Blue Book, No. 25, p. 103.

Marshal Foch's Memorandum of January 10th and the French Note of March 17th, the right bank of the Rhine to a line forty kilometres from the river was to be demilitarised permanently and no armed forces allowed to enter.

These provisions were incorporated in the Treaty of Peace in the following articles, drafted by Mr. Balfour :—

Article 42.¹

Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43.

In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation, are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44.

In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

Article 428.

As a guarantee for the execution of the present treaty by Germany, the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridge-heads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present treaty.

Article 429.

If the conditions of the present Treaty are faithfully carried out by Germany the occupation referred to in Article 428 will be successively restricted as follows :—

(I) At the expiration of five years there will be evacuated : the bridge-head of Cologne and the territories north of a line running along the Ruhr, then along the railway Jülich, Duren Euskirchen, Rheinbach, thence along the road Rheinbach to Sinzig, and reaching the Rhine at the confluence with the Ahr ; the roads, railways, and places mentioned above being excluded from the area evacuated.

(II) At the expiration of ten years there will be evacuated : the bridge-head of Coblenz and the territories north of a line to be drawn from the intersection between the frontiers of Belgium, Germany, and Holland, running about 4 kilometres south of Aix-la-Chapelle, then to and following the crest of Forst Gemünd, then east of the railway of

¹ British Blue Book, No. 28, p. 104.

the Urft Valley, then along Blankenheim, Valdorf, Dreis, Ulmen to and following the Moselle from Bremm to Nehren, then passing by Kappel and Simmern, then following the ridge of the heights between Simmern and the Rhine and reaching this river at Bacharach ; all the places, valleys, roads, and railways mentioned above being excluded from the area evacuated.

(III) At the expiration of fifteen years there will be evacuated : the bridge-head of Mainz, the bridge-head of Kehl, and the remainder of the German territory under occupation.

If at that date the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees.

Article 430.¹

In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces.

Article 431.

If before the expiration of the period of fifteen years Germany complies with all the undertakings resulting from the present Treaty, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately.

Article 432.

All matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements which Germany hereby undertakes to observe.

It should be noticed that in accepting this compromise France modified her claim to the Saar Basin Territory, which was placed for a period of fifteen years under the League of Nations, who administer it by means of a Governing Commission. On this Commission, however, France secured the chairmanship and a predominant vote for the first six years.

3. THE TRIPLE PACT OF GUARANTEE.

It has been seen that when the complete divergency between the French and Anglo-American views on the occupation of the Rhineland had brought about an *impasse*, a partial

¹ British Blue Book, Nos. 29-30, p. 105.

solution was found in the offer of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau of an Anglo-American guarantee of French security in the event of German aggression. This offer was made verbally on March 14th, and was endorsed by Mr. Lloyd George in his "Considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms," a Memorandum circulated on March 26th.

In dealing with the question of French security Mr. Lloyd George said :—

It is right that the other great Western democracies should enter into an undertaking which will ensure that they stand by her (France's) side in time to protect her against invasion, should Germany ever threaten her again, or until the League of Nations has proved its capacity to preserve the peace and liberty of the world.¹

Two days later the formula to which the British Prime Minister had agreed was handed by President Wilson to M. Clemenceau as follows :—

In a separate treaty with the United States, a pledge by the United States, subject to the approval of the Executive Council of the League of Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France as soon as any unprovoked movement of aggression against her is made by Germany.²

This, *mutatis mutandis*, became the formula for the British Treaty, and was further elaborated at a meeting of the Council of Four held on April 22nd.³

The two Treaties were almost identical in character,⁴ and both in their preamble made clear that their existence was merely temporary, because "There is a danger that the stipulations relating to the left bank of the Rhine . . . may not at first provide adequate security and protection to the French Republic."⁵ The American Treaty in its preamble emphasised the general importance of the maintenance of

¹ British Blue Book, No. 16, p. 81.

² Tardieu, p. 205.

³ British Blue Book, No. 23, Appendix S, p. 97; French Yellow Book, No. 7, pp. 43-46.

⁴ For texts of the British and American Treaties of Guarantee signed on June 28, 1919, see Appendix A.

⁵ British Treaty, Preamble, par. 1.

the peace of the Rhine, and that "an unprovoked movement of aggression by Germany against France would not only violate both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles . . . but would be regarded as a hostile act against all the Powers signatory to that Treaty, and as one calculated to disturb the peace of the world."¹

Article 1 of the Treaties clearly stipulates the conditions under which the guarantee would come into force, namely, the violation by Germany of Articles 42-44 of the Treaty of Versailles, or any other unprovoked act of German aggression.

Article 2 states that the two Treaties will only come into force when both have been ratified ; and it was this stipulation of inter-dependence that brought about the invalidity of the guarantee.

It was over the text of Article 3 that some difficulty arose. As drafted the article called for the submission of the Treaty to the League of Nations, and for its recognition by the Council, acting, if need be, by a majority vote, as being within the spirit of the League. The question then arose as to the time-limit of the Treaty. The original draft had provided for a period of three years, but to this the French vehemently protested that it was not in the next few months that Germany would again become dangerous, but later, when the period of recuperation had set in. They emphasised their former argument that France required a *permanent* guarantee against German aggression and proposed an alternative clause :—

The pledge to continue until it is considered by *all* the signatory Powers that the League itself affords sufficient protection.²

This draft was accepted by President Wilson on April 12th, but the British refused altogether to agree. In this new proposal they at once saw that France would acquire a permanent veto over any and every proposal to terminate the Treaties, and that Great Britain would therefore be permanently

¹ American Treaty, Preamble, par. 2.
² Tardieu, p. 208.

committed. In addition to this, the suggestion implied a direct curtailment of the rights of the League of Nations.

Three days of discussion followed, and on April 15th a compromise draft was agreed to and incorporated in the Treaty as follows:—

It will continue in force until, on the application of one of the parties to it, the Council, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

Article 4 provides for the approval of the French Chamber before the ratification by the President of the French Republic.

There is in the British Treaty an additional article (Art. 5). Although the Treaty was signed in the name of the British Empire, there was no desire among the Dominion representatives to associate themselves in the compact. There was in fact the beginning of a gradual manifestation on the part of these delegates of a conviction that it was profoundly dangerous for the Empire as a whole to be too closely involved in European affairs¹—a conviction that has since demonstrated itself in the refusal of the Canadian Government to be a party to the Lausanne Treaty or the Locarno Pact.

This being so, Article 5 of the British Treaty stipulated that the Treaty—

Shall impose no obligation upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Parliaments of the Dominions concerned.

But these Treaties even did not entirely satisfy the French or assuage their fear of aggression. With what seems to have been a fatal prophetic sense M. Clemenceau foresaw the possibility of their not being ratified.

“You have a Senate and I have a Parliament,” he said to President Wilson on April 25th. “We cannot be sure what they will do ten years hence, or even of what they will do to-morrow. If, for example, the Treaties with the United

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (British Institute of International Affairs), vol. vi, pp. 358–359. Hodder & Stoughton.

States and Great Britain were not ratified, what would be France's situation ? What alternative would she have at her disposal ? ”¹

This question led to a further period of negotiations, of proposals and counter-proposals, and finally of compromise. It is said that on five different occasions President Wilson exchanged drafts with M. Clemenceau. At last, on April 29th, agreement was reached, in the shape of the additional paragraph to Article 429 of the Treaty already quoted :—

If at that date (the end of fifteen years) the guarantees against an unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees.

The two Treaties were signed by France and Great Britain, and France and the United States, respectively, on June 28, 1919. The British Government ratified it on October 9th and the French on November 8th—ratifications being exchanged on November 20, 1919. The American Treaty was not even discussed in the Senate, but was automatically denied ratification by the adverse vote against the Treaty of Versailles on March 19, 1920.

4. GERMAN DISARMAMENT AND REPARATIONS.

No book dealing with the problems of security can claim to be complete without mention of those articles forming Parts V and VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. Both the complete disarmament of Germany and her economic subjection were prominent items in the French “ Programme of Security ” drawn up at the preliminary conference of November 28, 1918, and these aims were to some extent realised by the Disarmament and Reparation clauses of the Treaty.

¹ Tardieu, p. 210.

A. *Disarmament.*

The principles involved in the Military, Naval, and Air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles may be summarised as follows :—

- I. To render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations.
- II. To make Germany, who had been the cause of the colossal growth of armaments, begin the process of limitation.
- III. To prevent the danger of future aggression by Germany.
- IV. To leave Germany with a military force sufficient to maintain internal order.
- V. To avoid ambiguity, which might otherwise hereafter give Germany a pretext for evading her obligations.

It is not proposed to plunge afresh into the tide of negotiations which preceded the final draft of the disarmament clauses of the German Treaties, but merely to summarise very briefly exactly what form these clauses took. Germany undertook strictly to observe these clauses, the general outlines of which are as follows :—

1. **LAND ARMAMENTS.¹**

(a) "The army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 160, par. 2.)

(b) "The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped (than as prescribed), or of other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war, is forbidden." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 160, par. 8.)

(c) "The Great German General Staff and all similar organisations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 160, par. 9.)

(d) "Employees and officials (such as customs officers, forest guards, coast-guards, gendarmes and police) may not be assembled for military training." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 162, par. 1.)

(e) "The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any other war material shall only be carried out in factories or works the location of which shall be communicated to and approved by the Governments of the

¹ See *Information on the Reduction of Armaments*, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Jnr. (Association for International Understanding), George Allen & Unwin, pp. 24-27. Also *Present Status of the Armament Problem*, Reference Service on International Affairs (Paris), Bulletin No. 2, pp. 2-5.

Principal Allied and Associated Powers." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 168 par. 1.)

(f) "Importation of arms, munitions, and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited. The same applies to the manufacture for, and export to, foreign countries of arms, munitions, and war material of every kind." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 170.)

(g) "The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases," and all analogous materials "being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 171, par. 1.)

(h) "Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 173, par. 1.)

(i) "The army may only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment (for a period of twelve consecutive years for men and twenty-five for newly appointed officers; the number of discharges before expiration of term not to exceed 5 per cent.) (Versailles Treaty, Art. 173, pars. 4 and 5.)

(j) Military schools are restricted to those "absolutely indispensable for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed," students being strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled" and to be reckoned in the effectives fixed. (Versailles Treaty, Art. 176.)

(k) "Educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, and, generally speaking, associations of every description . . . will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members . . . in the profession or use of arms." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 177.)

(l) "All measures of mobilisation or appertaining to mobilisation are forbidden." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 178.)

(m) Germany agrees "not to accredit nor to send to any foreign country any military, naval, or air mission, nor to allow any such mission to leave her territory." She further agrees "to take appropriate measures to prevent nationals from leaving her territory to become enrolled in the army, navy, or air service of any foreign Power." Alternatively, the parties of the other part agree "not to enrol nor to attach to their army, navy, or air forces any German national." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 179.)

(n) Total army numbers, and the maximum personnel of corps units, of headquarters staffs, of infantry and cavalry divisions are fixed; the maximum of armament establishments and of arms and munitions stocks are determined. (Versailles Treaty, Art. 180.)

2. NAVAL ARMAMENES.

(a) Naval forces in commission are restricted in the classes of battleships, light-cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo-boats, while submarines are prohibited, even for commercial purposes. (Versailles Treaty, Arts. 181, 192.)

(b) Total naval personnel is limited and must include reserve forces. (Versailles Treaty, Art. 183.)

(c) The tonnage of warships for replacement purposes is restricted to the following figures: Armoured ships, 10,000; light-cruisers, 6,000; destroyers, 800; torpedo-boats, 200. Replacement periods are twenty years for battleships and cruisers, and fifteen years for destroyers and torpedo-boats. (Versailles Treaty, Art. 190.)

(d) Stocks, depots or reserves of arms, munitions or naval war material of all kinds, are forbidden in excess of determined limits, as well as their manufacture and export. (Versailles Treaty, Art. 182.)

(e) Conditions of naval recruitment correspond to the provisions for army recruitment. "No officer or man of the mercantile marine shall receive any training in the navy." (Versailles Treaty, Art. 194.)

(f) The armed forces must not include any air forces. (Versailles Treaty, Art. 198.)

(g) "All military, naval, and air clauses . . . for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed, shall be executed under the control of inter-Allied commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the principal Allied and Associated Powers."

(h) "With respect both to the execution of specific time-limit clauses and those of general application, so long as the treaties remain in force, Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting, if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary." (Versailles Treaty, Arts. 203, 213.)¹

B. *Reparations.*

The keynote of the Reparation clauses which form Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles was struck in President Wilson's famous speech of January 8, 1918, in which he declared that one of the essential conditions of peace was the restoration as well as the evacuation of all territories invaded by Germany. In his reply to the German request for armistice conditions dated November 5, 1918, President Wilson, after consultation with the Allied Governments, gave the Allied

¹ For the ultimate execution of these clauses see *Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace*; British White Paper, Cmd. 2429, *Collective Note of the Allied Powers presented to the German Government on June 4, 1925, in regard to the fulfilment of the obligations of the Peace Treaty with regard to Disarmament*; British White Paper, *Miscellaneous*, No. 12 (1925), Cmd. 2527, *Correspondence between the Ambassadors' Conference and the German Ambassador at Paris respecting German disarmament, evacuation of the Cologne Zone, and modifications in the Rhineland Regime*, Paris, October-November, 1925; German White Book, *Materialien zur Entwaffnungsnote (Fortsetzung 11)*; *German Disarmament*, by Wadsworth Garfield (Reference Service on International Affairs, Paris), *Bulletin* No. 8.

interpretation of this statement as being that Germany should undertake to make compensation for "all damage done to civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and in the air."

At the Peace Conference, on the suggestion, it is said, of Mr. William Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, the Allied Governments decided that pensions and disablement allowances should be included, and an attempt was made to find a definite reparation figure for insertion in the Treaty. The claim put forward by France and Great Britain totalled nine milliards (one milliard = £1,000,000,000 gold), while the American Delegation refused to discuss any figure above seven milliards. A compromise was eventually reached by placing the responsibility of fixing the amount in the hands of the Reparations Commission after the signing of the Treaty, and this body, until the introduction of the Dawes Plan in 1924, enjoyed "wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole Reparations problem."¹

Apart from the powers attributed to the Reparations Commission, which the German Delegation in the Commentary on the Treaty described as possessing in Germany incomparably greater rights than the German Emperor ever possessed,² the French secured the insertion of a clause that materially influenced their later policy. In case of voluntary default on the part of Germany the measures which the Allied and Associated Powers have the right to take, *and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war*, may include economic and financial prohibition and reprisals, and *in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances*.³ It was upon this clause that France based the legality of the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923.

The general provisions of the Financial and Reparation terms of the Treaty may be summarised as follows:—

¹ See Treaty of Versailles, Part viii, Annex ii, par. 12.

² *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. ii, p. 88.

³ See Treaty of Versailles, Part viii, Annex ii, par. 18.

I. Germany accepts the responsibility for having caused all damage suffered as a consequence of the war.

II. The Treaty specifies what portion of this damage is to become a financial liability of Germany.

III. It does this by determining precisely what Germany shall pay *for*; it does not determine in general how much Germany shall pay nor in what form her obligations are to be discharged.

IV. *How much* Germany is to pay in all, both by way of Reparation and on account of other Treaty claims, is left to the decision of the Reparation Commission.

V. The amount is to be determined by the Commission by valuation and addition of claims conforming to the different categories of damage for which compensation is due under the Treaty.

VI. In arriving at its decision the Commission will have no regard to the ultimate total nor to the capacity of Germany to pay this total.

VII. The decision to be notified to Germany by May 1, 1921, after the German Government has been heard as to the admissibility and the valuation of particular claims.

VIII. The Reparation Commission will also decide *when* payment is to be made, except that the equivalent of £1,000,000,000 must be paid as a first instalment within the period assigned to the Commission for arriving at its decision as to the total Reparation debt.

IX. *How* the payment of the first £1,000,000,000 is to be made is also a question left to the discretion of the Commission.

X. *How* payment is to be made after May 1, 1921, is left to the discretion of the German Government, except as regards certain specified amounts to be paid in kind.

XI. The Commission has no discretion to abate its aggregate award for Reparation, when once it has been arrived at, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

XII. But though it may not vary the Reparation *debt*, the Commission has a wide discretion over *payments*. It may extend their date and modify the form even of such payments as are required by the Treaty to be made in a specified way.

XIII. The sanctions by which the Commission is enabled to enforce its decisions are the ordinary international sanctions of force supported by public opinion. It has no special sanctions to support its authority against Germany.¹

Having now passed in review the various provisions made by the Peace Conference, both in the Peace Treaty and its dependent documents, for French security, it is of interest to compare these with the "Programme of Security" drawn

¹ *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. ii, pp. 90-91.

up by the French Government in November 1918 for the guidance of the French Delegation at the Conference:—

PROGRAMME OF SECURITY.¹

1. French Military control of the Rhine.
2. A Permanent Alliance of the Great Powers to help France keep the Rhine.
3. A group of smaller Allies to menace Germany from the east.
4. Territorial reduction of Germany.
5. Crippling the German political organisation.
6. Disarmament of Germany but not of the Allies.
7. A crushing indemnity.
8. Deprivation of economic resources.
9. A set of commercial agreements preferential to France, prejudicial to Germany.

TREATY PROVISIONS.

1. Allied occupation of the Left Bank for a period of fifteen years with gradual evacuation.
2. The Anglo-American Treaties of Guarantee.
3. Alsace-Lorraine returned to France.
4. Disarmament of Germany "in order to render possible the limitation of the armaments of all nations."
5. An unfixed sum for Reparations.
6. The Saar basin placed under the League of Nations; Upper Silesia divided by a plebiscite.

Of especial interest are items 3 and 5 of the French programme, for they provide the clue to the French policy in Europe after the Conference and after the failure of the Anglo-American guarantee. Into the details of this it is proposed to go at some greater length in a following chapter.

5. ARTICLE 10 OF THE COVENANT.

It will be remembered that the Anglo-American guarantee was offered to France "until the League itself affords sufficient protection." The guarantee of security in the Covenant of the League is embodied in Article 10, perhaps the most momentous obligation of all to be undertaken by its signatories:—

¹ Ray Stannard Baker, vol. ii, p. 20.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Around this article has surged the main flood of the tide of controversy about the League, for it provoked both strong support and opposition. President Wilson claimed for it the title of the Monroe Doctrine of the World,¹ and declared that without it the whole Covenant was useless. It formed the chief factor in Senator Lodge's attack on the League. At different times it has been the subject of resolutions in the Assembly by the Canadian Delegation for its abolition, and, on the other hand, the wish to expand and elaborate it inspired successively the authors of the Réquin and Cecil draft treaties, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Individually it is by far the most important provision in an important document, for it declared for the first time that nations of the world who subscribed to the Covenant were prepared to refrain from the policy which had hitherto prompted their line of action, that of extending their frontier at the expense of their neighbours. It was inadequate, it is true, as witness the later attempts to strengthen it, but it was the initial movement away from the unilateral security as understood by pre-war politicians to the mutual security as desired by the framers of the Covenant.

The origin of Article 10 goes back as far as January 1916, when President Wilson had formulated a plan for the preservation of Pan-American Peace, based upon the general principles of security represented in the Articles of Confederation of the American Colonies after the War of Independence.² The first condition of this plan, therefore, was that "The United States

¹ Ray Stannard Baker, vol. i, p. 326.

² Article iii of the Articles of Confederation states that the Colonies "bind themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon, them," and that (Article iv, Section 4) "the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of Government and shall protect each of them against invasion." (See Baker, vol. i, p. 221.)

and all other nations of this hemisphere *mutually agree to guarantee the territorial integrity* of the countries of this hemisphere.”¹

Though this Pan-American peace plan never fructified, the idea of mutual guarantee remained in the President’s mind, and on January 8, 1918, in his famous “Fourteen Points” address to Congress, he included as a final item—

XIV. A general association of nations . . . for the purpose of affording *mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity* to great and small States alike.

In the three draft covenants drawn up by President Wilson during the Peace Conference the theory of mutual guarantee appears as Article III, and is linked with the principle of self-determination.

Article III.—The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may be in the judgment of three-fourths of the delegates demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to these peoples: and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. . . .²

In the Hurst-Miller draft, however, which was presented to the League of Nations Commission of the Conference on February 3, 1919, and was used as the basis for its subsequent discussions, the doctrine of security began to take on its final form, viz.:—

Article 7. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League.³

It is not known what influences were brought to bear upon the President to persuade him to agree to the deletion of the principle of self-determination from the article of guarantee,

¹ World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, vol. vi, No. 2, April 1916, *The New Pan-Americanism*, p. 110.

² Baker, vol. iii, pp. 89, 102, and 118.

³ Baker, vol. iii, p. 146.

but it is a matter for congratulation that the Covenant was freed from a phrase which undoubtedly would have made far more difficult its acceptance by the Conference.

It will also be noticed that the phrase "unite in guaranteeing" in Article III of the Wilson drafts became "undertake to respect and preserve" in Article 7 of the Hurst-Miller draft. "This modification," says Secretary Lansing, "was made in accordance with the wish of the British Empire representatives, in contradistinction to those who represented the British Dominions."¹

The Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, in plenary session adopted the draft Covenant as presented to them by the League of Nations Commission. In this document the article of guarantee appeared as Article 10, "Members of the League" being substituted for "High Contracting Parties," and "the Council" for "the Executive Council," in the same form as in the Treaties of Peace. This draft the President took back with him to the United States, and though he accepted, either in full or in part, six out of the seven amendments put forward by Mr. Hughes and representative Republicans, to their remaining amendment, that of the omission of the guarantee of Article 10, he steadfastly refused to agree.²

Such, then, briefly is the history of Article 10 of the Treaty of Versailles, and it forms the gage flung down by the new doctrine of mutual guarantee as represented by the Covenant of the League to the policy of security by devastation and encirclement as represented by the old diplomacy. In the following pages an attempt is made to trace the history of the struggle between these two ideals which ensued during the six years following the Peace Conference. The struggle has now terminated, it is hoped, not in a spectacular victory for either side, but in an amalgamation of the two points of view in the Locarno Agreement, which must necessarily be the precursor of a general scheme for Security, Disarmament, and Arbitration.

¹ Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations*, p. 84. Constable, 1921.

² Thomas H. Dickinson, *The United States and the League*, pp. 21-22. Dutton, New York, 1923.

II

FRENCH POLICY, 1920-1922

1. THE BELGIAN AND POLISH ALLIANCES.

As a result of the rejection by the United States Senate on March 19, 1920, of the Treaty of Versailles, and with it the Franco-American Treaty of Guarantee, and the intimation given by Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons in November and December 1919 that Great Britain would not be able to maintain alone the guarantee of the Rhine frontier, the French Government claimed the right to take such steps as it saw fit to effect its own security.

This decision entailed a return to the Programme of Security of November 1918,¹ and more especially those items which provided for the encircling of Germany by hostile States: the disarmament of Germany but not of the Allies, and an enforced form of reparations.

French attention was first turned to Belgium. By Article 31 of the Treaty of Versailles² it is recognised that the Treaty of 1839, which established and guaranteed a neutral Belgium, was formally abrogated and Belgium herself later rejected neutralisation as a future condition.³ Moreover, France had from the first insisted that for military and strategic reasons the Belgian frontier must be considered merely as a continua-

¹ See p. 36.

² Article 31 of the Treaty of Versailles reads as follows: "Germany, recognising that the treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the status of Belgium before the war, no longer conform to the requirements of the situation, consents to the abrogation of the said treaties and undertakes immediately to recognise and to observe whatever conventions may be entered into by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by any of them, in concert with the Governments of Belgium and of the Netherlands, to replace the said treaties of 1839. If her formal adhesion should be required to such conventions or to any of their stipulations, Germany undertakes to give it." Cp. Article 83 of the Treaty of St. Germain (Austria) and Article 67 of the Treaty of the Trianon (Hungary).

³ *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. ii, p. 190.

tion of the French, and had emphasised this in her original reply of March 17, 1919, to the Anglo-American offer of guarantee :—¹

It goes without saying that by act of aggression against France the French Government understands also any aggression against Belgium.

It would seem that the same intuitive sense which prompted M. Clemenceau to secure the inclusion of Article 429 in the Treaty, thereby providing for a possible prolongation of the occupation of the Rhine,² inspired him also to take, as almost the last act of his Ministry, further precautions against the non-ratification of the Anglo-American Treaties of Guarantee. On January 8, 1920, ten days before he resigned with his Cabinet, he directed Marshal Foch to prepare a plan for a military understanding with Belgium.³ In September of the same year it became known that a secret military agreement had been signed by Marshal Foch and Generals Buat and Maglinse, Chiefs of the French and Belgian General Staffs respectively, respecting common action in the event of German aggression.

An outcry was at once raised that the agreement had not been registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations in conformity with Article 18 of the Covenant,⁴ and this was no whit abated by the somewhat naive statement of the Quai d'Orsay that, as the agreement was in the form of a military understanding and dealt with the disposition of troops under certain conditions, it would lose its value if its terms were made public. Finally, however, the French and Belgian Governments, in November of the same year, agreed to register with the League an exchange of Notes between their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs giving notice of

¹ See p. 23.

² See p. 25.

³ Tardieu, p. 230.

⁴ Article 18 of the Covenant reads as follows: "Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered."

governmental approval of the detailed military understanding.¹

Having secured a preliminary measure of assistance on her western frontier, France turned her attention to Germany's eastern border and the welfare of the newly resurrected Poland. Throughout the Peace Conference France had fostered Polish claims and aspirations, and the feeling of good will towards a nation whose past history was so closely knit with her own.² At the same time she felt that a strong Poland was necessary as buffer State against Germany,³ just as Napoleon had considered it necessary to create the Grand Duchy of Warsaw between Russia and Prussia. Poland fully appreciated and reciprocated these sentiments, and a negative common interest was also found in the fact that Germany felt even more keenly the cession to Poland of the territories of Upper Silesia, Posen, and West Prussia with their large German minorities, than that of Alsace-Lorraine to France.⁴ This discovery of common interests was assiduously fostered by the publicists of both countries. Then in the summer of 1920 occurred the Polish-Russian War, when the capture of Warsaw by the Soviet troops was only avoided by General Weygand's military mission. Forthwith there sprang up a blood-brotherhood between the two countries and Poland came under French control. "*Les Polonais sont devenus Napoléonais*," said a wag, and the Polish Army became known as "the French Army on the Vistula."

By 1921 the most cordial relations existed between Paris and Warsaw, and M. Briand, on the occasion of Marshal Pilsudski's official visit to Paris (February 4th-6th), summoned the British, Italian, and Japanese Ambassadors to the Quai d'Orsay to acquaint them with the following joint Franco-Polish declaration:—

¹ For text of this correspondence see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. ii, p. 128. See also World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, vol. vi, No. 2, *Post-War Political Alignments*, pp. 98-100.

² Cp. *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, p. 238; Baker, vol. i, p. 396.

³ See Baker, vol. ii, pp. 13 and 60.

⁴ Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-1923, p. 272. British Institute of International Affairs.

The two Governments of France and Poland, equally solicitous to safeguard their safety and the peace of Europe, have recognised once more the community of interests which unites the two countries in friendship.

They have agreed to confirm their decision to co-ordinate their efforts, and with this object to maintain close contact for the defence of these higher interests.”¹

This constituted an Entente Cordial between the two countries, officially notified to the Principal Allied Powers, and France at once took advantage of it to despatch General Niessel to reorganise the Polish Army, the same task being simultaneously performed by General Mittelhauser for Czechoslovakia.

Exactly two weeks later, and on the eve of the definitive treaty of peace between Poland and Russia, this entente developed into an alliance on the lines of a political agreement. The preamble to this agreement described its objects as the maintenance of treaties to which both States were parties, “or which may in future be recognised by both parties.” The two States undertook to act in concert in international questions of common interest “in the spirit of the treaties and in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations” (Art. 1); they pledged themselves to economic solidarity and mutual support to be embodied in special agreements and in a commercial convention (Art. 2); in the event of unprovoked aggression against either party the two States were to “take concerted measures for the defence of their territory and the protection of their legitimate interests, within the limits specified in the preamble” (Art. 3); and they undertook to consult one another before concluding fresh agreements affecting their policy in Central and Eastern Europe (Art. 4). This agreement was not to come into force until after the signature of the commercial agreements, then in course of negotiation (Art. 5).²

The Franco-Polish Commercial Convention provided for in Article 2 was signed in Paris on February 6, 1922, and the

¹ See *Post-War Political Alignments*, p. 109.

² See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-1923, p. 273.

political agreement was therefore ratified by France on May 15th, and by Poland on May 30, 1922.¹

2. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

The new and really quite beautiful catchword that dominates this conference (wrote Mr. H. G. Wells from Washington on November 20, 1921) is "security." The word was produced originally, I believe, in France.²

By the end of 1921 the French Programme of Security was well launched, and its tenets were found quite incompatible with the main objects for which the Washington Conference was called—the limitation of naval and land armaments. The French attitude at Washington was uncompromisingly negative. "France proposed to scrap nothing. France does not know how to scrap. She learns nothing and forgets nothing. It is her supreme misfortune. . . . The French contribution to the Disarmament Conference is that France has not the slightest intention of disarming."³

Nor is this an overstatement of fact. On the third day of the Conference M. Briand, Prime Minister and first delegate of France, nullified any decisions which might have been made as to land armaments by the following sentences:—

Nothing could be more gratifying to my colleagues and to myself than to be able to stand before you and say, "We come prepared to make the greatest sacrifices; our country is safe; we lay down our arms, and, in so doing, we rejoice in helping to lay the foundations of a permanent peace." Unhappily we cannot do this. I say further: unhappily we have not the right to do this.⁴

M. Briand continued in a speech, supported by copious quotations from General Ludendorff's then recently published book, to draw a picture of an exhausted and war-weary France standing isolated against a still secretly armed Germany and an openly hostile Russia. "France," he declared, was

¹ For text of the Franco-Polish Alliance see Appendix A.

² *Washington and the Hope of Peace*, by H. G. Wells, p. 86. Collins, 1922.

³ Wells, p. 92.

⁴ Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Verbatim Report), p. 116. Government Printing Office, Washington.

"menaced on three coasts"; he and his colleagues had not the right, nor did they intend, to leave France defenceless. "France must, to all intents and purposes, protect herself." He concluded with the blunt statement that "in the existing circumstances France cannot possibly do anything but what she has actually done."¹

This speech, which Mr. Balfour later described as "a perfectly candid, perfectly lucid, perfectly unmistakable exposition," had the desired effect as far as France was concerned, for, though the question of limitation of land armaments remained on the agenda of the Conference, no further discussion of the subject was held.

Nor was this all. When the question of the submarine as war-vessel came before the Committee on the Limitation of Armament, it was made known through the French Naval delegates, M. Sarrant and Admiral le Bon, that

France cannot consent to accept either the abolition of submarines or a reduction of the total tonnage of submarines which it considers to be the irreducible minimum necessary to assure the safety of the territories for which it is responsible; or a limitation of the individual tonnage of submarines.²

Thus, as Mr. Balfour again pointed out to the Conference, they had been given to understand that "the danger to France in future was a danger that came to her from the land side, and the Conference had been told in terms of unforgettable eloquence that the danger was so great and pressed so much upon the consciences of public men and the sentiments of the French public that it was quite impossible for France to permit any diminution of land armaments. The decision thus announced had had a most serious effect upon the development of the work of the Conference called together to diminish armaments. This ideal had had to be abandoned; and the Conference found itself confined to naval disarmament alone. France, having thus put an end to all chance of even discussing

¹ Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Verbatim Report), p. 134. Government Printing Office, Washington.

² *Ibid.*, p. 488.

disarmament by land, had proceeded to develop her sea policy, and her sea policy embraced the creation of a vast submarine fleet.”¹

In face of the intransigent French attitude, however, the question of the abolition of submarines had to be dropped, and the Conference had to content itself with a treaty regulating the activities of these vessels in time of war.²

These events, coupled with the Belgian and Polish alliances already referred to, and with the fact that in view of a partial German default in reparation payments M. Briand had at the Conference of London (February 21st to March 14, 1921) insisted on the occupation of the towns on the threshold of the Ruhr Basin by way of sanction, are illustrative of the abnormal political psychology of France during the two years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. At Washington this state of mind was so marked that it became the direct cause of the reopening of the question of an Anglo-French pact at the close of 1921.

¹ Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Verbatim Report), p. 540. Government Printing Office, Washington.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1605-1611.

III

SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS, 1922-1923

1. THE CANNES PACT.

THE uncompromising attitude of France at the Washington Conference had its inevitable reaction in Great Britain, where it produced a state of mind frankly suspicious and bordering upon hostility. The French stand against the abolition of submarines was interpreted as a veiled threat to British sea-power, and it became increasingly clear to M. Briand at the Quai d'Orsay that some gesture was necessary to dispel this impression by reopening negotiations for an Anglo-French Security Pact.¹

The Comte de Saint-Aulaire, French Ambassador in London, was instructed to prepare the ground by taking up the matter unofficially with Lord Curzon.² The Ambassador, therefore, on December 5, 1921, called on the British Foreign Secretary and outlined to him, as from himself and on his own responsibility, suggestions for a definite political alliance between the two countries.³

M. de Saint-Aulaire made it quite clear that he did not envisage a revival of the Guarantee Treaties of 1919, the formula of which was unacceptable and even humiliating to France, because it was unilateral and contemplated rendering France an "assistance" which it was beneath her dignity to accept.⁴ It was considered useless also, because it was said that Germany would also be able to cloak the issues of any

¹ British Blue Book, p. 112, footnote; French Yellow Book, No. 46, p. 251 (M. Briand's speech in the Chambre des Députés on November 23, 1923).

² French Yellow Book, No. 17, p. 90.

³ For the official reports of this conversation see British Blue Book No. 32, p. 108 (letter from Lord Curzon to Lord Hardinge, British Ambassador in Paris), and French Yellow Book, No. 18, p. 90 (Report from the Comte de Saint-Aulaire to M. Briand).

⁴ Compare this with M. Tardieu's description of the Guarantee Treaties, p. 208.

future struggle, and dangerous because it might lead France to be lulled into a sense of false security and thereby to reduce her armaments. Altogether its repetition was quite unacceptable to the French Government and people alike.

What the Ambassador had in mind was a reciprocal undertaking which must necessarily take effect in the event of *indirect* as well as *direct* German aggression, for it was considered very improbable that the contingency of *direct* aggression would arise.

Unless Germany is smitten with incurable lunacy (M. de Saint-Aulaire pointed out) she will not repeat the mistake of 1914 after the lesson of the last war. Her game will be more skilful and incomparably more formidable. She will recollect the Ems Telegram and make every effort to invest the origins of the conflict with a dubious character, or rather she will seek inspiration from the methods employed by Bismarck in 1866, throw herself upon her weakest adversary, and, following the line of least resistance, invade Poland as she did in 1772. No doubt France would not tolerate that and would take up arms to defend Poland and the European equilibrium of the Rhine. But France would be isolated, since an Anglo-French defensive alliance, limited *ex hypothesi* to the contingency of *direct* aggression, would not apply to the far more probable hypothesis of *indirect* aggression. We may say, then, that such an alliance, at the best, would cover us, if not against another Charleroi, at least against another Sedan, but it would not cover us against a Polish Sadowa, which for Germany would be the best preparation for another Sedan.

This passage, quoted from M. de Saint-Aulaire's report,¹ though ostensibly a mere personal opinion, conveyed very forcibly, as Professor Toynbee indicates, a consideration which was destined to govern the policy of France in the subsequent negotiations on this subject with Great Britain. It was the first move in the diplomatic game which lasted for the next three years, in which Great Britain consistently and successfully sought to evade any obligations (outside those incurred by her membership in the League of Nations) as to the maintenance of Poland's Western frontier.

Lord Curzon, in reply, said that, although there was a strong feeling of friendship for France in Great Britain, this

¹ French Yellow Book, p. 92. The English translation appears in Professor Arnold Toynbee's *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, p. 7.

had received something of a shock from recent French policy (i.e. at Washington) and the sometimes bitter and censorious tone of the French Press towards this country. Moreover, the foreign policy of Great Britain must be that of the British Empire as a whole, and before any such serious obligation could be undertaken the opinion of the Dominions would have to be seriously considered. No country, he declared, could be expected, even for so great an object as the peace of the world, to enter into an alliance the advantages of which in its view did not exceed the risks. Many persons and many points of view would have to be taken into consideration, and he could not go further in the matter until he had heard definitely from M. de Saint-Auliare that the project had sufficient official backing from the French Government to make such a consultation worth while.

These preliminary conversations concluded, M. Briand took advantage of his visit to London, for the meeting of the Supreme Council of December 18th-22nd, to broach the subject personally to Mr. Lloyd George.¹ The French Premier outlined an Anglo-French alliance on a very broad scale, in which the two Powers would guarantee each other's interests in all parts of the world, act closely together in all respects, and go to each other's assistance whenever their interests were threatened. Such an alliance, he urged, would form the basis in Europe of a group of alliances capable of giving the League of Nations that physical force which it now lacked. Even Germany, with certain reservations and guarantees, might be a party to such an agreement.

This was a very different tone to that adopted by M. Briand at Washington, but Mr. Lloyd George did not hesitate to tell him that—

English public opinion was hardly prepared at the present moment to contemplate such an extensive alliance, but there would be a majority in Parliament and in the country for a plain guarantee to France against invasion, although in point of fact the guarantee would be opposed by a greater minority to-day than two years ago.

¹ British Blue Book, No. 32, p. 112.

M. Briand, however, had contemplated something which went beyond the two countries, and the British Premier had no choice but to tell him that the British people were not very much interested in what happened on the Eastern frontier of Germany. They would not be ready to be involved in quarrels which might arise regarding Poland, or Danzig, or Upper Silesia. On the contrary, there was a general reluctance to get mixed up in these questions in any way. It was finally decided, however, that the two statesmen should meet at Cannes, and continue their discussion a day or two before the meeting of the Supreme Council scheduled for January 6, 1922.

Accordingly, at Cannes on January 4th Mr. Lloyd George handed M. Briand a Memorandum which embraced the British view of the case.¹ In this he said that Great Britain entirely appreciated the French causes of anxiety, but that complete frankness was essential in the subsequent negotiations. He then made it quite clear that, though Great Britain desired to do all that was possible to assist her Ally, she could not only consider France's security and reparations to the detriment of the progress of European economic reconstruction. In order to give satisfaction to French needs the British Government must first be able to tell the British people that the two countries were marching together to restore the economic structure of Europe and the general prosperity of the world.

In other words, no British guarantee would be given unless France abated her reparations claims and brought her policy on this subject more into line with that of her Ally.

Mr. Lloyd George then went to the extent of saying that, in the event of unprovoked German aggression against French soil, "the British people will place their forces at her side"—without making any stipulation as to similar agreement with the United States. He further agreed that such an undertaking should be reciprocal; but there his approval of M. Briand's London proposals ceased. "There are two ways," he said, "by which this mutual undertaking could be given.

¹ British Blue Book, No. 34, p. 114; French Yellow Book, No. 20, p. 94.

The first is by means of an offensive and defensive alliance . . . the second alternative is a definite guarantee that the British Empire and France should stand together in the event of an unprovoked aggression by Germany against French soil." He then proceeded to point out that the latter was the only one which was acceptable to the British people, who "understand the claims of France to be guaranteed against invasion of her own soil, but would not willingly be committed to military liabilities for breaches of the peace elsewhere." On the other hand, a treaty of guarantee had been favourably discussed by the Imperial Conference in the previous year, and thus might be expected to have the additional weight of the approval of the Dominions as well as of Great Britain.

M. Briand, in his reply of January 8th,¹ accepted in the main the proposals of Mr. Lloyd George, but had certain amendments to make. The guarantee, he stipulated, must be bi-lateral, and any violation by Germany of Articles 42-44 of the Treaty of Versailles,² or of the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of the same Treaty,³ must be expressly declared "to constitute in the eyes of the British Government a case of direct aggression against the security of France, on the same footing as aggression against French soil in the literal sense." Further, the French demanded that the Treaty of Guarantee must be supplemented by an entente between the two General Staffs on the same lines as that already existing between France and Belgium.

There was one final proposal—namely, that the Governments "ought to agree to concert together on any questions in conformity with justice." This was an attempt to reopen the question of safeguarding the Eastern and Central European satellites of France, and here Professor Toynbee makes an important point.⁴ In insisting on these points M. Briand was speaking not so much for himself but for the French people and the French Chamber, where even at that moment

¹ British Blue Book, No. 35, p. 121; French Yellow Book, No. 21, p. 107.

² See p. 25.

³ See pp. 31-33.

⁴ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, pp. 10-11.

his fall was being encompassed in the belief that he was committing France to a pact which would entail her desertion of her smaller Allies.

On January 12th, then, a draft treaty was agreed upon by the French and British Premiers.¹ It opened with a preamble, in which, after some introductory idealism, Articles 42-44 of the Treaty of Versailles were quoted. Thereafter it went farther than the Triple Pact of 1919, and explained that, whereas these articles "may not sufficiently provide for the defence of the essential common interests of the High Contracting Parties and the maintenance of the peace of Western Europe," the following provisions were made :—

Article 1.

In the event of a direct and unprovoked aggression against the soil of France by Germany, Great Britain will immediately place herself at the side of France with her naval, military, and air forces.

Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties reassert their common interest in Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, and will consult together should any breach of them be threatened, or any doubt arise as to their interpretation.

Article 3.

The High Contracting Parties undertake further to concert together in the event of any military, naval, or air measures inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles being taken by Germany.

Article 4.

The present treaty shall impose no obligations upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Dominion concerned.

Article 5.

This treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years, and shall, if approved by both parties, be renewable at the end of that period.

CANNES, January 12, 1922.²

On the afternoon of the same day M. Briand left for Paris, after the receipt of a personal telegram from President

¹ British Blue Book, No. 38, p. 127: French Yellow Book, No. 22, p. 110.

² For full text of Preamble and Treaty, see Appendix A.

Millerand, with the draft treaty in his pocket, to meet a hostile Chamber, which had already put forward two votes of censure in his absence. Next morning he met his Cabinet, and in the afternoon the Chamber, when he resigned, leaving the question of an Anglo-French pact still unsettled.¹ On January 13th President Millerand charged M. Poincaré with the task of forming a Ministry.

2. THE POINCARÉ DRAFT TREATY.

The Cannes Conference, during the final sessions of which, on account of the political crisis, France, like the United States, was represented by an observer instead of a delegation, concluded on January 13th, and on the following day Mr. Lloyd George visited M. Poincaré in Paris. In the course of their conversation² the French Prime Minister explained that in his view there were three grave objections to the Cannes draft :—

1. The plan should be reciprocal and should contemplate equally the possibility of France aiding Great Britain in the event of an attack upon her by Germany.
2. The necessity of completing the treaty by a military agreement.
3. The objection to a ten years' limit, which would result in the treaty expiring just at the moment when it was most needed.

Mr. Lloyd George showed no enthusiasm over these amendments, but M. Poincaré pressed his point, and on January 23rd sent a draft treaty, embodying his own theories, to the French Ambassador, who, three days later, communicated it to Lord Curzon.³

The principal alterations from the Cannes draft were as follows :—

Article I became reciprocal and provided for assistance in the event of an attack on "France" instead of "French soil."

Article II was extended and slightly strengthened in providing

¹ *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23*, pp. 23-24; British Blue Book, Nos. 36-37, p. 126.

² French Yellow Book, No. 23, p. 113.

³ British Blue Book, No. 39, p. 130; French Yellow Book, p. 122.

a special *casus belli* for the Contracting Powers in a violation by Germany of Articles 42-44 of the Treaty.

Article III was a new article interpolated in the treaty and provided for a close co-operation between the General Staffs of the two Allied Armies.

Articles IV and V corresponded to Articles 3 and 4 of the Cannes draft.

Article VI extended the duration of the treaty from ten to thirty years.¹

This treaty was on January 26th (the day of its communication) the subject of a conversation between Lord Curzon and the Comte de Saint-Aulaire,² which ended in an almost complete cleavage of opinion. The British Government raised no great objections to the provision for reciprocity, and were prepared for an extension of duration to fifteen, but not twenty or thirty years. They were, however, utterly opposed to the supplementing of the treaty by a military entente or convention, and to the French interpretation of Article 4 (Article 3 of the Cannes draft) as a possible means of assistance to France's Eastern European Allies.

Thereafter the life went out of the negotiations, which were carried on in a desultory manner. M. Poincaré, in a brilliant Memorandum, reiterated his case on January 29th,³ on which Lord Curzon prepared a commentary for the British Cabinet on February 17th.⁴ But the fact that the Comte de Saint-Aulaire, writing on the same date to M. Poincaré, conveyed the impression, received from his conversations with Lord Curzon during the previous week, that "*le Gouvernement britannique n'apporte aucun empressement à aboutir*"⁵ is evidence that negotiations were not progressing with that enthusiasm necessary to success. It is significant, also, that M. Poincaré, in his despatch to his Ambassador in London on the subject of his conversations with Mr. Lloyd George at Boulogne on March 4th, states that when interrogated on the past negotia-

¹ For full text of the Poincaré draft treaty, see Appendix A.

² British Blue Book, No. 40, p. 131; French Yellow Book, No. 24, p. 124.

³ British Blue Book, No. 41, p. 41; French Yellow Book, No. 25, p. 127.

⁴ British Blue Book, No. 44, p. 154.

⁵ French Yellow Book, No. 27, p. 136.

tions he had replied that he would miss his train if he engaged upon that subject.¹

The French Government did, however, press for a definite answer to its Memorandum of January 29th, but on the two occasions on which he tried to elicit this M. de Saint-Aulaire received only evasive answers, from Lord Curzon in March,² and from Lord Balfour in May.³ By this time, too, the divergence between the French and British reparations policies made it impossible to reach agreement on any other item. The negotiations, which dragged along half-heartedly for a further eight or ten weeks, finally lapsed in July 1922.⁴

3. THE CUNO OFFER.

In August 1922 the Reparations Committee declared Germany to have defaulted in her reparations payments, and in the following November Germany herself demanded a moratorium. Inter-Allied Conferences were held in London (December 9-11, 1922) and Paris (January 2-4, 1923) to consider what steps should be taken in the matter.

It was at the second of these Conferences, on January 2nd, that M. Poincaré made known the details of an offer of a non-aggressive pact which had been made by Germany, *via* the United States, and to which the German Chancellor, Dr. Cuno, had made reference in his Hamburg speech of December 31, 1922.⁵

On December 18th, Mr. Hughes, United States Secretary of State, informed the French Ambassador in Washington, M. Jules Jusserand, that he had received from the German

¹ French Yellow Book, No. 30, p. 137.

² British Blue Book, No. 45, p. 163; French Yellow Book, No. 31, p. 139.

³ British Blue Book, No. 46, p. 164; French Yellow Book, No. 34, p. 144.

⁴ British Blue Book, Nos. 47-50, pp. 165-168; French Yellow Book, Nos. 35-39, pp. 145-149.

⁵ British Blue Book, Miscellaneous, No. 3, 1923, *Inter-Allied Conferences on Reparations and Inter-Allied Debts*, Cmd. 1812, pp. 68-71; French Yellow Book, *Documents diplomatiques, Demande de Moratorium du Gouvernement allemand à la Commission des Réparations* (Nov. 14, 1922), *Conférence de Londres* (Déc. 9-11, 1922), *Conférence de Paris* (Jan. 2-4, 1923), pp. 76-77; World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, vol. vi, 1923, *Post-War Political Alignments*, pp. 106-107.

Ambassador, Herr Wiedfeldt, an offer, emanating from the German Government, for the conclusion of an agreement, under the terms of which Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy should pledge themselves not to make war against one another for a stated time without the matter being decided by a popular vote. Mr. Hughes suggested that if, having communicated with Paris, M. Jusserand desired him to do so, he would ask Herr Wiedfeldt to put the German offer in writing.

M. Poincaré, on receipt of M. Jusserand's despatch, at once characterised the offer as a clever manœuvre on the part of the German Government on the eve of an important financial conference. At a subsequent conversation with Mr. Hughes, however, the Secretary of State handed M. Jusserand the text of the German offer which had just been communicated to him by Herr Wiedfeldt. It was as follows :—

The German, British, French, and Italian Governments solemnly engage themselves toward one another and promise the United States not to make war among themselves for a generation (say for thirty years), unless the matter is decided by popular vote, which should make war virtually impossible.¹

This formal offer did nothing to dispel M. Poincaré's opinion that the whole manœuvre was merely political. His reasons, as expressed to M. Jusserand, were identical on each occasion :—

If the German Government wished to get rid of war it might be asked why had it limited the promise of peace to thirty years ? Even in less time than thirty years German propaganda might unhappily develop such desire for revenge that when the time came the popular vote in Germany might be in favour of aggression against France. The French Constitution gave the representatives of the nation full powers over peace and war, and this right could not be withdrawn without a revision of the Constitution. Moreover, the French Parliament would never take the initiative in any war. Further, M. Poincaré had stated that he thought he knew that in England the Constitution equally debars a like procedure. He did not know if it was otherwise.

¹ For German text see German White Book, *Materialien zur Sicherheitsfrage*, i, 1925, No. 4, p. 10.

in Italy. For the German promise to have any value it would have to be guaranteed by positive engagements on the part of England and the United States, engagements supported by agreements assuring to France within a determined period an arranged military defensive co-operation.

The Treaty of Versailles, he had pointed out, contained already in Article 10 a formal undertaking of non-aggression which bound France. As soon as Germany was admitted to the League of Nations she would have the benefit and the burdens of that article. The proposed pact would then be superfluous and would even have the defect of appearing to diminish the engagements under Article 10, which was not limited to thirty years, and which no popular consultation could destroy. At this moment, from all the evidence, Germany wanted to throw doubt on the sanctions which, sooner or later, the Allies would be called on to take if she violated her engagements, and which are foreseen by several dispositions of the Treaty of Versailles, and notably by paragraph 18, of Annex II of Part VIII. France could not fall into that net. Besides, Mr. Hughes had not held out the least possibility of an Anglo-American guarantee. But even an Anglo-American pact of guarantee duly ratified by the Federal Senate, and assuring to France within a determined period an arranged military defensive, would not suffice entirely to relieve France of anxiety.

Up to this moment the negotiations had been carried on between the Foreign Offices, but on the last day of 1922 Dr. Cuno made reference to them in his Hamburg speech, from which the Press of the world gave the following extract :—

To prove to France that we have no bellicose ideas and that she can evacuate without fear the left bank of the Rhine, we have made known to the French Government, through the intermediary of a third Power, that Germany was ready, in common with France and the other Powers having interests on the Rhine, to put in the hands of a third Power, not having interests on the Rhine, a solemn engagement by which these States would engage themselves during a generation not to make war without being authorised to this by a plebiscite. France had rejected the offer.

The curtain was finally rung down on what has come to be known as the Cuno Offer, by a statement issued by Mr. Hughes from the Department of State on January 2, 1923, to the effect that, "in the view of the United States Government, it had been deemed inadvisable to transmit the proposal to

the Governments named unless it appeared that it would be favourably considered by the French Government."

On January 11th French and Belgian troops entered the Ruhr.

4. LORD CURZON'S SUGGESTION, JULY 1923.

One further effort was made to reopen the negotiations for security before the French and British policies finally split over the occupation of the Ruhr. Lord Curzon, on July 20, 1923, in a Note to the French and Belgian Governments in the course of the abortive attempts to find some concerted policy among the four Governments concerned with regard to reparations, concluded with the statement that "H.M. Government . . . have already indicated their readiness to enter into sympathetic consideration of the subject (of security) whenever it may be thought desirable."¹

This tentative suggestion was received coldly by M. Poincaré, who abruptly dismissed it in his reply of July 30th with the words:—

It has no bearing on the occupation of the Ruhr, and it seems preferable that these two problems should be considered separately.²

The Belgian Government, on the other hand, in their reply of the same date as the French, declared that they welcomed the sympathetic attitude of Great Britain towards the problem of security, and added that—

Belgium, by reason of her particularly exposed geographical position, attaches the greatest importance thereto and thanks the British Government for their declaration. The Belgian Government will address a communication on this question at a later date.³

¹ British White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 5, 1923, *Correspondence with the Allied Governments respecting Reparation Payments by Germany*, Cmd. 1943, No. 6, p. 38; Belgian Grey Book, *Documents diplomatiques relatifs aux Réparations*, 1923, No. 40, p. 49; French Yellow Book, *Documents relatifs aux Notes allemandes des 2 mai et 5 juin sur les Réparations*, No. 34, p. 67.

² White Paper, No. 6, p. 38; Yellow Book, No. 35, p. 82.

³ White Paper, No. 7, p. 46; Grey Book, No. 43, p. 56; Yellow Book, No. 35, p. 85.

All hopes, however, which might have been raised by this reply were doomed to destruction, for the promised communication never arrived.

Both these replies were considered highly unfavourable by Lord Curzon, the French particularly so, since it brushed aside the suggestion with the least modicum of courtesy. Lord Curzon, therefore, in his Memorandum handed to the French and Belgian Ambassadors on August 11th, informed them that, since there was no connection between the problem of security and the occupation of the Ruhr, the whole question of a pact must be considered to have lapsed together with the similar project of a guarantee of Belgian territory.¹ In its note of reply, dated August 20, 1923, the French Government professed itself as having been completely misunderstood by Lord Curzon, and declared that France was ready to discuss security provided that the agreement should be "synallagmatic," and should have efficient military guarantees. But, it was added, guarantees, even if efficient, must not be allowed to rob France of all or part of her rights to reparation.²

Since this involved the very provisions to which the British Government had so strongly objected, no further movement was made by the Foreign Office.

5. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CUNO OFFER.

To return to the ill-fated offer of Dr. Cuno. Though this event was in itself unsuccessful, it undoubtedly marked the end of one period and the beginning of a new. From this point (with the exception of the equally abortive efforts of Lord Curzon) two definite changes appear in the attempts to find a plan for security:—

1. The nature of such plan became *general* instead of *special*. That is to say, from negotiations between two States it became a matter for general international interest. This principle is the foundation of

¹ White Paper, No. 10, p. 59; Grey Book, No. 53, p. 66.

² French Yellow Book, *Réponse du Gouvernement français à la lettre du Gouvernement britannique du 11 août, 1923, sur les Réparations.* (Published in French and English.) French edition, see p. 47: English edition, see p. 44.

the "security" activities of the League of Nations (i.e. the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol).

2. Whereas, hitherto, any agreement had had a very definite object of the protection of France *against* Germany, it now became a question of protecting any State against possible aggression by any other State.

It is in this latter case that the Cuno Offer is particularly important, for in the special case of the Rhineland it ushered in a new train of thought which had its reaction, swiftly in Great Britain, though more slowly in France, in the conviction that no good cause could be served by a unilateral agreement, and that any treaty entered into must of necessity include Germany.

This was a reversion to the view which Mr. H. G. Wells had advocated two years before at Washington :—

The only security for a modern State (he wrote in November 1921 at the darkest moment of the Conference) is a *binding and mutually satisfactory* alliance with the Power or Powers that might otherwise attack. The only real security for France against a German revenge is a generous and complete understanding between the French and German Republics so that they will have a mutual interest in each other's prosperity. . . . Other Powers may come into such a treaty as guarantors, but the essential thing for peace between France and Germany is peace made good and clear between them, a cessation of mutual injuries and hostile preparations.¹

This, in effect, was the spirit of the Cuno Offer, and ultimately became the spirit of Locarno ; for the German Government, in its first tentative move of February 9, 1925, turned for the basis of its proposals to "an idea cognate to that from which the proposal made in December 1922 by Dr. Cuno sprang."²

Thus, though in itself unsuccessful in its own time, the Cuno Offer became the forerunner of something far greater and of wider scope than itself—the Locarno Agreements ; and as such it deserves possibly a more conspicuous place in the history of "security" than modern historians have assigned to it.

¹ Wells, *Washington and the Hope of Peace*, pp. 88-89.

² British White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 7, 1925, *Papers respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security made by the German Government on February 9, 1925*, Cmd. 2435, p. 4.

IV

FRENCH POLICY, 1923-1924

1. THE RUHR AND THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT.

JUST as the failure of the Triple Pact of Guarantee had its reaction in a reversion of the French Government to its original Programme of Security, so the failure of the Anglo-French security negotiations of 1922-1923 resulted for the time being in a policy of retrogression.

Though M. Poincaré had officially declared that the French Ruhr policy had no connection with security, this cannot be taken at anything more than its face value. It is true that no official connection was made between the two policies by the Quai d'Orsay, but the fact remains that in invading the Ruhr the French were enforcing the policy of reparations which had figured so largely in their own policy of security; Besides this, in occupying one of the industrial areas remaining to Germany under the Peace Treaty, France was materially retarding the economic recovery of that country and consequently her return to power as an economic rival. And this, too, was included in the French security policy.

But though their action regarding reparations was important, it did not mark so great a retrogression as did the French policy with regard to the Separatist movement in the Rhineland. This in effect was a direct return to their original suggestion of 1917 that the Rhineland provinces should be separated and governed autonomously from Germany—a policy which it was thought they had formally abjured during the Peace Conference.

This evidently had not been the case, for during the actual proceedings of the Conference, General Mangin, commanding the French Army, on May 22, 1919, sent a colonel of his Staff to General Liggett, commanding the American forces at

Coblentz, to enquire what the American attitude would be towards a political revolution on the west bank of the Rhine for the establishment of an independent Rhineland Republic free from Germany. The Staff officer further stated that fifty French deputies were ready to enter the American Zone to assist the Separatists in starting their rebellion. General Liggett refused to consider the proposition, and reported the matter to General Pershing, G.O.C. American Army, who in turn referred it to President Wilson.¹

The matter was then brought before the Supreme Council, and M. Clemenceau despatched his Under-Secretary of State, M. Jennennez, to investigate on the spot. As a result of M. Jennennez' report, which included the words

I had the impression at Mayenz that General Mangin had more frequent dealings with the promoters of the Separatist movement than were proper, and in which a sort of collaboration could be seen,

M. Clemenceau addressed a letter to General Mangin on June 1st, recalling to him the "strict observation of the complete neutrality in everything which has to do with purely political affairs in the occupied territories," and asking him "to refrain from all interferences with Allied generals outside of such cases as are provided for by military regulations."

This letter, as Mr. Baker points out, contained no serious censure of General Mangin, much less any repudiation of the project for evading France's agreement in the Peace Conference to drop the idea of an independent Rhineland. Indeed, no secrecy was made of the concurrence of the French Government in Mangin's sympathy with the movement of revolt; he was only reproved for having compromised his military position and so having really injured the cause.²

Thus ended the first covert attempt of the French to inspire an independent Rhineland, but care was taken to maintain close contact with the Separatist leaders, Dr. Dorten,

¹ Baker, vol. ii, p. 87. See reproduction of Letter from General Pershing to the President.

² Baker, vol. ii, pp. 91-92.

Herr Matthes, and others. With the entry of Franco-Belgian troops into the Ruhr, however, the whole question was reopened, and this time it was impossible for the most biased observer to overlook French complicity. For though M. Poincaré in his Note of November 6, 1923, to the German Government, declared that the French Government "*s'est tenu complètement à l'écart des préparatifs qui ont abouti au déclenchement de l'action séparatiste et qu'il a été et devenue étranger aux événements qui se sont produits depuis lors dans la Province Rhenan, de même il ne saurait assumer aucune responsabilité à l'occasion des initiatives librement prises par la population palatine, ces deux mouvements n'ayant d'ailleurs aucun caractère commun,*"¹ his declaration was not borne out by the facts of the case.

From the first, the Separatists received the tacit consent, and—in a number of cases—the open assistance of, the French military and civilian authorities.² Bands of Separatists, who, in flat contradiction of an ordinance of the Inter-Allied Rhine-land High Commission, were allowed to camp, were transported to their points of attack by special trains run by the Franco-Belgian Railway *Régie*. The German police were in many cases disarmed, and were actually placed under arrest in order to prevent their interfering with the seizing of buildings by the Separatists, who received free railway passes and rations from French military stores. In every way, directly or indirectly, help was gladly given by the French authorities with the unofficial consent of the Government.

Perhaps the worst feature of the disgraceful episode was the fact that the troops mainly used for support were those drawn from the French Colonial Army—a parallel for which, as Professor Toynbee indicates, can only be found in the worst days of the Reconstruction period which followed the

¹ German White Book, *Notenwechsel zwischen der Deutschen und der Französischen Regierung über die Separatistischen Umrübe in den besetzten Gebieten* (No. 1, 1924), No. 6, p. 17.

² For sworn official evidence on this point see *Documentary Evidence of the Assistance given by the French Military and Civilian Authorities to the Separatists in the Palatinate*, published in 3 vols. at Heidelberg.

American Civil War of 1861-1865.¹ Here the seceding States were refused readmission to the Union, and were instead turned into Military Districts (the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Washington and John Marshall, became Military District No. 1). The newly emancipated negroes were enfranchised, and the former slave-owners lost the right to vote.

Two so-called Governments were set up in the occupied territory, the "Rhineland Republic," proclaimed on October 21st at Aachen in the Belgian Zone, and the "Autonomous Government of the Palatinate" on November 11, 1923, at Speyer in the French Zone; this latter was officially "recognised" by the French on December 22nd, and by the Rhineland High Commissioner (against the vote of the British representative) on January 2, 1924.

On the evidence of Mr. Clive, the British Consul-General for Bavaria and the Palatinate, sent to report on the situation by the British Government, there was overwhelming testimony to the fact that the majority of the people were opposed to the Autonomous Government, and that the Government would immediately collapse if French support were withdrawn.² The force of this statement appeared already to have been proved by the assassination of the "President of the Autonomous Government," Herr Heinz, at Speyer on January 6, 1924, and the British Government, on the strength of Mr. Clive's report, proposed that the whole matter should be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. To this the French would not agree, but were ready that it should be dealt with by the Conference of Ambassadors. But this was not agreeable to the British, and M. Poincaré, at the instigation of the Belgian Government, and himself sensing that he had attempted a greater task than he had power to accomplish,

¹ Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, p. 303. This book of Professor Toynbee's, in Part II, B, Section (iii), contains the best and most comprehensive account of the Separatist movement from 1923-1924. Copious references are made to official documents, and the evidence is carefully sifted.

² Telegram read to the House of Commons by Mr. Ronald MacNeill, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on January 21, 1924.

began gradually to withdraw the unofficial support of the Separatists. The result of this move entirely vindicated Mr. Clive's opinion, for by the end of July 1924 not a Separatist remained on the scene.

So ended the second attempt of the French Government, by means of unofficial support, to bring about an insurrection in the Rhineland.

2. THE CZECHOSLOVAK ALLIANCE AND THE BALKAN MUNITION CREDITS.

One of the principal items in the French Security Programme of 1923-1924 was a return to her Policy of Encirclement, conceived in November 1918, and put into operation during 1920-1921, by the Belgian and Polish Alliances. The furtherance of this policy took the form of cementing French contact with the States of the Little Entente.

The first step was taken during the spring and summer of 1923, when the Chamber of Deputies voted the proposals of M. Poincaré's Government to grant credits of 400,000,000 francs to Poland, 300,000,000 francs to Yugoslavia, and 100,000,000 francs to Rumania for the purpose of purchasing from France munitions and other military equipment.¹ This was the setting of the stage for the conclusion by France of a series of treaties with the three States composing the Little Entente.

In October 1923 a State visit was paid to the French capital by the President of Czechoslovakia, M. Masaryk, and his indefatigable and astute Foreign Minister, M. Benès. In the course of conversations with M. Poincaré the terms of a Franco-Czech treaty of alliance were outlined, and it would seem that M. Benès undertook to persuade his two partners in the Little Entente to conclude a Franco-Yugoslav and a Franco-Rumanian Alliance respectively. This was to be accomplished at the Belgrade Conference of the three States on January 10-12, 1924.

¹ The votes were made to Poland on February 15, 1923, to Rumania on May 29th, and to Yugoslavia on July 12th.

But before the date of this meeting a complication arose. On December 17, 1923, the French Senate voted the munition credits to Poland and Yugoslavia, but refused them to Rumania. At the same time an outcry arose among the creditor States of France and her satellites that the granting of large sums by the former to the latter was not justified until the whole question of Allied debts had been satisfactorily settled. The British Government, in the first week of January, 1924, addressed an identic Note to the diplomatic representatives in London of Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia enquiring whether these new credits or the war debts already due to Great Britain were to take priority over the revenues upon which both obligations were secured.¹

So it came about that this Note and not M. Benès' proposals for alliances with France figured on the agenda for the Belgrade Conference of January 10-12, 1924, with the result that the credits were refused by Rumania on January 22nd and accepted by Yugoslavia on January 28th. But neither of these States felt inclined at that moment to conclude alliances with France.²

The Franco-Czech Alliance, however, went forward, and was formally signed on January 24, 1924, though its ratification was delayed until March 4th. The treaty itself conformed to the type which formed the foundation of the Little Entente. It consisted of a preamble and eight articles. The preamble stated that the object of the two Parties was "to ensure respect for the international, juridical, and political order established by the treaties which they had signed in common." Articles 1 and 2 bound them to consult one another on questions of foreign policy involving a danger to their security or to treaties signed in common, and to come to an agreement as to measures to be taken to safeguard their common interests

¹ *The Times*, January 8, 1924.

² It was not till March 1926 that France was able to secure alliances with either of these two States. Then, during the attempt of Italy to oust France from her place as protector of the Little Entente, M. Briand was able to negotiate treaties on the model of those already concluded with Poland and Czechoslovakia, first with Yugoslavia, and finally, with the advent to power of the Averescu Government in June 1926, with Rumania.

in the event of their being menaced. There was to be consultation between the two Parties as to "measures to be taken" in case of attempts to bring about the *Anschluss* of Austria to the German Reich (Art. 3), or to restore the Hapsburgs in Hungary or the Hohenzollerns in Germany (Arts. 4 and 5). Disputes arising between them were to be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to Arbitration (Art. 6), and before entering into any other agreements with third parties affecting their policy in Central Europe, they were to inform one another (Art. 7). Art. 8 contained the usual provisions for the deposit of ratifications.¹

With this treaty France had to satisfy herself for the time, and from this moment the question of security passes as a question of practical politics into the sphere of the League of Nations, where it had already been debated since 1922. It may, however, be said that the successful handling of the Reparations problem by the Dawes Committee, and the adoption of its plan by the London Conference of August 1924, with the resultant evacuation of the Ruhr by French and Belgian forces, unquestionably did much to better the feeling between France and Germany. In their turn these improved relations brought the problem of security immeasurably nearer to solution by paving the way for the German offer of February 1925.

¹ For text of the Franco-Czech Treaty, see Appendix A. The best authority to be consulted on the question of French relations with the Little Entente States in 1923-1924 is *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, by Professor Arnold Toynbee, Part II, B, pp. 440-457.

ANNEX TO PART I
AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

I. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

1. BRITISH.

(a) *Blue Books.*

Papers respecting negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact (France No. 1, 1924), Cmd. 2169. Inter-Allied Conferences on Reparations and Inter-Allied Debts (Miscellaneous, No. 3, 1923), Cmd. 1812.

(b) *White Papers.*

Collective Note of the Allied Powers presented to the German Government on June 4, 1925, in regard to the fulfilment of the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles with regard to Disarmament. Cmd. 2429.

Correspondence between the Ambassadors' Conference and the German Ambassador in Paris respecting German disarmament, evacuation of the Cologne Zone, and modifications of the Rhineland Regime, Paris. October-November, 1925 (Miscellaneous, No. 12, 1925), Cmd. 2527.

Correspondence with the Allied Governments respecting Reparations Payments by Germany (Miscellaneous, No. 5, 1923), Cmd. 1943.

Papers respecting the Proposals for a Pact of Security made by the German Government on February 9, 1925 (Miscellaneous, No. 7, 1925), Cmd. 2435.

2. FRENCH.

Yellow Books.

Documents relatifs aux négociations concernant les garanties de sécurité contre une agression de l'Allemagne. (10 janvier, 1919-7 décembre, 1923.)

Demande de Moratorium du Gouvernement allemand à la Commission des Réparations (14 novembre, 1922). Conférence de Londres (9-11 décembre, 1922). Conférence de Paris (2-4 janvier, 1923).

Documents relatifs aux notes allemandes des 2 mai et 5 juin sur les réparations.

Réponse du Gouvernement français à la lettre du Gouvernement britannique de 11 août, 1923, sur les réparations.

3. BELGIAN.

Grey Book.

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4. GERMAN.

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5. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

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II. BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

(a) Books.

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The History of the Peace Conference of Paris. Edited by H. W. V. Temperley. 6 vols. (British Institute of International Affairs.) Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1920, 1924.

The Peace Negotiations. By Robert Lansing. Constable, London, 1921.

The United States and the League. By Thomas H. Dickinson, Dutton, New York, 1923.

Washington and the Hope of Peace. By H. G. Wells. Collins, London, 1922.

Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923. By Arnold J. Toynbee. (British Institute of International Affairs.) Oxford University Press, 1925.

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Information on the Reduction of Armaments. By J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Jnr. (Association for International Understanding.) George Allen & Unwin, London, 1925.

(b) Pamphlets.

Present Status of the Armaments Problem. Reference Service on International Affairs. Paris, 1924.

German Disarmament. Reference Service on International Affairs. Paris, 1926.

The New Pan-Americanism. World Peace Foundation. Boston, April 1926.

Post-War Alignments. World Peace Foundation. Boston, 1925.

PART II

EASTERN EUROPE, 1920–1924

I

THE RELATION OF THE BORDER STATES TO RUSSIA IN 1920-1921

JUST as the fear of a German *Kriegsrache* provided the occasion for the security negotiations in Western Europe, so the nightmare of an attempt by Soviet Russia to wrest from them their dearly bought freedom remained ever with the Succession States of the Russian Empire and drove them into some form of mutual co-operation.

These States were in a different position from that of Germany's neighbours, for one and all had, either in whole or in part, formerly been Russian territory. Before going into the steps which these States took for their own common protection it is necessary first to review briefly their legal established relations with Soviet Russia.

From north to south the European States contiguous to Russia are as follows: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania. Of these, Finland proclaimed her independence in December 1917, and settled her frontier with Russia by the Treaty of Dorpat, October 14, 1920.¹ Estonia (which includes the old Russian Province of Esthonia and part of that of Livonia) became independent in February 1918, and was recognised by Russia in the Treaty of Tartu, February 2, 1920.² Latvia and Lithuania declared their independence in November and February 1918 respectively, and made their peace with Russia in treaties signed at Moscow two years later—Lithuania on July 12th³ and Latvia on August 11, 1920.⁴ But Lithuania, as a result of the Zeligowski *coup* and the Polish policy connected therewith, lost the territory and city of Vilna to Poland. This was confirmed by

¹ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. iii, § 1, p. 6.

² Ibid., vol. xi, p. 30.

³ Ibid., vol. iii, § 2, p. 106.

⁴ Ibid., vol. ii, § 3, p. 196.

a decision of the Council of Ambassadors in March 1923, by which Lithuania lost her common frontier with Russia.

The cases of Poland and Rumania require special mention. Poland's eastern frontier had been fixed during the Peace Conference of Paris by what was known as the Curzon Line—a temporary frontier running roughly from Grodno on the Lithuania frontier south to Brest-Litovsk, and from thence south-east, following the course of the River Bug to Tarnopol.¹ This was, however, accepted by neither Poles nor Russians, and when the Russo-Polish War of 1920 ended in the Treaty of Riga (March 18, 1921) the Polish frontier was pushed considerably farther east beyond the Pripet marshes.²

In the case of Rumania, the only one of the Border States to exist officially before the war, the Allied Governments had given her, by way of compensation, the Russian province of Bessarabia. This cession of territory was made by the Treaty of Paris signed on October 28, 1920,³ on the grounds that geographically, ethnographically, historically, and economically the "reunion of Bessarabia to Rumania is fully justified," and, further, that the population of Bessarabia had "given proof of its desire to see Bessarabia reunited to Rumania."

An important fact to remember about this treaty is that Russia was not a party to it, and that she has never renounced her claims of sovereignty over the province of Bessarabia.⁴ Provision was made in Article 9 of the Treaty that the Allied Powers would invite Russian adherence to it "as soon as a Russian Government recognised by them shall be in existence." But the article continues that "it is understood that the frontiers defined in the present treaty, as well as the sovereignty of Rumania over the territories comprised, cannot be called in question."⁵

¹ See *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, p. 275.

² League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vi, p. 52.

³ British White Paper, Treaty Series, No. 15 (1922), Cmd. 1747. See also *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. iv, pp. 139, 229; vol. v, p. 169.

⁴ For the Russian point of view see a pamphlet by C. V. G. Rakovsky entitled *Rumania and Bessarabia*, published in 1925 by W. P. Coates (3, Adam Street, Adelphi, London, W.C. 2), price 1s.

⁵ The present position of the Treaty is uncertain. Of the Big Four (Great Britain, France, Japan, and Italy) who signed it only two have

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Thus it is seen that general apprehension against a kind of misplaced *irredentism* on the part of Russia is the *motif* of the security negotiations in Eastern Europe. These negotiations passed through the same phases as those in the West. First they began by attempts on the part of the Border States themselves to arrive at some plan for mutual assistance —then the bilateral note was struck by Russia in the Moscow Conference of 1922, and finally the question seems to be working itself out towards a solution through the system of treaties which the Soviet Government initiated with Turkey in December 1925.

ratified—Great Britain on January 1, 1921, and France on April 30, 1924, Of the remainder, Italy has made no move at all, and it is believed that some secret understanding arrived at between Russia and Japan at the time of their treaty, January 1, 1925, prevents the latter State from ratifying. The Bessarabian question was the subject of an abortive Russo-Rumanian Conference in Vienna (March-April 1924), since which time there have been continual rumours of Red divisions massing on the Rumanian frontier. A Joint Commission of the two States was set up in December 1924 to deal with frontier questions, raids, etc.

II

THE CORDON SANITAIRE

It soon became evident that the initiative in a movement of mutual protection among the Succession States must necessarily come from either Poland or Rumania. This was for two reasons : both countries had, as a result of the war, risen to be second-rate Powers, and were thus more important than their neighbours ; and, secondly, both Poland and Rumania were the more likely to be attacked than the minor Baltic States, to whose independence the Soviet Government became early reconciled. The disputed Polish frontier and the Bessarabian question were, however, permanent thorns in her flesh.

Rumania was first in the field in 1920 with a wide conception, an alliance from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and reinforced by Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. But the latter States were not willing to enter into a definite alliance directed against the Soviets, more especially Yugoslavia, who still cherished some of her old Slav faithfulness to Russia. The Rumanian proposal had the effect, however, of strengthening the bonds of friendship with Poland, to whom she gave strong moral support during the negotiations which preceded the Treaty of Riga with the U.S.S.R., and on March 8, 1921, two weeks after the Franco-Polish Alliance had been signed, a defensive agreement was concluded between Poland and Rumania at Bucharest, during the visit of Prince Sapieha, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to that city.

Under the treaty the two Powers agree to assist each other in the event of an unprovoked attack against their frontiers, and such an attack against the one should be considered a declaration of war against the other (Art. 1). A special annex (Protocol A) showed that the frontiers specified in this article were :—

1. For Rumania, those laid down by the Treaty of Paris, October 28, 1920, between herself and the Big Four.
2. For Poland, those laid down in Article 1 of the Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921, between herself and Russia.

Proceeding, the treaty provides for a co-ordination of efforts to maintain peace through the medium of regular consultations between the two Powers on their foreign policy regarding their Eastern neighbours (Art. 2), and for a military convention to determine just what manner of assistance each should render the other under the provisions of Article 1 (Art 3). Article 4 of the treaty bound the signatories, once they had entered into a war as under the terms of Article 1, not to conclude an armistice or treaty of peace without the knowledge and participation of both. The duration of the treaty was for five years, but either State could denounce it at the end of two years after six months' notice (Art. 5),¹ and the two States undertook not to conclude an alliance with a third party without the consent of both ; alliances already entered into by the two Powers for the maintenance of treaties of peace were exempted from this provision, but it was considered necessary for these to be notified. Formal notification of these treaties followed (Art. 6). By Protocol A, already referred to, this article was further completed by the provision that neither of the contracting parties may, without the consent of the other, conclude an alliance with ex-enemy States during the Great War. Articles 7 and 8 provide for the registration of the treaty with the League of Nations and the exchange of ratifications. This last ceremony took place on July 25, 1921, and the registration on October 24, 1921. Protocol B of the treaty declared that it must be kept secret and unratified until after the definitive treaty of peace was signed between Poland and Russia. This, however, occurred a fortnight later, on March 18, 1921.²

¹ The treaty expired on March 6, 1926, but was renewed by the two Powers. The text of the renewed treaty was published at Bucharest in April 1926. See Appendix B.

² For text of the treaty see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vii, p. 79. See also Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-1923, pp. 271-272 ; and World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, vol. vi, pp. 131-134.

Relations between Poland and her Baltic neighbours were considerably complicated and cramped by her seemingly permanent dispute with Lithuania over the occupation of Vilna by General Zeligowski, a dispute which has lasted from September 20, 1920, to the present day; but in spite of this difficulty some progress was made. The next step towards a combination of Succession States was taken by Finland, whose Foreign Minister, Dr. Holsti, summoned a Conference at Helsingfors, which was attended, in addition to Finland, by Estonia and Latvia, and, in a less formal manner, by Poland, on July 25-28, 1921. As a result of this meeting a protocol was signed to the effect that the Foreign Ministers of the four States should meet together for regular periodic conferences, and thus to some extent co-ordinate the foreign policy of the four States as regards Russia. Though this was no very great progress, it paved the way for the Conference of Warsaw, called by M. Skirmunt, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on March 13-17, 1922, as a preliminary to the International Economic Conference of Genoa, which opened on April 10th.

Finland had no very great wish to ally herself with the Chauvinist policy of Poland as displayed in the action of Zeligowski at Vilna and of Korfanty in Upper Silesia, but she had embarked on a dispute with Russia as to the interpretation of a provision of the Treaty of Dorpat with regard to Eastern Karelia, which had resulted in strained relations between Helsingfors and Moscow; hence she could not afford to disregard the Polish invitation to the Warsaw Conference. The Foreign Ministers of Estonia and Latvia also attended. The Conference resulted in a political agreement between the four Powers signed on March 17th, of which the principal provisions were the reciprocal recognitions of the treaties of peace which each had made with Russia (Art. 1), and the undertaking not to conclude any pact which might, indirectly or directly, place any of the four at a disadvantage; the agreement that all disputes between the signatories should be settled by purely peaceful methods, the more important to be submitted to arbitration or the Permanent Court of Inter-

national Justice (Art. 6); and the declaration that, in the event of unprovoked attack upon any one of them, the remainder would adopt a benevolent attitude towards the State attacked and would at once "agree upon their course of action" (Art. 7).¹

This treaty did not, of course, embrace Lithuania, and Finland, mainly on account of Article 7, which bound her too closely to Polish caprice, found herself unable to ratify it—a proceeding which brought about the resignation of Dr. Holsti (May 20, 1922). This virtually brought to an end for a time all hope of a military and political alliance between the four States, though co-operation continued along economic and commercial channels.²

A breathing space was, however, given to the Succession States in the shape of the Non-Aggression Pact of Genoa, entered into by the Allied Powers and Russia and her allies on May 19, 1922. This may be said, with the exception of the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo, to be the only concrete achievement of the Genoa Conference, and was entered into in contemplation of The Hague Conference, to which the questions for which no solution could be found at Genoa had been referred, as it turned out, quite vainly.

The terms of the pact, which took the form of Resolution XI adopted by the Plenary Session of the Conference on May 19th, are as follows:—

In order to enable the work of the Commissions to be carried on in tranquillity, and in order to restore mutual confidence, engagements will be entered into binding the Russian Soviet Government and the Governments now allied with the Russian Soviet Government on the one hand, and the other participating Governments on the other hand, to refrain from all acts of aggression against their respective territories, and to refrain from subversive propaganda.

The pact to refrain from acts of aggression will be founded on the observance of the existing *status quo*, and will remain in force for a period of four months from the closing of the work of the Commission.

The agreement against propaganda will bind all the signatory

¹ For text of agreement see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xi, p. 168.

² Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-1923, p. 242.

Governments to abstain from interfering in any way in the internal affairs of other States, from supporting by financial or other means political organisations at work in other countries, and also to suppress in their territory attempts to foment acts of violence in other States, and attempts which might disturb the territorial and political *status quo*.¹

The pact remained in operation for just two months, until The Hague Conference broke up on July 20, 1922, having accomplished nothing but having embittered rather than cleared the international political situation.

¹ British Blue Book, *Papers relating to the International Economic Conference of Genoa, April-May 1922*, Cmd. 1667, p. 50; French Yellow Book, *Conférence Économique Internationale de Gênes, 9 avril-19 mai 1922*, p. 141. See also World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, vol. vi, p. 135.

III

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, 1922

EASTERN negotiations for security entered upon a new phase very shortly after the Conference of Warsaw, when overtures were made by Russia for mutual disarmament, a preliminary to which should be the establishment of demilitarised frontier zones between Russia and her European neighbours. A Conference was called at Riga by M. Meierovics, Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which the four Warsaw Powers and representatives of the Soviet Governments participated. The Conference closed on March 30th, and the results were embodied in a protocol signed on that date,¹ by which the signatory Powers affirmed the sanctity and validity of the local peace treaties and promised to co-operate in the establishment of the neutralised zones.²

A more direct step was taken on June 12th of the same year in the shape of an identic Note sent out by M. Litvinoff, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Polish, Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian Governments inviting them to a conference at Moscow to discuss the question of mutual disarmament and non-aggression as a continuation of the Protocol of Riga.³ The four Warsaw Powers met again at Reval on August 1st–4th to discuss the question among themselves, as a preparation for the meeting of the Assembly in September, and replies were sent to Moscow expressing the opinion that the results of the work already undertaken by the League of Nations should be awaited before entering upon regional agreements. This point was especially strongly put in the Polish Note, which elicited a Soviet reply on August 19th that no practical results would be yielded by the

¹ For text of protocol see Soviet Red Book, pp. 239–241.

² *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923*, pp. 28 and 242.

³ See Soviet Red Book, *Conférence de Moscow pour la Limitation des Armements*, pp. 5–7.

discussion of the Assembly and fixing the date of the Conference definitely for September 3rd.¹ As, however, all the Baltic Governments and Poland intended to attend the League Assembly, they replied that this date was inconvenient, and suggested the postponement of the preliminary negotiations until the close of the Assembly. On October 8th-9th, therefore, representatives of the four Warsaw Powers met again at Reval, and it was commonly agreed that the Conference should meet at Moscow on November 30th.

As late as November 23rd the Soviet Government invited Lithuania to take part in the Conference without notifying Poland. This was done, as Prince Radziwill, Polish delegate to the Conference, later pointed out, "despite the peculiar relations existing between Poland and Lithuania, and although Lithuania had no common frontier with Russia."² Poland, however, raised no objection to the inclusion of Lithuania.

During The Hague Conference (June-July 1922) M. Litvinoff had made efforts to secure Rumanian representation at the future Conference, but on August 28th the Rumanian Government definitely declared that it could only attend the Conference on condition that Moscow recognised the Bessarabian frontier "*comme fixée et ne pouvant faire l'objet des débats avec le Gouvernement russe.*" The Soviet Government, however, took its stand on the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on March 3, 1918, between Rumania and the Central Powers, by which Rumania's evacuation of Bessarabia was a condition of peace. Despite a prolonged correspondence (August-November 1922) no compromise was reached, and Rumania did not attend the Conference.³ The Polish Delegation, however, at the first plenary session of the Conference, announced that they were empowered to make statements on behalf of the Rumanian Government "when the occasion presented itself."

¹ Soviet Red Book, pp. 19-22.

² See Prince Radziwill's Memorandum to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and circulated to the members of the Temporary Mixed Commission, Council Document 59, 1923, ix, C.T.A. 205, January 23, 1923.

³ For texts of this correspondence see Soviet Red Book, pp. 26-33.

The first plenary session of the Moscow Conference was held on December 2, 1922. It was the wish of the Soviet delegation to discuss disarmament and non-aggression simultaneously, but the other representatives insisted that the order of debate should be based on the policy recently laid down by the Third Assembly that political guarantees must precede discussions of a technical nature. The Polish delegation then submitted a draft Pact of Non-Aggression,¹ as did also the Lithuanians,² at the same time taking occasion to comment severely upon the Polish attitude toward the Vilna question. "The Polish delegate," says Prince Radziwill in his report, "refused to discuss this aggressive speech, which he regarded as being in doubtful taste."

The Polish draft was, however, accepted at length as a *modus operandi*, to which exhaustive amendments were put forward by both the Soviet³ and Lithuanian Governments.⁴ The final reading took place on December 7th, and the text of the pact was adopted by the General Committee of the Conference on the following day.

The pact consisted of eight articles, by the first and second of which the five States agreed to commit no act of aggression one against the other in respect of their several frontiers, and to give no support to any non-signatory State should it commit an act of aggression against any one of them. Should a signatory Power violate the pact, the remainder would not support it, and are released from their engagements not to attack it (Art. III). The five Powers declared their intention of deciding all disputes among them by peaceful means (Art. IV), and should a dispute arise on subjects not provided for in the various peace treaties, or in respect of the then territorial position, it should be referred to arbitration, for which a special agreement was to be drawn up separately (Art. V). The remaining three articles provided respectively for the adherence of non-signatory States to the pact (Art. VI) for the ratification

¹ For text of this see Soviet Red Book, pp. 93-94 (French text); also Annex I to Prince Radziwill's report (English text).

² For text see Soviet Red Book, p. 95.

³ See Red Book, pp. 125-127.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-129.

of the pact within three months from the date of signature (Art. VII), and for the deposit of such ratifications with the Norwegian Government, who should acquaint each of the Contracting Powers of the deposit of the ratification by the others (Art. VIII).¹

In accordance with the Soviet proposal the Pact of Non-Aggression was to be signed formally by the Conference in plenary session at the same time as the agreement relating to technical disarmament, to which question the delegates passed on December 9th. But here a deadlock was reached almost at once. The Soviet proposals did not take into account the amazingly advantageous position of Russia, and, in addition, the Soviet Government refused to consider the question "moral" disarmament, that is to say, the cessation of Communist propaganda throughout the Border States.² This *impasse* resulted in the break-up of the Conference on December 12th with nothing concrete accomplished. Before their departure, however, the four Warsaw Powers (Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia) declared that, although the Pact of Non-Aggression had not been signed, their intentions toward one another and toward Russia remained strictly peaceful.

¹ For text of the pact see Soviet Red Book, pp. 152-153; also Annexe II to Prince Radziwill's Memorandum.

² See Wheeler-Bennett, *Information on the Reduction of Armaments*, p. 149; also Baker, *Disarmament*, pp. 96-100.

IV

LATER DEVELOPMENTS, 1923-1924

THE failure of the Conference put an end to negotiations both for a Baltic alliance and for a mutual guarantee agreement between the Border States and Russia. Although throughout 1923 and 1924 commercial relations were strengthened between the Baltic States and between Poland and Rumania, no further steps towards a general security pact were taken until the Russian invitation of January 1926.

There were, however, two later developments which should be noted. Though the efforts to form a Baltic pact had failed, there had sprung up a close friendship between Estonia and Latvia. Both States had a community of interest, and both shared the fear of being drawn into a war in consequence of the aggressive and truculent policy of Poland. Both, too, had a common sympathy with Lithuania, who, in the Vilna incident, had been the first victim of this policy. As a result of this friendly attitude a Treaty of Defensive Alliance was signed between Estonia and Latvia on November 1, 1923, by which the two States agreed to adopt a purely pacific policy towards all nations and to co-ordinate their policies on international affairs. Should, however, despite this pacific attitude, one of the signatories be a victim of unprovoked aggression, the other should consider itself at once at war with the aggressor, and should render every possible assistance to the State attacked. To enable this assistance to be efficiently organised the "competent authorities" of the two countries were to confer and establish the necessary provisions. In the event of the two Powers finding themselves in a state of defensive war, each guaranteed not to make a separate peace without the consent of the latter. On the other hand, all disputes arising between the two States are to be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to arbitration,

and both States agreed not to enter into an alliance with a third party without the consent of the other. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years from the exchange of ratifications, which was effected at Riga on March 3, 1924. The treaty was registered with the League of Nations on February 21, 1924.¹

The second question of outstanding importance was the Russo-Rumanian attempt to arrive at an agreement over the Bessarabian question.² At the beginning of 1924 only two Powers, Great Britain and Rumania, had ratified the treaty of October 28, 1920, by which Bessarabia had been "ceded" to the latter country, and it became imperative that some attempt should be made to regularise the relations between Rumania and Soviet Russia. Early in February 1924 the two Governments agreed to reopen commercial negotiations (which had been in process since December 1923) in a Conference at Vienna to be held in the following March.

It is doubtful whether the ground had been very adequately prepared, for the Rumanians were only willing to discuss matters on the condition of a tacit admittance by Russia that the Bessarabian question was closed, while the Soviet Government was equally emphatic that commercial agreement could only be reached if the Bessarabian question were discussed simultaneously.³ Nor was this complicated situation simplified by the fact that M. Poincaré seized the opportunity on March 11th to secure the French ratification of the 1920 treaty,⁴ an act against which M. Chicherin vehemently protested on March 16th.

The Vienna Conference opened on March 28th after a

¹ See League of Nations Document C. 34, 1926, V, *Arbitration and Security*, p. 160.

² See above, pp. 74-75.

³ See *The Times*, March 5, 1924.

⁴ In this connection it is curious to note that on April 29, 1924 (some six weeks after the French ratification), Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Labour Government, announced that, as the treaty had been ratified *only by Great Britain and Rumania*, it was not yet in force, and the British Government was not bound by its terms. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Anglo-Soviet Conference was in session in London at this time.

process of delay, since the Delegations had arrived on the 23rd, and its results were at once stultified by the deadlock which arose at the second session. The Soviet Delegation declared that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to forgo the former Imperial Russian rights over Bessarabia, but not to recognise the treaty of October 1920. They proposed that a plebiscite should be held to discover the wishes of the inhabitants. This proposition the Rumanian Delegation definitely rejected, replying that the basis upon which the Conference had been called included the preliminary recognition by Russia of the Rumanian frontier as it then was.¹ Whereupon, at the third session (April 2nd), on the motion of the Soviet delegates the Conference terminated without result.²

The immediate result of this failure to adjust matters was an orientation of Rumanian foreign policy toward France, who deposited her ratification of the 1920 treaty on April 30, 1924, and put it into instant operation by a decree dated June 7th. As regards France's Programme of Security this was in complete consistency with her policy of attaching small States to her by means of treaties of friendship—though in the case of Rumania this is still a matter of negotiation.

¹ See *Temps*, March 29, 1924.

² The fundamental documents of this Conference are contained in a publication by the Rumanian Ministry of Finance, *Rapport du Ministre des Finances au Conseil des Ministres sur la situation créée à la Roumanie par la politique des Réparations et des Dettes Inter-Alliés*. Bucarest. Imprimérie de l'Etat, 1925. 2 vols.

ANNEX TO PART II

AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

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Treaty Series. Vols. II-XI.

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2. BRITISH.

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3. FRENCH.

Yellow Book.

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4. RUMANIAN.

Rapport du Ministre des Finances au Conseil des Ministres sur la situation créée à la Roumanie par la politique des Réparations et des Dettes Inter-Alliées. Bucarest, 1925. 2 Vols.

5. SOVIET.

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Conférence de Moscow pour la Limitation des Armements, 1923.

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History of the Peace Conference of Paris (see Annex to Part I).

Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 (see Annex to Part I).

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Rumania and Bessarabia. By C. G. Rakovsky. W. P. Coates, London, 1925. French edition Librairie du Travail. Paris, 1925.

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PART III

**THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND GENERAL
SECURITY, 1923-1924**

RESOLUTION XIV

IT has been seen that security is provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations by virtue of Article 10, and that this article is the natural starting-off place for any further development of the subject.¹ It is a curious but historical fact, then, that the League's activities regarding security were only a "by-product," as it were, of its efforts to secure disarmament.

This, however, is the case, and the whole question of general security, as demonstrated by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, arose from a resolution of the Second Assembly (September 1921) :—

That the Temporary Mixed Commission be asked to make proposals on general lines for the reduction of national armaments which, in order to secure precision, should be in the form of a draft treaty, or an equally definite plan, to be presented to the Council if possible before the Assembly next year.²

In accordance with this resolution the Temporary Mixed Commission, during its Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Sessions (February-September 1922), considered a plan for disarmament, submitted by Lord Esher and based upon the ratio system adopted by the Washington Conference.³

For a variety of technical reasons the Commission considered the scheme unacceptable, but in their discussion it became more and more clear that security must precede dis-

¹ See above, pp. 36-39.

² See *League of Nations Journal*, Special Supplement, No. 6, October 1921, p. 23, par. 2.

³ For text of Lord Esher's plan see *Minutes of the Third Session of the Temporary Mixed Commission*. See also Wheeler-Bennett, *Information on the Reduction of Armaments*, pp. 58-59; and Baker, *Disarmament*, pp. 74-85; Hogarth Press, London, 1926.

armament—that is to say, that before a State can reduce its armaments it must have some form of guarantee that other States will assist it in the event of aggression. Psychologically the limitation of armaments was impossible while a state of fear was uppermost in the national and international mind; so that the first and most urgent need, before even the technical questions of disarmament were touched upon, was to find some method, in advance of that already provided in the Covenant, whereby this fear of aggression might be allayed.

In realisation of this need the Temporary Mixed Commission, at its Fifth Session (September 1922), included in its report to the Third Assembly a set of resolutions, of which the second and third deal directly with the question of security.

2. In the present state of the world the majority of Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee for the safety of their countries.

3. Such a guarantee can be found in a general defensive agreement between all the countries concerned, binding them to immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a prearranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked, provided that the obligation to render assistance to a country attacked shall be limited in principle to those countries situated in the same part of the globe. In cases, however, where, for historical, geographical, or other reasons, a country is in special danger of attack, detailed arrangements should be made for its defence in accordance with the above-mentioned plan.¹

The Assembly referred the Commission's report to its Third Committee, which in its turn elaborated the resolutions quoted above and emphasised their own cordial approval. The report adopted by the Third Assembly included, therefore, the celebrated Resolution XIV. This resolution, upon which both the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol were based, ran as follows:—

¹ See *Report of the Fifth Session of the Temporary Mixed Commission to the Third Assembly, 1922.*

Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly directing the Temporary Mixed Commission to prepare plans for a Draft Treaty of Security.¹

XIV. (a) The Assembly, having considered the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on the question of a general Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, being of opinion that this report can in no way affect the complete validity of all the Treaties of Peace or other agreements which are known to exist between States; and considering that this report contains valuable suggestions as to the methods by which a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee can be made effective, is of opinion that—

- (1) No scheme for the reduction of armaments, within the meaning of Article VIII of the Covenant, can be fully successful unless it is general.
- (2) In the present state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country.
- (3) Such a guarantee can be found in a defensive agreement which should be open to all countries, binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a prearranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked, provided that the obligation to render assistance to a country attacked shall be limited in principle to those countries situated in the same part of the globe. In cases, however, where, for historical, geographical, or other reasons, a country is in special danger of attack, detailed arrangements should be made for its defence in accordance with the above-mentioned plan.
- (4) As a general reduction of armaments is the object of the three preceding statements, and the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee the means of achieving that object, previous consent to this reduction is therefore the first condition for the treaty.

This reduction could be carried out either by means of a general treaty, which is the most desirable plan, or by means of partial treaties designed to be extended and open to all countries.

In the former case the treaty will carry with it a general reduction of armaments. In the latter case the reduction should be proportionate to the guarantees afforded by the treaty.

The Council of the League, after having taken the advice of the Temporary Mixed Commission, which will examine how each of these two systems could be carried out, should further formulate and submit to the Governments, for their consideration and sovereign decision, the plan of the machinery, both political and military, necessary to bring them clearly into effect.

- (b) The Assembly requests the Council to submit to the various

¹ See *Records of the Third Assembly*, vol. i, p. 291

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

Governments the above proposals for their observations, and requests the Temporary Mixed Commission to continue its investigations, and, in order to give precision to the above statements, to prepare a draft treaty embodying the principles contained therein.

This resolution marked a definite period in the activities of the League, for from now on it became no longer a question of finding a solution for problems of disarmament or security, but of the pacific settlement of international disputes in which security and disarmament (and ultimately arbitration) became integral parts of one formula.

II

THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

1. THE DRAFT TREATIES OF COLONEL RÉQUIN AND LORD ROBERT CECIL.

DURING the year 1923 the Temporary Mixed Commission proceeded to carry out the principle of Resolution XIV, and in the process of this execution they received draft treaties both from Colonel Réquin and Lord Robert Cecil.

(a) Colonel Réquin's Draft.

The draft presented by Colonel Réquin, a former member of Marshal Foch's staff, was frankly novel. It boldly recognised as inevitable the general tendency of European politics to drift towards alliances and ententes, and sought to bring this tendency within the scope of the League of Nations, making it a part of a general plan for the reduction of armaments. Colonel Réquin proposed that the League should formally permit and acknowledge the formation of alliances and ententes among the members for mutual security against aggression. Realising that some of these agreements would be made public in accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,¹ while others would remain secret, Colonel Réquin's draft provided that all agreements so registered and made public should have a premium attached to them in the shape of absolute freedom of action on the part of the contracting parties in cases when attacked in ways foreseen and provided for in the treaty registered. No decision of the Council need be had before proceeding

¹ Article 18 of the Covenant :—“ Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall forthwith be registered with the Secretariat, and shall as soon as possible be made public by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.”

automatically with measures of defence. Reference of the case to the Council or to the Permanent Court of International Justice is not debarred, but the Parties are free to make initial speed in mobilising for defence. This premium Colonel Réquin considered as being sufficiently alluring to bring to light many "secret" understandings.

The Réquin draft provided, further, that in the event of States, *ententes*, or alliances being attacked in ways unprovided for in registered agreements, the party who suffers the aggression shall inform the Council of its intentions, thereby opening the way for mediation by the League before taking action.¹

(b) *Lord Robert Cecil's Draft.*

Lord Robert Cecil's draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee,² which was forwarded to the Secretariat of the League in December 1922, was a document of greater detail and wider provision than that of Colonel Réquin. While providing for regional understandings, the draft insisted that these should only be undertaken with the approval of a three-fourths majority of the Council, which, by the same majority, should have power to suspend an offending party from the privileges enjoyed under the special treaty.

The Cecil draft went farther also than the Réquin proposals in making provision for deciding which State is the aggressor in case of attack. This was to be the duty of the Council of the League, which must give a decision within four days of the information of aggression reaching the Secretary-General. The State which violated the territory of another State was to be deemed the aggressor.

Lord Cecil's draft included provisions for the military assistance to be given the State attacked, and also for the reparation for material damage in the war. This last was to be borne first by the aggressor State, and secondly by the

¹ For text of Colonel Réquin's draft treaty, see *League of Nations Assembly Document A. 35, 1923, ix, part i*, p. 62.

² For text of Lord Robert Cecil's draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee see *ibid.*, p. 51. See also *Information on the Reduction of Armaments*, pp. 61-62.

High Contracting Parties in proportion to be determined by an impartial commission.

Both the Cecil and Réquin drafts emphasised the fact that no country should be asked to give assistance to another State outside of its own continent.

It will at once be seen that the outstanding difference in these two plans is in their respective attitudes towards partial alliances. Colonel Réquin was satisfied that they should merely be registered with the League, while Lord Robert Cecil felt it imperative that they should only be undertaken with the consent of a three-fourths majority of the Council.

Thus, at the outset, the Temporary Mixed Commission, when they came to the task of amalgamating the two drafts, found themselves faced with the problem of reconciling two apparently diametrically opposite points of view. It was felt, moreover, that neither draft was sufficiently comprehensive to stand alone. A joint Cecil-Réquin draft treaty was, however, prepared and submitted to the Third Committee of the Fourth Assembly in September 1923. The Committee made various amendments, and the Assembly then unanimously adopted the draft treaty with the provision that it should be circulated to the various Governments of the world for their comments and criticisms.¹

2. THE DRAFT TREATY.

The alternative security provided in the draft treaty consisted in the assurance given by the signatory Powers that in the event of a State being attacked the remainder would immediately come to its assistance. Thus, supposing six States, A, B, C, D, E, and F, had signed the treaty, and B was attacked by F, the aggressor State would find himself automatically at war with A, C, D, and E, as well as with B.

¹ For a comparison of the texts of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance as adopted by the Fourth Assembly, with the Cecil-Réquin draft treaty as presented by the Temporary Mixed Commission to the Third Committee, see *Information on the Reduction of Armaments*, pp. 63-77.

This in itself was thought to be a sufficient deterrent to any bellicose State ; it will be remembered that it is unlikely that Germany would have gone to war in 1914 had she known in advance just what States she would have had opposed to her. In addition to this, it was laid down that no State should claim the benefit of this guarantee until it had reduced its armaments to a scale approved by the Council of the League of Nations. Thus, to quote Lord Robert Cecil, 'There can be no limitation without security, but there will be no security without limitation.'¹

It was realised, however, that to some extent at least regional agreements, or, as they were then called, partial alliances, were essential to security, and here no small praise is due to the Temporary Mixed Commission, which combined the two theses of the Cecil and Réquin drafts. "It was the great achievement of the Temporary Mixed Commission," said Professor Philip Baker, "that, starting from rival plans based respectively on general and special guarantees, on the apparently conflicting principles, that is, of world-wide co-operation and private alliances, it welded these two plans into one consistent whole, in which private alliances became part of the general plan under effective League control. Moreover, agreement on this plan was reached with no sacrifice of principle by either side, for private alliances lost no part of their efficiency for defence, and yet became no more than one special means of rapidly applying a general system of security."²

Under the draft treaty provision was made for any parties to the treaty to enter into special and separate defensive agreements. These, however, had to be strictly complementary to the General Treaty, and their terms known in advance and registered with the Secretariat at Geneva. The League Council was appointed judge as to whether these agreements were compatible with the terms of the Covenant

¹ League of Nations Union Pamphlet, No. 142, p. 4.

² *The Geneva Protocol*, by Professor P. J. Noel Baker, p. 148. P. S. King Sons, London, 1925.

and the Treaty, and could, if necessary, demand changes in the text to secure this compatibility.

It was further provided that such agreements could only be contracted between States which had already signed the General Treaty, and that they left its general obligations unaffected. Thus they could not excuse the contracting parties from the discharge of obligations undertaken by them as signatories of the General Treaty.

As regards the question of determining which State, in the event of war, was the aggressor, the draft treaty delegated to the Council this very delicate task, and the Council must give a decision within four days of its being summoned. In the case of special agreements the action decided on in the event of hostilities would be taken immediately the first shot was fired by the aggressor; but, in that case, too, the Council would have to decide what action should be taken by the other signatories of the General Treaty.

Briefly, then, the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was essentially a combination of the two principles of a general agreement and special alliances—an amalgamation of general guarantees among all States with partial alliances among some of them, under the control of the League of Nations.

3. THE WORLD'S OPINION ON THE TREATY.

As directed by the Assembly and the Council, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations duly circulated the draft treaty to all States whether members of the League or not, and during the following year replies began gradually to come in.

Of the States to whom the treaty was sent, sixteen accepted it in principle with varying degrees of approval (viz. Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, and Uruguay); while twelve countries declared that they could not adhere to the treaty (viz. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway,

Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Spain, Sweden, United States of America, and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). It will be observed that no South American States, with the exception of Uruguay, replied at all.¹

This division of approval and disapproval was a very natural one. It can be seen at once that those States who stood definitely in need of immediate guarantees of security, such as France, with her satellite States, and the Baltic States, naturally accepted, while such States as the British Empire, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and the Netherlands, further removed from danger, were less ready to accept a treaty which would greatly increase their international obligations.

Of the non-member States the refusals of the United States and the U.S.S.R. were merely consistent with the policies which both Powers had previously adopted towards the League of Nations; but Germany, in a very reasoned Memorandum, pointed out that her adherence to the treaty would place her in an "intolerably ambiguous situation, and would involve her in well-nigh incalculable danger. Disarmed to the point of impotency, she would have to reckon with her being drawn resistless and defenceless into all sorts of conflicts, and to look on while her unprotected territory became the battlefield of foreign Powers."

A note struck by nearly all the replies was a criticism of the absence in the draft treaty of a definition of aggression, and of the policy of giving full power to the Council in the question of determining the aggressor States. In these replies, notably in the German and British, the word "arbitration" appeared, which was to form the third element in the new formula eventually devised to meet this criticism. And before the Assembly met for its Fifth Session in September 1924 new political forces were at work. General elections had taken place in Great Britain and France, where Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had replaced Mr. Baldwin, and M. Herriot M. Poincaré.

¹ For texts of these replies see League of Nations Documents, A. 35, 1924, ix; A. 35 (a), 1924, ix; A. 35 (b), 1924, ix.

III

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

1. THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND THE DAWES PLAN.

It is true to say that the birth of the Geneva Protocol was made possible by the Anglo-French *rapprochement*, which began with the entry into power of Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot. Successive Governments in London and Paris had been in disagreement over the policy of the Ruhr, and it was a happy chance that caused two men with such a community of ideals to be at the head of affairs when the report of the Dawes Committee of Experts offered the chance of a reconciliation over the question of reparations.

The Reparations Commission communicated the text of the Dawes Report on April 17, 1924, and on July 9th the French and British Premiers met together in Paris to make final plans for the calling of an International Conference in London for the application of the Dawes Scheme. At the same time the two Prime Ministers took the opportunity of clearing up a variety of questions which had for some time been at issue between the two countries, and in the course of this process they touched upon the question of security. As a result of this the eighth (and last) paragraph of the Anglo-French Memorandum ran as follows :—

8. The two Governments have likewise proceeded to a preliminary exchange of views on the question of security. They are aware that public opinion requires pacification; they agree to co-operate in devising, through the League of Nations or otherwise, as opportunity presents itself, means of securing this, and to continue the consideration of the question until the problem of general security can be finally solved.¹

¹ See British Blue Book, *Proceedings of the London Reparation Conference, July and August 1924*, Miscellaneous, No. 17, 1924, Cmd. 2270, p. 110. See also Belgian Grey Book, *Documents diplomatiques relatifs aux Réparations (Conférence de Londres du 16 juillet au 16 août 1924)*, p. 60; German White Books, *Die Londoner Konferenz Juli-August 1924*, No. 3, p. 86, and *Materialien zur Sicherheitsfrage*, p. 12.

In this way the threads of the Anglo-French security negotiations were picked up where they had been left after Lord Curzon's unsuccessful efforts of just a year before, and were interknit with the League's general activities as they stood after the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

This agreement was further and more firmly established at the London Conference of July-August 1924, where the commencement of the evacuation of the Ruhr as a preliminary for the application of the Dawes Plan did much to re-establish a modicum of good feeling between France and Germany.

So it was with both warm personal regard and the solidarity of a re-established *entente* that the British and French Prime Ministers set out for Geneva early in September.

2. THE SHOTWELL DRAFT TREATY.

Meanwhile the dominating factor in international politics had been the search after the definition of aggression with which to supplement and amend the plan for general security contained in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

It remained for an unofficial group of American private citizens, including many distinguished names, such as Professor James Shotwell (after whom the Committee was called), Major-General Tasker Bliss, a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, and Dr. David Hunter Miller, to provide the formula which was, in an amended and altered form, adopted by the Fifth Assembly as an integral part of the Protocol.

The Shotwell Committee drew up a Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security, which contained at the same time a comprehensive definition of aggression and a plan for the outlawry of the aggressor. The definition of aggression was a negative one. Briefly it was this: any State refusing summons by another State before the Permanent Court of International Justice on a charge of aggression thereby admits its guilt. An answer to the summons must be made within four days or the other States may take action. The Court was to be empowered to declare when aggression had occurred.

The action to be taken against the aggressor was to be purely economic, the States being left free to do all they could against the aggressor with reference to its property rights on the high seas, etc. It amounted, in effect, to the outlawry of the aggressor State.

The Treaty further made provision for an International Armaments Conference to meet once in every three years with a permanent committee of experts, and also adopted the Réquin theory of placing a premium upon publicity of engagements as against secret undertakings. Here, therefore, the principle of partial alliances found a place.¹

3. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE PROTOCOL.

It was made clear at once in the opening speeches of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot that their policy was not to be founded upon military alliances but was to be a return to the Covenant :—

"We do not believe that military alliances will bring security," declared Mr. MacDonald, and later: "What we require now is that the Covenant should be elaborated. We do not want a new foundation. Before it is elaborated it ought to be understood."²

While M. Herriot, next day, not to be outdone, continued in the same strain :—

It is by thinking over and putting into force the articles of this solemn instrument that France seeks for the rules which are to guide her future action and her foreign policy.³

Moreover, a new note was struck by Mr. MacDonald in his opening speech, in which he emphasised the elaborate need for the test of arbitration in determining the aggressor State.

The one method by which we can secure, the one method by which we can approximate to an accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is arbitration . . . The test is, Are you willing to arbitrate?

¹ For text and official commentary on the American Draft Treaty see *World Peace Foundation Pamphlets*, vol. vii, No. 80.

² See *Reduction of Armaments*, pp. 9 and 17. League of Nations Secretariat, Geneva, 1924.

³ See *ibid.*, p. 37.

The test is, Are you willing to explain ? The test is, Will you expose your commitments ? Are you afraid of the world ? Are you afraid of daylight, a lover of darkness, and timorous lest the world should know what is in your mind ? Such is the test, the only test.¹

Moved by this display of rhetoric, the Assembly unanimously adopted on September 6, 1924, the following Anglo-French resolution :—

The Assembly,

Noting the declarations of the Governments represented, observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to establish a secure peace,

Decides as follows,

With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergencies between certain points of view which have been expressed, and, when agreement has been reached, to enable an International Conference upon Armaments to be summoned by the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment.

1. The Third Committee is requested to consider the material dealing with security and the reduction of armaments, particularly the observations of the Governments on the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, prepared in pursuance of Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly and other plans prepared and presented to the Secretary-General since the publication of the draft Treaty, and to examine the obligations contained in the Covenant of the League in relation to the guarantees of a security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require.

2. The First Committee is requested

- (a) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement of disputes ;
- (b) To examine within what limits the terms of Article 36, paragraph (2), of the Statute of establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice ² might be rendered more precise, and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause ;

¹ See *Reduction of Armaments*, p. 13.

² Art. 36, par. 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice : "The Members of the League of Nations and States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either signing or ratifying the Protocol, to which the present Statute is adjourned, or at a later moment, declare that they recognise as compulsory, *ipso facto*, and without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning :—

- (a) The interpretation of a Treaty.
- (b) Any question of International Law.
- (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation.
- (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation."

and thus strengthen the solidarity and security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between States.¹

Proceeding on the lines of this Anglo-French Resolution, a special Joint Sub-Committee of the First and Third Committees of the Assembly turned to the examination of the material at their disposal. This consisted of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the replies and commentaries passed upon it by various Governments, and the draft treaty prepared by the Shotwell Committee.²

From these elements the Sub-Committee, under the able guidance of M. Benès (Czechoslovakia) and M. Politis (Greece), constructed a draft Protocol of Arbitration and Security, which it submitted to the First and Third Committees. These bodies amended the draft, which was unanimously adopted by the Assembly on October 2, 1924, as the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.³

4. THE PROTOCOL AND SECURITY.

Security as such is barely mentioned in the Protocol. But security, it has been demonstrated, is a state of mind consequent upon a certain set of circumstances. It was the object of the Protocol to bring about these circumstances ; security, therefore, although only part of the triple formula, was also the goal and the ideal which inspired the whole.

The theory of security in the matter of the Protocol has been aptly defined by Dr. Hunter Miller : "If the nations of the world will agree to outlaw war, if they will agree to substitute law for force, to settle by pacific means all disputes among them, if they will agree to unite against any people which so agrees but then betrays humanity by tearing up

¹ See Assembly Document, A. 135, 1924.

² There was also circulated to members of the Assembly a draft treaty by Mr. H. E. Hyde, of New Zealand. This plan, however, visualised a virtual revision of the League's Constitution. It had no bearing upon the final form of the Protocol. For a summary and text of the plan see *Information on the Reduction of Armaments*, pp. 96-97, 186-191.

³ For a comparison of the Joint Sub-Committee's draft with the draft as finally adopted see *Information on the Reduction of Armaments*, pp. 97-116.

its own agreements, then we may develop intra-nationally a belief in security, a confidence in a settled order, a hope for the future, which will slowly but inevitably disarm the forces for war and lift the curtain on a new day.”¹

This might equally well have been written of the Covenant itself, and clearly shows how far removed the spirit of the Protocol was from that of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which definitely sought to supplement the provision of the Covenant by new machinery.

The principal feature of the Protocol was the new element of arbitration. To effect this, the Protocol provided that all legal disputes must go before the Permanent Court of International Justice (this entailed the general acceptance of the obligatory clause to the Protocol of the Court), and any non-legal dispute must be submitted to arbitration. The system of arbitration devised was elaborate and even cumbrous:—

1. The Council first attempts to settle the dispute by conciliation.
2. Failing this, it endeavours to persuade the parties to arrange arbitration on their own account.
3. If both sides will not agree to this, the Council, at the request of one of them, appoints arbitrators.
4. If neither side desires arbitration, the Council becomes the tribunal and its decisions, if unanimous, are final.
5. If the Council is not unanimous, it appoints arbitrators in spite of everything, and their ruling is final.²

In any case, by virtue of Article 2 of the Protocol, war was declared a criminal offence, and the arbitration system thus provided would, it was believed, definitely stop up the loophole for war left by Article 15 of the Covenant, by which, in the event of the Council’s being unable to come to a unanimous decision over a dispute, “The members of the League reserved to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.”

Having provided these strict terms of settlement for

¹ *Geneva Protocol*, by David Hunter Miller, p. 103. Macmillan, New York, 1925.

² See *The Covenant and the Protocol*, League of Nations Union Pamphlet, No. 165, p. 10.

disputes, the way was clear for the definition of an aggressor. This was made in Article 10 of the Protocol, which laid down that "Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor." In addition to this, "In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall be assumed to be an aggressor unless a decision of the Council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare."

1. If it resorts to war rather than submit a dispute for pacific settlement.
2. If it resorts to war rather than conform to a verdict given against it.
3. If it commits an act of war when the Council has forbidden it to move its forces.¹

In this way determination of an aggressor State is made as far as possible automatic, which would relieve the Council of the necessity of threshing out each case; the responsibility of declaring the aggressor, however, must always remain with the Council. Thus a great objection to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was overcome.

The "Sanctions" to be taken against an aggressor State remain those provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant. That is to say, a Covenant-breaking State places itself automatically outside the pale of nations and automatically at war with other States Members of the League, who in their turn undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. In other words, the Economic Boycott would be applied.

Article 16 also empowers the Council to "recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military,

¹ See *The Covenant and the Protocol*, League of Nations Union Pamphlet, No. 165, p. 11.

naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League." This provision was further strengthened under Article 11 of the Protocol, by which all signatory States undertake to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League, and in resistance to any act of aggression. In addition to this, by Article 15 of the Protocol the aggressor State is required to pay all the costs of the war for which it is responsible, and full reparation for all damages, public or private, which the war has caused. It is protected, however, from any alteration of its frontiers and all interference with its internal affairs.

The conclusion of separate defensive alliances was provided for, but no great encouragement was manifested towards this policy.

The definition of aggression, the system of arbitration, and the effective measures to be taken against an aggressor were supposed to create a threefold guarantee of security, which in its turn would pave the way for the International Conference on the Reduction of Armaments, which was foreshadowed in Articles 17 and 21 of the Protocol, and for which the date was actually set for June 15, 1925.

It will be noticed how very closely the framers of the Protocol adhered to the "back-to-the-Covenant" note struck by the British and French Prime Ministers in their opening speeches. The Protocol fulfilled the aims of its framers in that it is a general agreement to supplement and strengthen the Covenant, and is thus calculated to establish security and ultimately disarmament.¹

5. THE FATE OF THE PROTOCOL.

The Protocol was doomed to very much the same fate as the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Of the forty-eight States who at Geneva voted to "welcome it warmly" and to recommend its acceptance, only seventeen signed, and of these

¹ For text of the Geneva Protocol see Appendix C.

only one State, Czechoslovakia, ratified it. These seventeen States (viz. Albania, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Latvia, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Spain, and Uruguay) were to a great extent the same as those which had the previous year accepted in principle the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. From the point of view of the remainder the Protocol lay open to much the same criticisms as the draft treaty, in that it increased the international obligations of States Members of the League over and above those undertaken in the Covenant.

It may be said, however, in this connection, that the Protocol was accorded a far greater publicity than the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and it was only through the repeated articles and speeches on the subject that many of the general public learned just what the British Empire was called upon to do as a Member of the League of Nations.

As far as the British Government were concerned it was intended to make the Protocol the subject for a special Imperial Conference, and invitations to this effect were sent out on December 29, 1924. Prior to this, however, in the preceding October a general election had replaced Mr. Ramsay MacDonald by Mr. Stanley Baldwin, with Mr. Austen Chamberlain at the head of Foreign Affairs, and shortly afterwards M. Herriot gave place to M. Briand. The replies of the Dominions to the invitation of the Imperial Government were chiefly negative, and on January 20, 1925, it was decided not to hold a Conference but to consult the Dominion Governments by cable.¹

The Protocol was then submitted to a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and on March 12th, at the Thirty-third Session of the Council, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the Protocol was unacceptable to Great Britain, the Dominions, and India.

¹ For text of correspondence between the Imperial and Dominion Governments, see British White Paper, *Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Correspondence relating to the position of the Dominions*, Cmd. 2458.

The British Government's case against the Protocol was based first upon its definite objection to compulsory arbitration in all cases, and secondly to the fear that its obligations and responsibilities already undertaken as a signatory of the Covenant would be greatly increased. It doubted the efficacy of the economic sanctions, and was convinced that security could not be reached "by that route so carefully explored by the First and Third Committees of the Assembly in 1924." Mr. Chamberlain declared that the futility of trying to supplement and alter the Covenant to preserve peace in all conceivable cases had been abundantly proved by the Protocol, "for, whatever else its proposals give us, they do not give us security. They multiply offences, but do nothing to strengthen remedies. They increase the responsibilities undertaken by individual members of the League, but do nothing to readjust their burden."

But even as he rang the death-knell of the Protocol at Geneva Mr. Chamberlain was aware that an offer, perhaps the most momentous in modern history, had been made by the German Government to the French, and doubtless it was this knowledge which caused him to conclude his speech with an appeal for "special arrangements to meet special needs . . . these arrangements to be purely defensive in character, framed in the spirit of the Covenant and working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance." For in February 1925 Herr Stresemann made that first tentative suggestion to the Quai d'Orsay, which bore fruit in the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee initialled at Locarno on October 16, 1925.

ANNEX TO PART III

AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

I. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

1. LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

League of Nations Official Journal, Supplement No. 6, October 1921.

Minutes of the Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments.

Records of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Assemblies (1922-1924).

Assembly Document A.35, 1923, ix, Part i (for texts of draft treaties presented by Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel Réquin).

Assembly Document A.111, 1923, iv, First Part (for text of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance).

Assembly Documents A.35, 1924, ix; A.35 (a), 1924, ix; A.35 (b), 1924, ix (for text of replies of Governments in the draft Treaty).

Assembly Document A.135, 1924 (for text of First Anglo-French Resolution on the Protocol).

Assembly Document C.582. M.199, 1924, ix (for text of Draft Protocol).

Reduction of Armaments: Debate in the Fifth Assembly, 4-6 September, 1924. Information Section, Geneva, 1924.

Arbitration, Security, and Disarmament: Documents and Proceedings of the Fifth Assembly (September 1924). Information Section, Geneva, 1924.

2. BRITISH.

Blue Book.

Proceedings of the London Reparation Conference, July and August 1924. Miscellaneous No. 17 (1924), Cmd. 2270.

White Papers.

Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Correspondence relating to the Position of the Dominions.

Cmd. 2458.

II. BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

(a) Books.

Information on the Reduction of Armaments. (See Annex to Part I.)

Disarmament. (See Annex to Part II.)

The Geneva Protocol. By Professor P. J. Noel Baker. P. S. King & Son, London, 1925.

The Geneva Protocol. By David Hunter Miller. Macmillan, New York, 1925.

(b) Pamphlets.

The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Commentary by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. League of Nations Union, London, 1923.

The Covenant and the Protocol. Commentary by H. Wilson Harris. League of Nations Union, London, 1924.

American Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security. World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1924, and Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1924.

PART IV

THE LOCARNO SYMPHONY—FEBRUARY
1925—SEPTEMBER 1926

THE FIRST MOVEMENT

1. GERMAN OFFER, FEBRUARY 9, 1925.

ON March 6, 1925, Mr. Chamberlain proceeded to Geneva, and there made the speech rejecting the Geneva Protocol and emphasising the necessity of finding alternative methods of ensuring security. Prior to his departure for Geneva Mr. Chamberlain had made known in the British House of Commons that Germany had offered a Pact of Guarantee.

This German offer was made in the form of a Memorandum communicated on February 9th by the German Ambassador in Paris to M. Herriot. In a statement made to the *Kölnische Zeitung* of March 12th, Herr Stresemann set forth Germany's motives in taking this step. France still considered herself threatened by Germany, and attempts had been made to form a Triple Pact directed against Germany. Germany, in these circumstances, took the initiative and based her action on the pact formerly proposed by the Government of Dr. Cuno in December 1922, without, however, the limitation of a generation or the provision of a plebiscite. The Ruhr struggle had intervened, but when the Reparation problem had been settled by the Dawes Scheme the Security question became immediate.

The question of the pact was then renewed with guarantees for the integrity of the Western Frontier of Germany, together with proposals for arbitration treaties in the East similar to those between Germany on the one side and Sweden and Switzerland on the other. The Memorandum of February 9th declared that Germany could "declare her acceptance of a pact by virtue of which the Powers interested in the Rhine—above all, England, France, Italy, and Germany—entered into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to be eventually defined more specifically), *vis-à-vis* the Government of the United States of America as trustee, not to wage war against

a contracting State. Furthermore, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status (*gegenwärtiger Besitzstand*) on the Rhine would be acceptable to Germany.¹

The document went on to state that the treaty States could guarantee in this pact the fulfilment of the obligations to demilitarise the Rhineland which Germany had undertaken in Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

In conclusion, it was suggested that it would be worth while considering whether it would not be advisable so to draft the Security Pact that it would prepare the way for a world convention to include all the States along the lines of the *Protocole pour le Règlement pacifique de Différends internationaux* drawn up by the League of Nations.

In the speech to which reference has already been made Herr Stresemann stated that the pact might involve the recognition by Germany of the loss of her historical position in the West, but it also involved for the French military leaders the permanent renunciation of the envisaged French frontier on the Rhine. The German Nationalist Party opposed itself to the movement, disliking the irrevocable *Preisgabe* (renunciation) of Alsace-Lorraine and the solemn reaffirmation of Germany's acceptance of the Versailles Treaty.

On March 24th Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons again emphasised the favourable attitude of the British Government towards the German proposals, and made an eloquent appeal to support the new German offer. Faced with Mr. Chamberlain's speech, the Nationalist Party in Germany called for Herr Stresemann's resignation, but the whole question subsequently fell into abeyance owing to the fall of M. Herriot's Government, the Belgian elections, and the Presidential election campaign in Germany, which resulted in the election of Marshal Hindenburg on April 26, 1925.

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 2435, Miscellaneous, No. 7, 1925, *Papers respecting the proposals for a Pact of Security made by the German Government on February 9, 1925* (hereinafter cited as British White Paper (I)), No. 1, p. 4. See also French Blue Book I, *Pacte de Sécurité*, No. 1, p. 3. (These Blue Books are in themselves of historical interest, since they mark the first departure of the Quai d'Orsay from their usual custom of issuing *Yellow Books*.) See also German White Book, *Materialien zur Sicherheitsfrage*, p. 1, 1925, No. 8, p. 12.

THE SECOND MOVEMENT

ANGLO-FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS, MAY 12-JUNE 16, 1925.

SUBSEQUENT to Marshal Hindenburg's election there was a renewal of activity during May and June in connection with the Security Pact. The character of these negotiations was indicated in the Memorandum handed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Herr von Hoesch, German Ambassador in Paris, on February 28th, in which it was stated that the examination of the suggestions made in the German Memorandum could not be continued until France had submitted them to her Allies and had come to an agreement with them for the establishment of a system of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles.¹

Some delay was caused by the parliamentary crisis in France and Germany, but on May 12th a long process of negotiation was initiated between the French and British Governments regarding the terms of the reply to be sent to the German offer.

The French Government began by sending to London for approval a draft reply to the German offer (May 12, 1925). In this document it was stipulated that the agreement could be conceived if Germany herself entered the League under the conditions laid down in the Note from the Council of the League of Nations dated March 13, 1925. It further suggested that Belgium, which had not been expressly named in the German Memorandum, must clearly be a party to the Pact.²

This draft reply demonstrated the desire of France to be in a position of not violating the proposed Rhineland Pact if she went to the help of Poland, and of not allowing Germany

¹ British White Paper (I), No. 2, pp. 4-5; French Blue Book (I), No. 2, p. 4; German White Book, No. 9, p. 14.

² British White Paper (I), No. 3, pp. 5-10; French Blue Book (I), No. 3, p. 5; German White Book, No. 10 (a), pp. 14-18.

This reference to Belgium was consistent with the French policy adopted at the Paris Peace Conference. See above, Part I, p. 41.

to use it to prevent action by the Allies under the League Covenant.

In the sixth section of the reply the French Government stated that they considered the general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace could not be effectively assured unless the contemplated agreements formed an indivisible whole. This general convention should be capable of forming, as suggested in the German Memorandum itself, the nucleus of a still more general pacific *entente*. Finally, France welcomed the suggested participation of the United States of America.

After the presentation of the French draft reply Mr. Chamberlain on May 19th addressed an informal Memorandum to the French Ambassador with regard to certain points in that Note (May 12, 1925).¹ In the French reply to this, communicated by the French Ambassador on May 25th, it became clear that France strongly desired that her hands should be left free as regards Eastern Europe,² and that she did not intend that the proposed Pact should in any way infringe the political agreement arrived at between herself and Poland in Paris on February 19, 1921.³

This communication produced on May 28th a long Memorandum from the British Government, in which Mr. Chamberlain gave a definite outline of the policy of his Government in this matter and enclosed a suggested alternative draft to the French Memorandum⁴ designed to meet the British Government's view. Mr. Chamberlain referred to his speech in the House of Commons on March 24th, in which he had indicated that, while the British Government could not accept an extension to every frontier of obligations of the most serious kind, they could properly undertake such

¹ British White Paper (I), No. 4, pp. 11-13; French Blue Book (I), No. 4, pp. 7-8; German White Book, No. 10 (b), pp. 18-21.

² British White Paper (I), No. 5, pp. 13-18; French Blue Book (I), No. 5, pp. 9-10; German White Book, No. 10 (c), pp. 22-25.

³ Official French text registered with the League of Nations on July 2, 1923. See above, pp. 42-44.

⁴ British White Paper (I), No. 6, pp. 18-28; French Blue Book (I), No. 6, pp. 11-18; German White Book, No. 10 (d), pp. 26-38.

obligations in that sphere with which British interests were most clearly bound up—namely, the frontier between Germany and her Western neighbours. The basic principle by which the British Government was guided was that any new obligation which they undertook must be specific and limited to the existing territorial arrangement on the western frontier of Germany.

Section IV of the French draft reply had contemplated the conclusion between the signatories of the proposed Rhineland Pact of arbitration treaties, which would apply to all disputes of whatever nature and would be guaranteed jointly and severally by the signatories of the Rhineland Pact.

Section V had suggested that the same joint and several guarantee should be given by the same Powers to similar arbitration treaties between Germany and States other than signatories of the Pact. The British Government felt that, while for the Continental Powers concerned the conclusion of the suggested arbitration treaties formed, as had been stated in the French draft reply, a natural complement of a Rhineland Pact, this, in view of the world-wide interests of the British Empire, was not the case with Great Britain. For the same reasons the British Government, while it was of the opinion that it would be in the best interests of peace if the Rhineland Pact and the various arbitration treaties between Germany and her neighbours came into force simultaneously, felt unable to support the proposal made in Section VI of the French draft, that all such arbitration treaties should form an indivisible whole and be co-ordinated in one general convention. The British Government were, however, prepared *in principle* to give a guarantee following logically from the territorial guarantee of the Rhineland, of arbitration treaties to be concluded between Germany and her Western neighbours, signatories of the Pact. This meant, of course, the inclusion of Belgium in the Pact.

In their reply of June 4, 1925,¹ the French Government

¹ British White Paper (I), No. 7, pp. 28-43; French Blue Book (I), No. 7, pp. 19-24; German White Book, No. 10 (e), pp. 38-48.

stated that while they realised the circumstances which led the British Government to limit their undertakings on the Continent, the French Government for their part considered it essential to preserve their liberty to go to the assistance of States to which they deemed it necessary to grant their guarantee, without it being possible for the provisions of the proposed Rhineland Pact to block their way and thus to be turned against them. To leave no doubt on this point the French Government, therefore, submitted a French re-draft practically embodying the British amendments of Sections IV to VII of the final text.

On June 8th, in Geneva, Mr. Chamberlain addressed to M. Briand a Note containing the statement of the attitude of the British Government towards the question—all-important to the French Government—of French freedom of action in Eastern Europe under the Rhineland Pact.¹ The British Government recognised that the proposed Rhineland Pact could not operate as a barrier to prevent France taking action in conformity with such guarantees as she might have given to arbitration treaties between Germany and Germany's neighbours.

On June 16th the Note agreed upon between Paris and London was handed to Herr Stresemann by the French Ambassador in Berlin. It consisted of seven articles, which are here reproduced.²

Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German Note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations :—

I

The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations.

Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them

¹ British White Paper (I), No. 8, pp. 44–45; French Blue Book (I), No. 8, pp. 25–26; German White Book, No. 10 (f), pp. 48–50.

² British White Paper (I), No. 9, pp. 45–51; French Blue Book (I), No. 9, pp. 27–29; German White Book, No. 11, pp. 50–55.

clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace.

The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League.

This Agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the Note from the Council of the League of Nations, dated the 13th March 1925.

II

The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the Peace Treaties.

The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses.

Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them.

III

The memorandum of the 9th February contemplates first of all the conclusion between the "Powers interested in the Rhine" of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles:—

1. Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States.
2. Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States.
3. A guarantee by the contracting States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarisation of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty of Versailles, of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States.

Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly, named in the German Memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested.

It also goes without saying, and, further, results from the silence on this point of the German Memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative

to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.

IV

The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States parties to the Rhineland Pact arbitration treaties guaranteeing "a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts."

France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that, as between France and Germany, such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes, and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or of the Rhineland Pact or in virtue of the guarantee given to an arbitration treaty by the parties or by any one of them. An arbitration treaty of the same kind between Belgium and Germany would be no less necessary.

To give full effect to these two treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures.

Where one of the contracting parties, without resorting to hostile measures, fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.

V

In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, which the Rhineland Pact tends to consolidate and of which it is to constitute an essential element, could not be completely guaranteed.

The Allied States, in fact, have under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

These arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in Section IV. The Powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and of the proposed Rhineland Pact would have the option, if they so desire, of constituting themselves the guarantors of such arbitration treaties.

VI

Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present Note should affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant of the League.

VII

The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present Note come into force simultaneously.

These agreements, in conformity with the Covenant, ought to be registered by the League of Nations and placed under its auspices.

Finally, it goes without saying that, if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realised, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security.

Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The French Government would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

The view taken in England of the French reply to Germany on the terms of the proposed Pact was summed up in the House of Commons debate on June 24th, when Mr. Chamberlain explained the negotiations. British obligations under the Pact were limited to the West. France was allowed to assume a special obligation to Poland, but as regards Eastern Europe British obligations could not go beyond the Covenant.

On the German side the signs were that criticism tended to concentrate on the right given to the French in Eastern Europe, on the conditions attaching to Germany's entrance into the League, and the reasserted prohibition by implication of Austria's union with Germany. It was also clear that a consideration of German relations with Soviet Russia would affect any decision that was to be made.

The opinions of the British Dominions on the pact were not wholly favourable. General Smuts in South Africa opposed the pact, seeing in it the danger of the disintegration of the British Empire. He proposed that Britain should take an independent line, leaving each of the Dominions to

come to a separate opinion. General Smuts further declared for an Imperial Foreign Policy, based upon the Covenant and without any further commitments. The Canadian attitude, though not officially so, was one of reluctance. New Zealand decided to abide by the opinion of the British Government.

THE THIRD MOVEMENT

THE GERMAN REPLY OF JULY 20TH AND GENERAL OPINIONS.

THE reply of the German Government to the Note, which had been handed to Herr Stresemann by the French Ambassador, M. de Margerie, on June 16th, was made on July 20th.¹

In this reply the German Government noted that the proposals of the Allies as contained in the Note of June 16th were based on the suggestions of the German Memorandum of February 9th, yet they gave them another direction on important points, and also placed on them some new constructions. The German Government in their reply proposed to confine themselves to a general statement on some questions of principle and to reserve their attitude on points of detail for final negotiations.²

With regard to Article II of the French Note of June 16th (which had stated that guarantees of security could not involve or imply any modification of the Peace Treaties) the German Government professed themselves unable to make out the intentions of the Allied Governments. The German Government stated that a pact of security as outlined in the German suggestions did not represent a modification of existing treaties, and that therefore there should be no need for a special statement in that respect. The Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 19) allowed, however, for the possibility of adapting existing treaties at the proper time to changed circumstances by way of peaceful agreement. The German Government added that the Memorandum did not make the conclusion of the Pact dependent on the modifications of the treaty provisions in force concerning the military

¹ British White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 9, 1925, Cmd. 2468, *Reply of the German Government to the Note handed to Herr Stresemann by the French Ambassador at Berlin on June 16, 1925, respecting the proposals for a Pact of Security* (hereinafter cited as British White Paper (2)); French Blue Book (II), *Pacte de Sécurité*, No. 1, pp. 3-5.

² British White Paper (2), p. 6.

occupation of German territories. The conclusion of a security pact would, however, represent an innovation of such importance that it could but react on the conditions in the occupied territories and the question of occupation in general.¹

In the second section of their reply the German Government dealt with Article IV of the French Note of June 16th. Herein it had been stated that Arbitration Treaties with Germany, France, and Belgium were a natural complement to the Rhineland Pact.

The German Government stated that it contemplated treaties of arbitration such as had been concluded in recent years by Germany as well as by a number of other Powers. Treaties of this kind, modelled on the corresponding terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exhausted, in the opinion of the German Government, the possibilities under the prevailing conditions of bringing about, with prospects of practical results, the arbitral settlements of conflicts among States. The German Government were greatly interested in the cases of exception provided for by the Allied Governments in which coercive action by one State against another State was to be permitted. The German Government, judging by the terms of the Note of June 16th and the correspondence published between the French and British Governments, assumed in those cases, in the opinion of the Allied Governments, coercive action could take place without any regular procedure laid down in advance either by arbitral or some other international procedure. If such a view was correct the German Government considered that the results would be that the Allied Governments, for instance, would not wish to subject the decision on the question of the admissibility or inadmissibility of reprisals on account of reparation obligations to a regular procedure, but would leave the decision to their own unilateral discretion.

A further result would be that the German Government would have to cede to the Allied Governments the right to

¹ British White Paper (2), p. 6, section 1; French Blue Book (II), p. 3, par. 1.

take military measures against Germany without any preceding regular procedure, whenever they were of the opinion that Germany had infringed the provisions regarding the demilitarisation of the Rhineland.

Just as serious would be the consequences which might result from the form of guarantee as proposed by the French Note for the Treaties, the conclusion of which was suggested. The intervention of the guarantor would be dependent upon certain conditions. He would, nevertheless, be entitled to decide on his own free judgment whether, in the case under consideration, those conditions actually existed.

The guarantor, then, in the case of a conflict, would have to judge which of the two contracting parties to the Treaty of Arbitration was to be considered the aggressor.

Such a system of guarantees would clearly by such constructions be invalidated to the sole detriment of Germany. The German Government hoped their misgivings on these points would be removed by the Allied Governments.¹

In the third and last section of their reply the German Government stated that they were of the opinion that the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations (as stated in Article 1 of the French Note of June 16th) would not be a necessary condition for the realisation of the fundamental ideas of the German Memorandum, but in view of the importance that the German Government attached to the solution of the security question, they would not raise any objection to the knitting up of the two problems.

The German Government stated that the Note of the Council of the League of Nations of March 13, 1923, had not removed objections that had been expressed by Germany against the acceptance of the obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant.

Germany, as a member of the League of Nations, would not be considered as enjoying equal rights until her disarmament was followed by the general disarmament provided for

¹ British White Paper (2), pp. 7 and 8, section ii; French Blue Book (II), p. 4, section ii.

by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, if the immediate entrance of Germany into the League of Nations was to be rendered possible, a solution had to be found to tide over the time until the general disarmament had become a reality.

The German Government hoped that, despite the doubts and apprehensions indicated, they were yet justified in hoping that further discussion would lead to a positive result.

The general effect produced in London and Paris by the German Note was varied, and in France particularly it was felt that the net result would be to belie the pious hope for an acceleration of the discussions that had been expressed in the final paragraph of the Note. In France the Note was considered to be the first sign of a peace offensive on a grand scale with the revision of the Treaty of Versailles as its ultimate objection. M. Briand hastened to indite a Memorandum of French views on it, of which M. de Fleuriau, the French Ambassador in London, gave a copy to Mr. Austen Chamberlain on July 23rd. In England the speeches of the Prime Minister and Mr. Austen Chamberlain showed that the reply was viewed more favourably, but it was obvious that the provocative tone of the German Note could only impede the negotiations. In this somewhat discouraging atmosphere the keen moral support of President Coolidge for the Pact was a factor of some importance.

THE FOURTH MOVEMENT

THE BRIAND VISIT AND FRENCH NOTE OF AUGUST 26TH.

ON August 10th, three weeks after the receipt of the German reply, M. Briand came to England bringing with him two drafts of the Pact itself—one prepared by the Quai d'Orsay and the other the work of M. Fromageot—and also the text of the proposed French reply to the German Note. At the British Foreign Office a third draft had been made by Sir Cecil Hurst.

The conversations which M. Briand held at the Foreign Office with Mr. Chamberlain hinged on the difference between the French and British interpretation of the word "immediate," which had appeared in Section IV of the French Note of June 16th.¹ The German Government, in their reply, had pointed out that this section could mean that the Allies might reserve to their unilateral decision the right to decide as to whether or not Germany was the aggressor in any given dispute. The Briand-Chamberlain conversations made it clear that the British Government reserved to itself the right to decide whether a flagrant aggression had been made by either France or Germany, and in doubtful cases to refer to the League for a decision. The British Government's limitation of its commitment under the pact was accepted by M. Briand, and official opinions on the whole subject were for the main part brought into accord.

M. Briand returned to Paris on August 13th, and on the following day the French Government circulated the Anglo-French draft to Brussels, Rome, Prague, and Warsaw, and in each case it was received with approval.

The reply of the French Government to the German Note of July 20th was issued on August 24th and published by

¹ *From Dawes to Locarno*, by George Glasgow, p. 94, Ernest Benn, Ltd., London, 1925.

The Times on the 27th.¹ The French Government expressed their satisfaction that the German Government, after a careful study of the French Note of June 16th, believed that an agreement would be possible.

The French Government stated that they realised that the German Government did not seek to subordinate the conclusion of a Pact of Security to a modification of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, but it noted, however, that the German Government twice drew attention to the eventual possibility of concluding agreements under which existing treaties might be adopted to changed circumstances. The German Government had further invoked certain provisions of the Covenant, and had also suggested the hypothesis of a modification of the conditions of the Rhineland Occupation.

The French Government stated that it was aware of the treaty to which the German Note made reference, and that further, in their respect for international undertakings, they had no intention of evading any of the provisions of the Covenant.

In agreement with their Allies the French Government considered that the Treaty of Peace and the rights which Germany, as well as the Allies, possessed thereunder, must not be impaired ; nor would the guarantees of its execution and the provisions which governed the application of those guarantees (and in certain cases contemplated their alleviation) be modified by the proposed agreements, any more than the treaty itself could be modified.

The French reply in its second section stated that the Allies were convinced that membership of the League of Nations would provide Germany, once she had entered the League, with the most efficacious method of presenting her requirements, as other States had found in regard to their interests. The French Government expressed its regret on reading the reservations in the German Note in regard to the League of Nations, but they felt themselves not qualified to speak in the name of the League of Nations.

¹ French Blue Book (II), No. 2, pp. 6-8.

The Allied Governments adhered to their statements that the entry of Germany into the League of Nations under the same conditions as were prescribed for everybody remained, in their opinion, the basis of any understanding of security. It was precisely the absence of any such security which had hitherto blocked the initiation of a process of general disarmament, which was provided for in the Covenant, and to which the German Note alluded.

The French reply was supplemented by two declarations on the part of M. de Margerie, the French Ambassador in Berlin, and these were confirmed by identical declarations by the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, and the Belgian Minister. The first of these was to the effect that France and her Allies considered that it would be a practical advantage for the legal advisers of the four Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Germany, Belgium, France, and Great Britain to meet as soon as possible in order to allow representatives of Germany to become acquainted with the views of the Allies on the juridical and technical sides of the problem involved. The second declaration added that, once the preliminary study had been finished, these Ministers could arrange a meeting, which, in accordance with the desire of the Allied Powers, would accelerate a definitive solution.

On August 29th the British Foreign Office issued an official translation of the German reply to the French Note of August 24th.¹ In its reply the German Government agreed with the French that a further exchange of Notes was hardly calculated to assist the end in view, and therefore accepted the invitation verbally addressed to it by the French Ambassador in Berlin to send German experts to a Conference to be held in London.

¹ *The Times*, August 29, 1925: French Blue Book (II), No. 3, p. 9.

THE FIFTH MOVEMENT

JURISTS' CONFERENCE, AUGUST 31-SEPTEMBER 4, 1925.

THE Jurists' Conference began on August 31st. The British, French, Belgian, and German Foreign Ministers were represented by Sir Cecil Hurst, M. de Fromageot, M. Rolin, and Dr. Gaus. Italy also testified to her interest in the question of the pact by sending M. Pilotti. The discussions were not made public. The conclusions that might be reached by the Jurists were not in the least degree binding on their Governments, and it was essential that every assistance should be given to the various representatives for a frank exchange of views unhampered by any *arrière pensée* which in some form or other must always limit the freedom of action of a politician.

The report agreed upon by this Conference was completed on September 4th and forwarded to the Governments represented. It was reported that the subjects discussed by the Jurists were : (1) The draft of the Security Pact prepared during the visit of M. Briand to London; and (2) the wording of the proposed treaties of arbitration between France and Germany, and Belgium and Germany. The discussion of the question of the arbitration treaties relating to Germany's eastern frontier was left for a future date. On the Security Pact and the Western Arbitration treaties it appeared that the views of the experts on the main points had been brought into harmony.

THE SIXTH MOVEMENT

GENERAL REACTION IN EUROPE.

AFTER the Jurists' Conference a period ensued in the Security Pact negotiations in which, though the rapid passage of Notes between Germany and the Allied Governments ceased, "security" became the catchword of the European Press and the peg upon which to hang much inspired journalism. The Sixth Assembly of the League opened on September 7th. It soon became apparent that, though the actual security negotiations lay outside the competence of the League, it was the Pact that dominated the minds of the European delegates, and became definitely incorporated in the discussions of the Assembly as part of the rhetorical solemnities accompanying the process of laying the Protocol on the shelf. Additional excitement was given to the proceedings by the presence of Mr. Baldwin at Aix-les-Bains "on holiday," and by M. Painlevé, M. Briand, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain motoring from Geneva on September 8th to confer with him regarding the proposed Conference of Allied Ministers.

On September 10th Mr. Chamberlain defined the attitude of the British Government, and dispersed any vague hopes that may have survived in the hearts of the supporters of the Protocol after his statement at the Council in the previous March.¹ He stated that his Government desired to see that the region which was most associated with war should secure in the first place a mutual agreement to guarantee peace, and in this justification of the Rhineland Pact Mr. Chamberlain continued that it was the object of his Government to supplement the Covenant of the League by special arrangements on the basis of the Covenant. On the following day M. Paul Boncour stamped the Assembly by an eloquent defence of the Protocol. After summarising the principal features of

¹ See above, p. 110.

the Protocol, he proceeded to link together Pact and Protocol, desiring that the former should carry the principles of the Protocol into effect, though limited in time and space. An important resolution, moved by the Spanish delegate, Señor Quiñones de León, on September 13th, indicated the angle from which the supporters of the Protocol viewed the Pact. The resolution stated that the Assembly was in sympathy with the endeavour that was being made by certain nations to conclude treaties of mutual security conceived in the spirit of the Covenant of the League, and in harmony with the principles of the Protocol. The Assembly placed on record that such agreements should not necessarily be limited to a restricted region, but might apply to the whole world.

In this manner the League substituted for its most ambitious project the theory that a series of regional pacts would have to be concluded before the Protocol as a whole could be realised; in other words, that the machinery of worldwide arbitration could only be set up by a piecemeal process.

M. Briand returned to Paris on September 13th, and Mr. Chamberlain arrived back in London on the same day, and the centre of interest was transferred from Geneva to Germany.

Here the negotiations had created the liveliest interest, for the proposed Conference of Foreign Ministers marked a turning-point in Germany's post-war relations with outside countries. From the beginning the Nationalist Party had made opposition to Herr Stresemann's foreign policy a broad plank in their platform, and in every rumoured move on the part of France, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia they saw attempts to hoodwink Germany. The report that the scope of the Conference was to be enlarged to include representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia was severely criticised from all quarters. The Nationalist organ, the *Kreuz Zeitung*, observed in a leading article in its issue of September 11th that the Rhineland Pact was in itself an almost insoluble problem, already sufficiently complicated by the demand that Germany should enter the League, and that the reopening of the whole

Eastern question by the proposed enlargement of the Conference burdened the problem of security to an almost unbearable degree.

Poland and Czechoslovakia were already bound to France by definite defensive alliances which, in one case specifically, and in the other by implication, involved armed support in the event of unprovoked aggression. These obligations made it necessary for France to consider under what circumstances and at whose discretion France would be free to cross the neutral zone between herself and Germany which the Rhineland agreement would create. It was this inter-relation of the proposed new Pact with the old treaties that made it necessary to consider inviting representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia to attend the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

The invitation of the Allies to Germany to take part in a discussion of Ministers for the purpose of agreeing upon a Pact of Security was verbally delivered to Herr Stresemann by M. de Margerie, the French Ambassador, at the Wilhelmstrasse on September 15th.¹ A Memorandum was presented at the same time proposing some time between the end of September and the beginning of October as a period for the meeting.

In the weeks following the presentation of the Allies' invitation the opposition of the Nationalist Party to Germany's participation in the proposed conference increased. Behind the violent attacks, such as that made in September by Herr Hertz, one of the leading figures of the German Nationalist Party, the guiding principle seemed to be that the Party wished at all costs to avoid any assumption of responsibility. It had, however, become obvious that Germany could not at this stage withdraw from the Pact negotiations, and when the Nationalist Party recognised that such was the case, its leaders embarked on a vigorous campaign to induce the Government to make as many reservations as possible in their reply. It was reported at an early stage that the Official Nationalist Party had found a formula with regard to Alsace-Lorraine, to

¹ French Blue Book (II), Nos. 4-6, pp. 10-12.

the effect that there could be no question of renunciation of German land because there was always the possibility of a settlement on the principle of self-determination. On the failure of these early claims the Party demanded, among other things, as necessary reservations, the evacuation of Cologne, refusal to comply with the demands of the Disarmament Note of March 1925, and the rejection of the aviation restrictions drawn up by the Conference of Ambassadors. The nature of the demands altered from day to day, but during the week in which the Cabinet were deliberating on their reply, the Government was subjected to a great deal of pressure from both the National Party and the Centre Party to take advantage of the occasion to repeat Germany's denial of her responsibility for the war, as stated in Article 231 of the Peace Treaty. The official attitude was indicated in the *Tägliche Rundschau* (the organ of Herr Stresemann's Party), on September 27th, in an article stating that it was due to a comedy of errors that the subject was not raised at the London Conference on the Dawes Scheme, and that it would only be an act of loyalty on the part of the existing Government if it were to declare that assumption of new international obligations must involve no voluntary admission of a moral delinquency on the part of Germany.

The result of these various manœuvres was that when the German Note, dated September 26th, was delivered to Mr. Chamberlain, M. Briand, and Signor Mussolini the German Ambassadors in London and Paris received instructions to make a point of obtaining a preliminary undertaking with regard to the evacuation of Cologne and the question of Germany's responsibility for the war. The translation of the German Note, issued by the Foreign Office, was published in *The Times* of September 30th. The German Government accepted the invitation of the Allies to a meeting of the members of the Governments concerned, and suggested October 5th as a date. The Note contained no reservations. Verbal declarations were, however, made by the Ambassadors in connection with the subjects which had been debated so

intensely in Germany, and drew extremely sharp replies from the Governments addressed and aroused considerable comment in the European Press.

The answer of Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the German Ambassador was published in *The Times* of September 30th as follows :—

His Majesty's Government have received with pleasure the acceptance by the Government of the Reich of the proposal for a conference on October 5th at Locarno. His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the acceptance is given without reserve.

In reply to the declaration which Your Excellency made to me at the same time, I have the honour to take note of the assurance of Your Excellency that the questions therein raised do not constitute conditions preliminary to a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

These questions have, in fact, no relation to the negotiations for a Security Pact and have formed no part of the preliminary exchange of views.

As regards that part of the declaration which deals with Germany's entrance into the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the German Government raise no objection to this essential condition of any mutual pact. The question of Germany's responsibility for the war is not raised by the proposed pact, and His Majesty's Government are at a loss to know why the German Government have thought proper to raise it at this moment. His Majesty's Government are obliged to observe that the negotiations of a Security Pact cannot modify the Treaty of Versailles or alter their judgment of the pact.

As regards the evacuation of the Cologne Zone, I have the honour to repeat that the date of that evacuation depends solely on the fulfilment of Germany's disarmament obligations, and that His Majesty's Government will welcome the performance of this obligation as permitting the Allies at once to evacuate the Northern Zone.

The *Temps* of September 30th, commenting on the reply of the Allies, trusted that the incident would demonstrate to Germany that the Allies were united in their determination not to allow the treaty to be tampered with. It also stated that, after a meeting of the German Cabinet, Herr von Hoesch had assured M. Briand that the German Government had agreed that points raised in the verbal declarations should be excluded from the Locarno Agenda. In Germany itself the rebuff which had been administered was generally laid to the charge of the Nationalists, who were roundly abused in

certain sections of the Press, such as the *Berliner Tageblatt*, for their lack of a sense of responsibility, and political incapacity ; the Nationalist Press, however, for somewhat obscure reasons, maintained that the placing on record of the German denial of war guilt was in itself a German victory.

In canalising the flood of opposition to the Pact on to the questions of war responsibility and the evacuation of Cologne, the problem of the participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the Conference was comparatively neglected in the German Press. A somewhat unexpected turn was given to this particular point when it was announced that the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, M. Krofta, had informed Herr Stresemann on September 20th that, having regard to the Notes exchanged between Germany and the Allies, the Czechoslovak Government were prepared to enter into negotiation for the conclusion of a German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty. The action of the Czechoslovak Minister was not done in co-operation with the Polish Legation—a fact which demonstrated the incorrectness of bracketing the two countries together as if their interests were identical.

In the conclusion of this sketch of the events immediately prior to the Conference at Locarno, it remains to trace the rather sinister movements of a Power not directly concerned in the Security negotiations. At a very early stage the diplomatists of Soviet Russia manifested their dislike of the new policy and made plain their determination to upset the Security apple-cart. The *Izvestia*, on September 14th, stated that the Security Pact would force France to lessen her support of Poland, and Poland was advised to turn her eyes from the West and join up with the U.S.S.R. This indication of Soviet policy was confirmed when it became known that Count Skrzynski, the Polish Foreign Minister, had decided to go directly to Warsaw (instead of proceeding to Paris) to meet M. Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs. On the Polish side the Security negotiations had been viewed with suspicion, and Soviet overtures were not altogether unwelcome, when the Polish Press, oblivious of the Polish annexation

five years previously of many thousands of miles of Russian territory, light-heartedly proclaimed that there were no real difficulties outstanding with Russia, and at this period the general temper of the country appeared to be one of reaction against the Rhineland Pact and distrust for the schemes of arbitration treaties for the Eastern frontiers. After a postponement due to illness, M. Chicherin went to Warsaw at the end of September, and during his visit held numerous conversations with Count Skrzynski, and wishes were expressed at a dinner given in his honour that a spirit of reason would overrule the historic lack of harmony between Poland and Russia. Count Skrzynski later informed the French Government of the exact situation in regard to Chicherin's visit to Warsaw. The initiative had come from Moscow and no choice was left to the Polish Government, as the news of Chicherin's proposed visit was accompanied by a definite proposal to conclude a commercial treaty and to liquidate the outstanding questions connected with the Treaty of Riga of 1921. Count Skrzynski explained that he had given Chicherin no ground for supposing that the Polish Government would be ready to change the orientation of its policy.

From Warsaw M. Chicherin went on to Berlin, where the Nationalist Party welcomed the possibility of throwing grit into the machinery of the Locarno Conference in advance, and declared that nothing must be allowed to happen at Locarno that might endanger Germany's relations with Soviet Russia. On the eve of the departure of the German delegation for Locarno it was announced that the Cabinet had approved "in principle" of the draft Trade Treaty with the Soviet. On October 4th Herr Stresemann, at Locarno, in a statement to the Press, declared that the visit of Chicherin to Berlin had afforded an opportunity for the settlement of the outstanding political and economic relations between the two countries. Herr Stresemann regretted that the policy of Germany had been represented as a choice between the East and the West.

THE SEVENTH MOVEMENT

LOCARNO AND AFTER, OCTOBER 6TH-DECEMBER 1ST.

AT the time when the idea of the Security Pact began to crystallise it was uncertain whether Italy would be a party to the negotiations. Reports appeared in the British Press that Signor Mussolini would be likely to ask for an extension of Britain's guarantee to that portion of the Italian frontier which borders on Austria, and to consider the Piave as much a Western frontier as the Rhine.¹ Signor Mussolini, in his speech to the Senate on May 20, 1925, firmly stated the necessity of a Brenner Security Pact as a corollary to Italy's adhesion to a Western pact, but Italy ultimately sent her delegate to Locarno without any such agreement having been reached. In a review of the situation, Signor Mussolini, a year after his first statement,² explained that the frontier of the Brenner was not guaranteed because the Italian Government realised that the pact was already sufficiently complicated. He added, somewhat naively, that to have asked Germany for such a guarantee would have involved an implicit admission that Germany could at a given time come down to the Brenner and become a neighbour.

The Conference at Locarno was formally opened on October 4, 1925. The following were the chief representatives of their respective countries :—

England.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain ; Sir Cecil Hurst ; Mr. Miles Lampson ; Mr. Sterndale Bennett ; Mr. Walford Selby (Private Secretary to Mr. Austen Chamberlain).

Germany.

Dr. Luther (Chancellor) ; Herr Stresemann (Foreign Minister) ; Herr von Schubert (the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office) ;

¹ *Morning Post*, September 14, 1925.

² *European Economic and Political Survey*, vol. i, No. 19, June 15, 1926.

Dr. Kempner (Permanent Secretary to the Chancellor's Department); Dr. Gaus (Legal Adviser); Herr Kondner (also of the Chancellor's Department); Dr. Kiep (Head of the Press Department of the Foreign Office). In addition the German delegation consisted of several experts (such as Herr von Bülow, an expert on questions relating to the League of Nations) and, together with secretaries and typists, numbered about twenty-five.

France.

M. Briand (Minister of Foreign Affairs); M. Philippe Berthelot (Secretary-General to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); M. Fromageot (Legal Adviser); M. Leger (M. Briand's Private Secretary).

Belgium.

M. Emile Vandervelde (Minister of Foreign Affairs); M. Henri Rolin (Chef de Cabinet); Baron von Zuylen, Comte du Chatel (Directors of the Western Europe Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); M. Dernel (Chief of the Juridical Section of the Ministry).

Italy.

Signor Scialoja (Italian Representative on the Council of the League of Nations); Signor Dino Grandi (Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs); Signor Chiarmonte Bordonaro, Signor Medici del Vascello (Ministers Plenipotentiary); Signor Pilotti (Legal Adviser); Signor Buti (of the Italian Diplomatic Service).

The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Benès, and the Polish Foreign Minister, Count Skrzynski, did not arrive at Locarno until four days after the Conference had opened.

Perhaps the most significant indication of the atmosphere which it was hoped would prevail at Locarno was made in a speech delivered by M. Painlevé at Nîmes on October 3rd,¹ wherein Franco-German reconciliation was described as the corner-stone of European civilisation. M. Painlevé also made an interesting comment on the position of Poland and Czechoslovakia. "Precisely because the Rhine has an essential rôle in European peace we do not wish the young nations liberated by the war to feel themselves injured by the special precautions which the Rhineland exacts for the tranquillity of our old Continent."

At the outset of the conference it seemed all too likely that any possible harmony of opinion would be disrupted on

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, October 5, 1925.

account of the problems connected with Poland and Czechoslovakia. For France the crux lay in finding in what measure her existing liabilities towards these two countries could be liquidated in the new arrangements, and in insisting on a simultaneous conclusion between Germany and her Eastern neighbours of arbitration pacts, together with the Western pact. In Germany, on the other hand, it was maintained that the Western and Eastern problems could not be compared, since in the first place the Western frontier was covered by a demilitarised zone which would make a case of deliberate aggression far more clear ; secondly, both Poland and Czechoslovakia had large German minorities, for whose welfare Germany felt a certain amount of moral responsibility.

The absence from Locarno of both Dr. Benès and Count Skrzynski during the preliminary stages of the Conference tended, from this particular point of view, to ease matters. It had previously been agreed that Mr. Chamberlain should take the initiative in opening the proceedings, and it was further decided to issue only short communiqués on the discussions at the several meetings. The cryptic nature of these communications, and certain leakages of information produced, in the place of solid information, a series of wild rumours. One of the worst scares was the appearance in several newspapers in Rome of a version of the draft pact—with anti-German twists which called forth a volume of abuse and anger in the German Nationalist Press.

Meanwhile, the work at Locarno, apart from the formal meetings, was carried on by a series of informal conversations between the representatives of the different countries. For instance, on October 7th there was a meeting between M. Briand and Dr. Luther at Ascona, on Lake Maggiore, at which it seemed to the correspondent of the *Temps* each of the parties must have discovered how far they could go without compromising the interests which they considered vital. On October 10th it was announced that an examination of the articles had resulted in the adoption of a definite text on the majority of points. To this was added a statement that

Italy had joined the number of contracting parties in the preamble.

This concluded the formal business of the first week. The most important feature of the proceedings of the early part of the following week was the commencement of the negotiations between Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia for the arbitration treaties designed to establish security on the Eastern frontiers. Once these had begun, the work at Locarno went swiftly ahead, and on October 14th *The Times* announced that the negotiations for a Pact of Security had been completed, and it only remained to give the finishing touches to the formulæ reached by the Allies with Germany regarding her entrance into the League, and to the method of guarantee of arbitration treaties with the States on her eastern and southern borders. The Locarno Conference came to an end on October 16th, with the initialling of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy (Signor Mussolini arrived at Locarno on the 15th), and of the Arbitration Conventions between Germany and Belgium, Germany and France, Germany and Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The written agreements of Locarno were "nine":¹ the preamble, seven treaties, and a letter. The preamble, technically called "The Final Protocol,"² was signed by all the countries represented: Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In it the signatories declare their intention to "seek by common agreement means for preserving their respective nations from the scourge of war, and for providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes of every nature which might eventually arise between them." It is further stated that a proposal had been made and agreed upon to the effect that in reply to certain requests for explanations concerning Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, presented by the representatives of Germany in a

¹ British White Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 11, 1925, Cmd. 2525, *Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference 1925 (and Annexes), together with Treaties between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia, Locarno, October 16, 1925.*

² British White Paper, pp. 4-7.

letter (of which the draft was attached Annex F),¹ should be addressed to them at the same time as the formality of signing the instruments.

This collective Note to Germany stated that the signatories of Locarno by whom it was signed were not in a position to speak in the name of the League, but they felt justified in giving their interpretation of Article 16. "In accordance with that interpretation the obligation resulting from the said article on the members of the League must be understood to mean that each State Member of the League is bound to co-operate loyally and actively in support of the Covenant, and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account."

The preamble itself concluded with a pledge that the countries concerned would give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations.

The seven treaties, which were initialled only, may be divided into four classes:—

1. The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy.²
2. Arbitration Conventions, ancillary to the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, between Germany on the one side and Belgium³ and France⁴ respectively on the other.
3. Arbitration Treaties not connected with the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany on the one side and Poland⁵ and Czechoslovakia⁶ on the other.
4. The two treaties of guarantee between France on the one side and Poland⁷ and Czechoslovakia on the other.⁸

1. The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

This document consists of ten articles. In the first place, Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, as a

¹ British White Paper, Annex F, pp. 54-57.

² British White Paper, Cmd. 2525, Annex A, pp. 7-13.

³ Ibid., Annex B, pp. 14-23.

⁴ Ibid., Annex C, pp. 24-33.

⁵ Ibid., Annex D, pp. 34-45.

⁶ Ibid., Annex E, pp. 45-55.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 56-59.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 59-61.

group and individually, guarantee the present German frontiers of Belgium and France, and the demilitarisation of German territory west of a line drawn fifty kilometres east of the Rhine. Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other (Art. 2). This undertaking does not apply in the following situations :—

- (1) Exercise of the right of resistance to a violation of the undertaking specified above.
- (2) Flagrant breach of the provisions demilitarising the Rhineland.
- (3) Action in pursuance of Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant.
- (4) Action resulting from a decision of the Assembly or Council of the League.
- (5) Action in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations—action directed against an attacking State, if such an action is taken for the maintenance of peace following a unanimous report on an enquiry by the League Council.

In view of the above undertaking Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means "all questions of every kind which may arise between them, and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy. Questions with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights" are to be submitted to juridical decision. All other questions are to be submitted to a conciliation commission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question is to be settled by the Council of the League.¹

If Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain, or Italy should allege a violation of Article 2, the allegation shall be considered at once by the Council of the League. If the Council is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, those States agree, each for itself, to come to the assistance of the injured State. If there should occur a flagrant breach of the peace, or of the demilitarisation provisions, each State undertakes to come to the aid of

¹ Article 3, Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, British White Paper, Cmd. 252.

the injured State on satisfying itself that an unprovoked aggression has taken place, and that immediate action is called for by reason of military movements. But in this case the Council of the League will still issue its findings and the contracting parties, other than those engaged in hostilities, undertake to act in accordance with them. Article 5 provides a guarantee by the contracting parties (which include Great Britain and Italy) that, in the case of France or Belgium or Germany refusing to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement, or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision (this refusal being accompanied by hostilities or a breach of the demilitarisation provisions), the procedure outlined above will be applied. If the refusal is not accompanied by the overt act or acts, Germany, Belgium, or France shall bring the matter before the Council, and Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and France shall comply with its proposals as to what steps shall be taken.¹

2 & 3. *The Arbitration Conventions and Treaties.*²

The general scheme of pacific settlement is defined by Article 3 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. The detailed arrangements are given in the two arbitration conventions. These conventions, between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France, are identical with the arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia with the exception of the Preamble and of Article 21 of the latter, which is identical with Article 7 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

By the network of these documents Germany on the one side and Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, and Poland, severally, on the other, engage to settle "all disputes of every kind . . . which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy"

¹ See World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, vol. ix, No. 1.

² The Arbitration Conventions will be dealt with in detail in the next publication of the Information Series, to be entitled *Information on International Arbitration*, by Maurice Fanshawe and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett (to be published in 1927).

by peaceful means. Provisions in conventions in force shall be applied to disputes arising thereunder in the first instance.

In any case the jurisdiction resorted to, including the Council of the League, shall lay down provisional measures to be adopted, particularly if the dispute "arises out of acts already committed or on the point of commission." The contracting Governments undertake "to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion prejudicial" to the plans of the commission or the Council of the League, and "in general to abstain from any sort of action whatsoever which may aggravate or extend the dispute" (Art. 19). All contracting parties to the scheme agree to apply it "even when other Powers are also interested in the dispute" (Art. 20).

When the "parties are in conflict as to their respective rights," the dispute "shall be submitted to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice." Such disputes particularly include those "as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach." A test of an international dispute is afforded by providing (Art. 3) that only a dispute upon which a final judgment has been pronounced by the competent national judicial authority falls within the scope of the scheme.

Before seeking an award or decision, however, the parties are at liberty to agree to submit their dispute to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, which they set up for less formal procedure, and whose report is due within six months. If the commission fails to produce agreement between the parties and thus to eliminate the dispute, it (Art. 16) "shall be submitted" either to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal. The Statute controls procedure before the Court. Arbitration may employ arbiters from the panel of the Permanent Court of Arbitration under The Hague 1907 Convention or others; in either case, the procedure of that Convention will control, unless modified by agreement. In formal, judicial or arbitral practice the question at issue is defined by the parties. They might fail to find a satisfactory basis for this "special agreement." If they cannot agree on its terms, one or other of the parties may bring the dispute itself, in its undefined state, "before the Permanent Court of International Justice by means of an application."

While questions involving "conflict as to their respective rights" must eventually come to an award or decision if conciliation at the outset does not solve them, Part II does not definitely leave all other disputes to conciliation. Article 17 assigns to the Permanent Conciliation Commission "all questions . . . the settlement of which cannot be attained by means of a judicial decision as provided in Article 1" and not provided for in other conventions in force. The duty of the Commission is "to propose to the parties an acceptable solution and in any case to present a report."

In case the Conciliation Commission does not bring about, or is unable to propose, a solution acceptable to the parties and the dispute is thus brought to an end, this report is submitted to each of the parties, which are to attempt to reach an agreement on the basis of its facts and considerations. If such agreement is not reached within one month after the Commission has finished its work, the question shall be brought by either party before the Council of the League under the procedure of Article 15 of the Covenant (Art. 18).

The Permanent Conciliation Commission is composed of five members, a national of each contracting party and three nationals of third States appointed by agreement between the contracting Governments. The Commission is permanent, commissioners holding office for three years. In case the parties are unable to appoint, the President of the Swiss Confederation may fill vacant positions. The parties by agreement, or either of them alone, may bring a question before the Commission by a request inviting the Commission to seek a settlement and containing a summary account of the subject-matter. If the dispute should be a technical one, the parties may replace the national commissioners by persons possessing special competence in the matter.

The task of the Commission "shall be to elucidate questions in dispute." It may inform the parties of terms in its opinion suitable for settlement, prescribing a period within which the parties are to accept or reject them. The Commission makes a report of its labours, whether or not it had brought the parties into agreement. Six months is the normal period for the Commission to consider a particular dispute. The procedure of The Hague 1907 Convention relative to commissions of enquiry is normally to be applied.¹

4. The Guarantee Treaties between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia.

The two agreements between France on the one side, and Czechoslovakia and Poland on the other, are not described as "mutually interdependent" on the other instruments initialled at Locarno, thus recognising that they are solely bi-lateral in character. In the event of Poland or France or Czechoslovakia suffering from a failure to observe the undertakings arrived at between them and Germany, France and reciprocally Poland (and Czechoslovakia), acting in application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, undertake to lend each other immediate aid and assistance,

¹ World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, vol. ix, No. 1.

if such failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms.

Between the initialling and the signing of the treaty in December there was the Locarno debate in the House of Commons on November 18th, when there was a large Government majority for signature and ratification. Some slight opposition was manifested in the Liberal Party, which regretted the non-consultation of the Dominions, and by the Labour Party, who detected in the treaty a tendency towards isolating Russia. In Germany, Nationalist opposition continued unabated, and Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz formulated ten reasons for voting against the Pact. On November 21st the Reichsrat adopted the Bill authorising the signing of the Locarno Treaties and the entry of Germany into the League by forty-six to four votes.¹ The debate on foreign policy in the Reichstag commenced on November 23rd, and Dr. Luther announced that the German Cabinet would resign after the signature of the Locarno Pact. During the debate the Socialist Herr Wills approved the Pact on behalf of his party.

Ultimately the Locarno Treaties were signed at the British Foreign Office on December 1st. Apart from the complicated mechanism of the documents themselves they mark a new development in international policy. Locarno stands for the termination of the historic policy of forming political alignments of the type of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. War, it is true, is the final resort provided for in the Treaty of Locarno, but the possibility of war has, it is hoped, been almost eliminated by the new system of bi-lateral guarantee. The machinery of the Treaty is such that the country committing a hostile act automatically finds itself without Allies. The significance of this is twofold. In the first place it is a *business* arrangement. In the past much has been said and little stability has resulted from the claims made on the historic political ties based on blood kinship between countries. In the Locarno agreement these sentimental and frequently disastrous directions given to the conduct of international

¹ *Bulletin of International News*, No. 23, November 30, 1925.

affairs are dispensed with in favour of a policy based on an almost mechanical arrangement for peace. In the second place, as a complement to the statesman-like provisions made in the Treaty for the maintenance of peace, there has appeared a new international spirit—the Spirit of Locarno.

THE EIGHTH MOVEMENT

LOCARNO AND GENEVA, MARCH AND SEPTEMBER, 1926.

AFTER the signing of the Treaties of Locarno the next step on the road to Security was to accomplish the formal entry of Germany into the League of Nations. The German Government had had a hard struggle to overcome the prejudices of the German nation against the League. Germany eventually applied for admission to the League and Council on February 10, 1926.¹

In view of the unfortunate events which marked the March session of the League at Geneva, it is necessary to give a brief account of the composition of the League Council.²

The League Council consisted of ten members. Four of the seven great World Powers already occupy permanent places on it, namely, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. The remaining six seats have been filled by States elected for a year. At the time of the March session, Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay were Council members.

On February 8th *The Times* published an article and a leader on a proposal to add Poland, Brazil, and Spain to the permanent members at the same time that Germany should take her seat. The British Press thereafter devoted much space to the subject, and the arguments against the enlargement of the Council strikingly outweighed those on the other sides.

Various objections were urged. Some critics were pre-occupied with the danger to the efficiency of the League. A larger Council might be paralysed by obstructive use of the veto. Then, again, it was pointed out that the admission of

¹ *Admission of Germany to the League of Nations*, League of Nations Documents, C. 60, M. 34, 1926, vii.

² *Bulletin of International News*, vol. ii, No. 4, February 22, 1926.

second-rate Powers to permanent membership would make it difficult or impossible to exclude others in the future.

It was also asked whether such was the Council that Germany believed herself to be entering when she signed and ratified the Treaties of Locarno.

In England, during the five weeks following the appearance of the article in *The Times*, the question of a further extension of the League Council, outside of the proposed entry of Germany, aroused an expression of public opinion on a matter of international interest for which it would be difficult to find a parallel in recent years either in volume or uniformity. Papers of widely different policies, representative of every party, as well as individuals such as Lord Grey, united to express their hostility to the idea of making Germany's admission to the League and the League's Council an occasion for enlarging the Council by the addition of any other member or members at the March meeting.

Despite the official pronouncement which came from Sweden that the latter country would exercise her vote in the Council against the admission of Poland to a permanent seat (a movement which sealed the fate of the scheme, as in such cases unanimity is required in the Council), the idea of increasing the number of permanent seats on the Council fired the imagination of several members of the League, and, besides Poland, Spain, Brazil, and China put forward their claims.

In England, as has been indicated, public opinion was emphatically and explicitly united against the proposal of enlargement, considering the supreme objection against the proposal to be that, coming at such a time, it had the appearance of being directed against Germany.

On February 23rd, at a moment when public opinion had been thoroughly aroused, Sir Austen Chamberlain made a speech at Birmingham which, in view of the storm it let loose, must be considered to have been inopportune. He indicated that he was not averse to additions being made to the League Council beyond Germany if there could be

found suitable additions which would increase the authority of the League. Sir Austen denied that additions beyond Germany would be an infringement of Locarno.

The uneasiness felt with regard to the proposed admission of Poland to a permanent seat was expressed in a speech made by Lord Grey at Newcastle on February 26th. Lord Grey pointed out that to bring in Poland to counterbalance Germany was calculated to encourage the Germans to do the very things that they should refrain from doing. A Deputation from the League of Nations Parliamentary Committee waited on the Prime Minister on the same day and conveyed to him their anxiety on this question.

At a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on March 1st Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that he had taken no decision on the question of Poland's entry when he was passing through Paris in January. He declared that he was averse to any State being brought on to the Council to counterbalance Germany.

In Germany public opinion crystallised into the following form : A permanent seat was promised to Germany at Locarno, and, though there was no guarantee that only Germany should be received into the League Council, there was no mention of other applicants. Sir Austen Chamberlain's Birmingham speech caused widespread resentment, which was, however, directed almost as much against M. Briand.

In Poland it was urged that the situation in Eastern Europe constituted one of the most delicate international problems, and its settlement depended on the policy adopted by Poland. The need for a Slav representative on the Council was much stressed. In a speech on the ratification of the Locarno Treaties on February 25th Count Skrzynski argued that after Locarno Article 4 of the Covenant, in which a seat was reserved for one of the great Allied Powers, could only be interpreted as implying the simultaneous and equal presence of Poland on the Council of the League at the moment of Germany's entry.

In the debate, March 2nd, on the Locarno Treaties in

the French Chamber, M. Briand declared that the French Government was in favour of the extension of the Council's business, and that if the Council were enlarged would see Poland on it with the very greatest pleasure.

On February 22nd the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs made a statement reaffirming Brazil's claim to a permanent seat on the Council. Spain demonstrated the importance she attached to her claim by sending her Foreign Minister, Señor Yanguas, to Geneva. The Chinese attitude was explained by Mr. Chao-Hsin Chu in a speech in which he declared that he had been instructed by his Government to announce that China would only claim a permanent seat on the Council if any other candidates outside Germany came forward. Brazil, Spain, and China supported their claims for the most part by emphasising the size of their territories and populations.

At the meeting of the Assembly on March 17th it became definitely known that Germany's admission to the League would have to be postponed until the ordinary League meeting in September. Up to the last moment, in spite of a series of disconcerting developments, it was hoped that her admission might go through. Efforts were made to placate such States as had chosen to bargain for permanent seats on the Council. Sweden, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia offered to give up their own seats in order that Poland and other States claiming representation might be given a chance of election without increasing the number of seats on the Council. Poland no longer insisted on a permanent seat.

M. Unden's proposal to withdraw from the Council was received with the greatest regret, since almost alone the attitude of Sweden towards the proposal to extend the number of permanent seats on the Council had from the first been irreproachable ; in any case, it was unsatisfactory that the more unselfish members of the Council should be penalised to make way for States with lesser claims. However, in view of the importance of Germany's admission, this could have been sanctioned. Then, at the last moment, the dead-

lock occurred over a difficulty which only latterly was seen to be acute.

Brazil's threat to veto the admission of Germany to the Council if she herself did not receive a permanent seat at the same time was carried into effect. It had been thought that, if the claims of other States with better reasons for demanding permanent seats on the Council were satisfied or sacrificed in order to make Germany's admission possible, Brazil would not stand out alone in defiance of public opinion and incur the odium of wrecking the whole proceedings. But this is exactly what Brazil did do, for reasons best known to herself. At the opening of the Assembly meeting on March 17th, Sir Austen Chamberlain called upon the Brazilian delegate, Señor Mello Franco, to speak, and the Assembly then learnt that the attitude adopted by the Brazilian Government in refusing to vote for the admission of Germany unless Brazil was granted a permanent seat on the Council was irrevocable.

The Assembly at last knew that it had been summoned to no purpose. It spared no pains to convey to the German Delegation its sincere sympathy and regret for the incongruous position in which it had been placed by what M. Briand described as "the humiliating paralysis of the League."

On the motion of M. Briand, a resolution was passed adjourning the whole question of Germany's admission till the September session. Viscount Ishii announced that meantime a Commission would be set up to consider and report on the constitution of the Council before that date.

It was a satisfactory indication of the general atmosphere created at Locarno that in the interim the ultimate success of the Treaties was not doubted. Immediately before the Assembly meeting on March 16th the following statement had been issued by the Locarno Powers:—

The representatives of Germany, Belgium, France, England, and Italy have come together to consider the situation as it has resulted from difficulties of procedure which have arisen and which are an obstacle to the fulfilment of their common aims.

They state that they reached an agreement and succeeded in over-

coming the obstacles which, at a certain time, came between them. If these difficulties should persist, as there is reason to believe, the representatives of the seven Powers signatories to the Locarno Protocol would regret their inability at present to accomplish the end which they had foreseen. But they are happy to state that nothing affects the work for peace which they had realised at Locarno, and which remains with all its value and force.

They remain bound thereto to-day, as yesterday, and are firmly resolved to undertake in common to maintain and develop that work.

They remain convinced that on the occasion of the next session of the Assembly the present difficulties will be overcome, and that an agreement on the questions arising out of Germany's entry into the League of Nations will be realised.

LUTHER, STRESEMANN, VANDERVELDE, BRIAND,
CHAMBERLAIN, SCIALOJA, SKRZYNSKI, BENÈS.¹

For a time the Treaties remained in cold storage, but the hopes of the "Locarno Powers" were fulfilled at the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations, when, after the two Sessions in May and August of the Committee appointed to consider the reconstruction of the Council, Germany was unanimously elected on September 8th as a member of the League of Nations, and appointed to a permanent seat on the Council. The exchange of ratifications of the Locarno Treaties on September 14th marked the formal inauguration of the new international policy of Security.

¹ *European Economic and Political Survey*, vol. i, No. 14, March 31, 1926.
Translation of French text.

ANNEX TO PART IV

SECURITY PACT

Feb. 9, 1925 Germany made tentative overtures to France for a Pact of Security.

March 5 Mr. Chamberlain made a declaration in the House to the effect that the British Government attached great importance to the German offer.

June 16 The French Government replied by Note to the German offer laying down the seven essential points upon which a basis for negotiations might be formed.

July 20. The German Government, in a Note of Reply, agreed among other points to the linking up of the subject of a Western Pact (Great Britain—France—Belgium—Germany) with that of Germany's entry into the League of Nations, but made reservations with regard to Article 16 of the Covenant.

Aug. 10-13 Conference in London between Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand at which the actual text of the Pact was discussed.

Aug. 14 The Anglo-French draft text agreed upon was circulated to Rome, Brussels, Prague, and Warsaw for approval.

Aug. 26 French Note of Reply emphasised the necessity of Germany's entry into the League upon an equal footing without reservations. In presenting this Note the French Ambassador in Berlin, accompanied by the British and Belgian Ambassadors, suggested that the period of diplomatic correspondence was at an end and there should be :—

- (1) A Conference of legal advisers to the Foreign Offices at London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, and Berlin for the settlement of juridical questions.
- (2) A Conference of Foreign Ministers to conclude a final agreement.

Aug. 28 German Note of Acceptance of French suggestions.

Aug. 31- Sept. 4 Conference of Legal Experts in London drew up a final draft of the Security Pact, and also draft arbitration agreements between France and Germany, and Belgium and Germany.

Oct. 5-16 Conference of Foreign Ministers at Locarno (Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). The delegates initialled on October 16th :—

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

A. WESTERN PACT.

1. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy).
2. Arbitration Treaties between Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium.

B. EASTERN PACT.

1. Arbitration Treaties between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia.
2. Treaties of Reciprocal Guarantee between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia.

C. A LETTER TO THE GERMAN DELEGATION REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 16 OF THE COVENANT SIGNED BY THE OTHER SIX DELEGATES.

Nov. 16-18 Locarno debate in House of Commons, large Government majority for signature and ratification.

Nov. 23-27 Locarno debate in Reichstag.

Dec. 1 Conference of the Contracting Powers in London for the formal signature of the Locarno Treaties.

Jan. 21, 1926 Belgium ratified.

Jan. 22 Italy ratified.

Feb. 28 Czechoslovakia ratified the Locarno Agreement.

March 3 France and Poland ratified the Locarno Agreement.

March 8-17 Extraordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. Germany's admission postponed until September on account of Brazil's veto.

Sept. 8 Germany elected member of the League at the Seventh Assembly.

Sept. 14 Ratifications of the Locarno Treaties exchanged. Treaties come into force.

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PART V

THE U.S.S.R. AND SECURITY

I

THE TURKISH AND GERMAN NEUTRALITY TREATIES

1. THE SOVIET-TURKISH AGREEMENT

WITHOUT doubt the success of the Locarno negotiations, initiated in February 1925 and concluded in the following December, was a severe blow to Soviet diplomacy, partly because they detached Germany from a purely Soviet orientation and partly because they bid fair to establish a united front among the "capitalist" Powers in the West. It was necessary, therefore, to find an alternative formula which would attract the Eastern European Powers and Turkey, and which might even succeed in winning back some part of what had been lost through German adherence to the Locarno Agreement.

Just as *arbitration* had been the talisman of the Western Security negotiations, so *neutrality* became that of the new system put forward by the Moscow Government. The history of the putting into operation of this system falls into two distinct periods: the first a preliminary period, from July 1925 to April 1926; the second a more leisurely movement, which, although it overlaps the first, in that it began in January 1926, is still more or less distinct from it; this is the period of negotiation between the Soviet and Baltic Governments which is still in progress.

By July 1925 the Western Security negotiations had become sufficiently advanced to alarm Moscow, and immediate steps were adopted to create some counter-attraction. A reaffirmation of the alliance with Turkey at once presented itself, as that Power was already becoming embroiled with Great Britain in the Mosul dispute. But something more than a mere reaffirmation was required—a new note had to

be struck, a new system initiated. Tentative negotiations were, therefore, opened between Moscow and Angora.¹

The curious thing about the Soviet-Turkish Treaty is that it had not taken place earlier. It would have been so useful to Turkey in her Geneva negotiations over Mosul, and certainly Moscow would not have proved averse to causing the League difficulties at an embarrassing moment. Why, then, was the conclusion of the negotiations delayed till after the crowning of the Locarno Agreement?

The answer is contained in the statement made by M. Litvinoff, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs (and acting Commissar during the absence of M. Chicherin in Western Europe), on December 23, 1925.² "I shall not deny," said he, "that the formal definition of our relations with Turkey and the hurried signature of the agreement were called forth by rumours appearing frequently in the Anglo-American Press, and becoming more insistent of late, of a secret agreement concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Italy and directed against Turkey. On the other hand, the Soviet Government was aware of the attempt of certain countries to draw Turkey into political combinations against it."

It is clear, then, that the path of negotiations between Moscow and Angora had not been entirely free from misunderstandings. The truth is this—Moscow had in fact hoped for an alliance with Italy, and this was not merely a fabrication of the Anglo-American Press. Indeed, during the month of October, Signor Mussolini had hastily summoned several of his foreign advisers to Rome to discuss the Russian situation, but as it turned out matters quite the contrary of an alliance were the subject of discussion.

At the same time Moscow had had even more reason to be suspicious of Angora. M. Litvinoff's allusion to "the attempts of certain countries to draw Turkey into political

¹ See a commentary on the Soviet-Turkish Agreement by "Europa," which appeared as a special supplement to vol. ii, No. 1, of the *Bulletin of International News*, issued by the Association for International Understanding on January 11, 1926.

* *Pravda*, December 24, 1925.

combinations" is a reference to the threatened *rapprochement* between Poland and Turkey which had been indicated by the exchange of military missions between Warsaw and Angora, and, further, to the attitude of Turkey during the Georgian revolution of 1924, which was also reported to have received much inspiration and some funds from Paris. Finally, it is even supposed that the Little Entente, none too kindly disposed at any time to Moscow, had made advances to Turkey through Dr. Benès.

Thus matters stood at the beginning of the autumn of 1925, with little or no progress made towards the Soviet-Turkish alliance. Then, in October, the long-sought formula for agreement among the Western Powers was found at Locarno, and at the beginning of December Turkey suffered a grave setback in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the consequent award of the Council of the League of Nations in the Mosul dispute. Simultaneously M. Chicherin was in Paris, having achieved singularly little diplomatic success during his much-heralded Western European tour. Both countries felt it was imperative to achieve something that might compensate for the loss of prestige which both claimed to have suffered. These circumstances led to the two calls made by Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Turkish Foreign Minister, at the Soviet Embassy during his flying visits to Paris, in the course of the Mosul negotiations at Geneva. It was during the last of these, namely, on December 17, 1925, that, in company with M. Georges Chicherin, he signed the Treaty.

The Treaty itself, the text of which was published in Moscow on December 23,¹ is brief, consisting only of three articles and three additional protocols. By the first of these articles Russia and Turkey agree that in the event of either being the victim of military action the other will remain neutral. A special note provides that the term "military action" does not apply to manœuvres or demonstrations in force. By Article 2 the two States undertake not to attack

¹ *Pravda*, December 23, 1925.

one another, and not to participate in any alliance or political agreement with a third party directed against either of them. Protocol 2 amplifies this provision to include among political agreements all financial and economic agreements between any Powers directed against Turkey or Russia. In addition, Article 2 provides for the abstention on the part of the Contracting Parties from joining with any other Powers in hostile acts against either of them. The agreement remains in force for three years from the ratification and enters at once into force. Apart from the obligations in the treaty, both Powers reserved complete freedom of action in the relations with any third person (Protocol 1), but the two agree to establish "a modus of settlement" of differences arising between them which cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channels (Protocol 3).

As the Russian counterblast to Locarno, or the Turkish reply to the League's Mosul decision, the treaty has little political significance, since neither party is in any danger of being called upon to assist in attacking the other, and it is improbable that either would benefit by an attack by a third party against the other. But it is important as being the first step in the new system of "neutrality" treaties of security initiated by Russia.

One point, however, remains obscure : *What would happen if either Turkey or the U.S.S.R. was the aggressor?* What would Moscow do if a clash of Turkish and British Interests provoked Turkey to defy the Mosul Agreement and invade the *vilayet*? What would be the attitude of Angora in an attempt by the U.S.S.R. to settle the Bessarabian question by force of arms? Is it possible that the agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey has a special significance here? The text as published does not cover this point, and M. Litvinoff, in the statement already quoted, declared : "I consider it my duty to state that there are no secret annexes whatever to the agreement or to the protocols." If this is so, he is justified in the remainder of his statement that "the agreement is not directed against, and does not threaten, any

country." But there are stranger things in Soviet diplomacy than that entire agreements should not be published. It should be noted that since neither Turkey nor the U.S.S.R. are members of the League of Nations, Article 18 of the Covenant does not apply. The question of aggression, however, emerges a little more clearly in the German Note which accompanied the signature of the Soviet-German Treaty on April 24, 1926.

2. THE GERMAN-SOVIET TREATY

In the final paragraph of his commentary on the Soviet-Turkish Agreement, M. Litvinoff gave the key to the continuity of this new Soviet foreign policy. "The best proof of the peaceable intentions of the agreement is the fact that the Soviet Government is ready to conclude an analogous agreement with all countries with which it has normal relations." The new system of neutrality treaties was to be the means by which Moscow was to win back Germany to her side.

Up to the conclusion of the Locarno Agreements Russian influence had been paramount on the Wilhelmstrasse. In Berlin one found the curious state of affairs in which the Nationalists, because of their opposition to any reconciliation in the West, found themselves of necessity allied to their political opponents, the Bolsheviks, in the East. The efforts of M. Chicherin, during his visit to Berlin, to prevent German acceptance of the Locarno Treaties were strongly seconded by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Ambassador in Moscow, and indeed, directly and indirectly, by the whole Nationalist Party.

But it is necessary for a moment to retrace briefly the steps in the history of post-war German-Russian relations.¹ The real basis of these relations is the Treaty of Rapallo, signed on April 16, 1922, during the course of the Genoa Conference. It will be remembered the initial object for which this Conference was called was to reunite victors and

¹ See *Germany and Russia*, by "Europa," special supplement to vol. ii, No. 9, of the *Bulletin of International News*, issued by the Association for International Understanding on April 26, 1926.

vanquished in the European family. Unfortunately, at the very outset there occurred an *impasse* between the views of Mr. Lloyd George and those of M. Poincaré, and the result was that both Germany and Russia were left somewhat in the cold. The consequent conduct of the negotiations convinced both States that they had little to expect from the Conference, and they at once seized upon the opportunity to settle their own difference. The Treaty of Rapallo was the result.

This action called forth a stern rebuke from the Allied Powers, who were, however, powerless to nullify it.¹ From this moment Russo-German relations progressed smoothly until the Locarno Agreement, which seemed definitely to dispel all chance of a further German-Soviet Entente. Despite the fact that Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that the agreement was directed at no one State and was not antagonistic to Russia, the Moscow Foreign Office preferred to consider it as an anti-Soviet alignment, and, as has been seen, made every effort to secure its rejection by Germany. Failing in this, M. Chicherin rested for a moment on his oars, when an apparently heaven-sent opportunity presented itself to minimise the effect of Locarno on Soviet influence at Berlin.

In accordance with the Locarno Protocol, Germany duly presented herself for admittance to the League of Nations at the extraordinary session of the Assembly called in March 1926. But now an unfortunate incident arose. Brazil threatened to exercise her veto on Germany's admission if she herself were not given a permanent seat on the Council. The Rapallo situation was recapitulated, the German delegation kicking their heels at their hotel at Geneva while the Locarno Powers held fevered conferences in private sitting-rooms. Finally, as is well known, the Assembly broke up with Germany still outside the League.

¹ For the text of the Rapallo Treaty and the subsequent correspondence between the Allied and German Governments, see British Blue Book, *Papers relating to the International Economic Conference at Genoa, April-May, 1922*, Cmd. 1667, pp. 51-58.

Meanwhile, as a prominent political cartoonist depicted the situation, Germany, having been kept waiting too long without service at the League of Nations Hostel, crossed the road to the sign of the Russian Bear and the Red Star.¹ Scarcely had Herr Stresemann returned from Geneva when negotiations were opened with the U.S.S.R. for the conclusion of a treaty on the model of the Soviet-Turkish Agreement, as a reaffirmation of the Treaty of Rapallo.

The first announcement of the impending agreement was made in the British Press in the second week of April,² and was at first vehemently denied by the German Press. But Herr Stresemann acquainted the Foreign Offices of the Locarno Powers with the official intelligence that German-Soviet negotiations were in progress, and, in a speech at Stuttgart on April 18th, declared the the treaty was complementary to and not in the least at variance with the Locarno Pact. German public opinion, too, desired to be on friendly and peaceful terms with her great Eastern neighbour, no matter what might be thought of its inner political and commercial system or of the prospects of the present régime.

There was also a contributory cause to the *rapprochement*. On March 26th there was signed at Bucharest a renewed and strengthened form of the Polish-Rumanian Alliance originally concluded on March 3, 1921.³ The new form of the treaty is dealt with elsewhere;⁴ it is sufficient to say here that it was looked upon as a negation of Poland's Locarno obligations as regards Germany and a renewed threat as to Rumania's claims on Bessarabia. The German attitude towards this new Alliance, and more especially towards Poland, is summed up in Herr Stresemann's party journal as follows: "The new Polish-Rumanian treaty, which is a dagger directed against Germany, and the very strange attitude of the French delegate to the League of Nations, Paul Boncour, in Poland

¹ See Sir Bernard Partridge's cartoon in *Punch*, April 26, 1926.

² See *Times*, April 14, 1926.

³ See above, p. 76.

⁴ See below, p. 176.

recently, do not leave much to be seen of the famous 'Locarno spirit.' "¹

Little apprehension, however, was at first felt among the Locarno Powers, and although the Quai d'Orsay considered that no Russo-German treaty could be compatible with the spirit of the Pact, Sir Austen Chamberlain let it be known that he was not unfavourably disposed to its conclusion.

It was at Warsaw and Prague that anxiety was aroused as to the new treaty, and the Polish Foreign Minister, Count Skryznski, at once posted off to confer with Dr. Benès, his Czechoslovak colleague. The two, after a conference with President Masaryk at Prague on April 15th, decided to circulate the Locarno Powers. It was here that a regrettable leak occurred in the Czech Foreign Office. The German Press of April 21st startled Europe by publishing a five-point *questionnaire* which Dr. Benès had confidentially sent to the Foreign Offices of London, Paris, Rome, and Brussels. The points were as follows :—

1. Is the German Ministry obliged, as the result of the German-Soviet Treaty, to inform Moscow of all its various confidential negotiations with the Powers and the League in so far as they affect the interests of the Soviet and Germany ?
2. If, in the case of a war in which Soviet Russia is involved, the Soviet is not the aggressor, will Germany or the League decide who is the aggressor ?
3. If the League decrees the boycott of Soviet Russia, what will be the attitude of Germany as a member of the League ?
4. Is the clause relating to the neutrality of Germany based upon Article 16 of the Covenant of the League, or on the modification of this article consented to by the Allies in Locarno, relieving Germany of certain obligations ?
5. If the neutrality of Germany is determined by this supplementary declaration, what authority is to decide upon its interpretation ?

The Press made no secrecy of the authorship of the *questionnaire*, and further pointed out that whoever drafted it must have had more than a superficial knowledge of the treaty.

On April 24th the treaty was officially signed at the

¹ See *Germania*, April 15 (evening).

Wilhelmstrasse by Herr Stresemann and M. Nicholas Krestinsky, Soviet Ambassador. Its text was made public in England three days later.¹ In substance the treaty was a four-articled document conceived, as was expected, very much on the plan of that between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey. The two Powers reaffirmed the Treaty of Rapallo as the basis of relations between them, and further arranged for co-operation with regard to all political and economic questions mutually affecting them (Article 1). As in the Soviet-Turkish treaty, Article 2 provided for the neutrality of one if the other is attacked—only, in this Article the attack must be unprovoked. By Article 3 the contracting parties agreed to take no part in any possible economic or financial boycott instituted against either of them, “even at a time in which neither of the Contracting Parties is involved in warlike affairs.” Article 4 provides for the exchange of ratifications, and fixes the duration of the treaty at a period of five years.

The treaty was accompanied by an exchange of Notes between the plenipotentiaries, by which they agreed that in regard to the provision for co-operating politically and economically contained in Article 1, the two Powers would bear constantly in mind the need for the preservation of the general peace ; and, further, that they would at once embark upon negotiations for a general treaty for the peaceful solution of any conflicts arising between them, special attention being given to the principle of arbitration. This agreement is on a par with Protocol 3 annexed to the Soviet-Turkish Agreement.

3. THE TREATIES IN RELATION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

It was one thing for a treaty on these lines to be concluded between two non-members of the League of Nations, but quite another for it to exist between the League's greatest opponent and a State about to become the League's latest neophyte. The German Foreign Office, therefore, was faced with the double problem of proving that its Locarno policy

¹ See *Times*, April 27, 1926.

did not imply hostility towards Russia, and also that its relations with Russia were not at variance either with the Locarno spirit or with the Covenant of the League of Nations. The question of double allegiance had further been strongly emphasised in M. Benès' *questionnaire*, and to answer this was imperative.

This Herr Stresemann endeavoured to do in his Note to M. Krestinsky, already quoted; and in this connection the treaty was of comparatively secondary importance in comparison with the exchange of Notes which accompanied it. The German Foreign Minister declares that Germany's entry into the League "can constitute no obstacle to the friendly development" of Russo-German relations, but he says frankly that Germany is prepared to collaborate in the realisation of the League's plans for the peaceful settlement of international disputes to the best of her ability. He assures the Soviet Ambassador, however, that Germany would most energetically oppose "any efforts within the League contrary to the fundamental idea of peace" directed exclusively against the U.S.S.R.

Having skilfully pledged his allegiance to both parties, Herr Stresemann goes on to consider the question of economic blockade. "The German Government," he says, "proceeds on the assumption that this fundamental attitude of Germany towards the U.S.S.R. cannot be adversely influenced by the loyal observation of the obligations (arising out of Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant and relating to sanctions) which would come into existence for Germany as the consequence of her entry into the League of Nations,"¹ and which could only come into operation against the U.S.S.R. in the event of a war in which she was the aggressor State. In any case, she could only be declared aggressor with the consent of

¹ It will be remembered that Articles 16 and 17 oblige all members to take part in financial and economic sanctions against a recalcitrant State as determined upon by the League. Further, the States Members of the League must contribute to the armed forces to be used in such cases, whether the State against whom action is to be taken is a member of the League or not.

Germany, so that should the Council of the League, in the event of war between the U.S.S.R. and some other State, arrive at a decision (in which Germany could not concur) that the U.S.S.R. was the aggressor, Germany would not consider herself bound by the obligations of Article 16. Indeed, Herr Stresemann gave some prominence to the question whether Germany could take part in the execution of Article 16 at all ; at any rate, in a concrete case, the extent of her action would be based upon the Note of December 1, 1925, agreed upon by all the Locarno Powers with regard to the application of Article 16.¹

This, to a certain extent, clears up the attitude of the Contracting Parties towards an act of aggression committed by one of them—a matter which was not made clear in the Soviet-Turkish Agreement. It is, perhaps, significant that M. Krestinsky's reply to this detailed *exposé* of Germany's attitude towards Russia and towards the League is contained in the merely formal notification :—

The Government of the U.S.S.R. takes note of the explanation contained in Numbers 2 and 3 of your Note concerning the principal questions which are connected with Germany's entry into the League of Nations.

It may, however, be truthfully said that these neutrality treaties contain in themselves nothing contrary or antagonistic either to the Covenant of the League or to the Pact of Locarno. The treaties emphasise the fact, and in this lies their most unique feature, that neither party will take any measure *against* the other *should it be the victim of an attack*. It is thus claimed for the treaties that alone among post-war political agreements they have no provision for military action ! Certainly no one can take exception to their neutrality provisions ; indeed, from a League view-point, they do not go as far as the Covenant itself, which provides for armed

¹ In this Note the Locarno Powers other than Germany informed her that they interpreted the obligations of Article 16 as being understood to be a pledge by the Members of the League that they will "loyally and effectively" (the phrase is from Article 11 of the Geneva Protocol) co-operate in resistance to any act of aggression, *to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes into consideration its geographical position*.

assistance in the event of aggression. It should be added that these treaties may help forward the work of the League, rather than hinder it, by leading to a development of arbitration agreements between Russia and her neighbours.

In fact, it can be said that, with very little amendment, had these agreements been signed between members, instead of non-members, of the League, they would in all probability have been lauded as greatly advancing the cause of peace. But in this matter, as in every diplomatic and political arrangement, it is not so much the text and its provisions which matter as the interpretation put upon them.

II

SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES

HAVING to some extent redressed, as it seemed to them, the balance of Locarno by the Turkish Treaty and the prospect of a similar agreement with Germany, the U.S.S.R. considered March 1926 a favourable moment for taking up the Security negotiations with the Border States at the point where they had been left at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference in December 1922. Again M. Litvinoff is the commentator on the Soviet's foreign policy. In a statement at the end of April¹ he said :

We are proposing a treaty of guaranty to the Baltic States, whether separately, collectively, or with a group among them. Estonia and Latvia are important for us from an economic point of view as well as transit countries. From a political point of view, we are trying to reach a lasting friendship capable of guaranteeing our frontiers with these countries. Foreign influences have hampered this up to the present. . . .

Unfortunately, all our efforts to arrive at a full understanding with Poland have always been obstructed by the attempt of the Poles to try to manage the foreign relations of all the Baltic States. We tried to reach an understanding with Poland, but she insists on speaking in the name of all the Baltic States which, so far as we know, have not entrusted her with this power.

I am glad to note the particularly friendly relations with Lithuania. We consider that the interests of general peace in Eastern Europe would be greatly promoted by a more definite settlement of our relations with Lithuania.

It can likewise be noted that our relations with Finland are steadily improving and becoming closer. To the present we have concluded up to thirty conventions with Finland, thus regulating all phases of our relations.

M. Litvinoff's mention of the attempt of the Soviet Government to reach an understanding with Poland is in

¹ *Izvestia*, April 27, 1926.

reference to a proposed pact of non-aggression between Moscow and Warsaw in 1924. To this offer Count Skrzynski, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied that negotiations could only begin in the case of Russia's other neighbours on her western border being admitted to the discussion.¹ These tentative offers were repeated by M. Chicherin during his visit to Warsaw in the autumn of 1925, when he attempted to secure separate agreements as opposed to the collective agreements at Locarno which would leave Soviet Russia out of the bargain. On this occasion, too, Count Skrzynski replied that, whereas he was prepared to discuss problems arising between the two States as regards the application of the Treaty of Riga or other economic and commercial problems, he preferred to leave the question of security to Locarno.²

Subsequently Poland, instead of gravitating towards Russia, renewed on March 26, 1926, her treaty of alliance with Rumania originally concluded on March 3, 1921. The renewed treaty differed in several respects from the original. Instead of a defensive agreement covering "present eastern frontiers" of the two States, the new treaty pledges mutual support in case of "all foreign aggressions." Thus Rumania must assist Poland in the event of a war against Germany, as well as in a war against Russia. By the application of Article 16 of the Covenant, an act of unprovoked aggression against either party will bring in the other. This provision, however, is only a reaffirmation of the obligations of all members of the League in a similar case, though when the understanding is between two Powers alone it is generally reasoned that it is easier to determine what is "unprovoked aggression" and who is the aggressor.

An entirely new provision is made in Article 6 of the new treaty, and this doubtless is a development of the Locarno Pact, in that all disputes arising between the two Powers,

¹ See Count Skrzynski's statement at Helsingfors in *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 15, 1926.

² See *European Economic and Political Survey* (issued by the Reference Service on International Affairs, Paris), No. 18, May 31, 1926, p. 14.

and "which may be found impossible of settlement through ordinary diplomatic means," are to be submitted to conciliation or to arbitration.¹

It has already been seen how this treaty proved a factor in the conclusion of the negotiations between Berlin and Moscow in the German-Soviet Treaty, when it was considered as "a dagger pointed against Germany." It may readily be understood that it was no more inducive to friendly relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

Thus it was to the Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Governments that the March Note from Moscow was addressed. It had at first been the Soviet intention to negotiate separate pacts with all the Baltic States, but it was later decided to treat with the Estonian and Latvian Governments collectively and separately with Finland and Lithuania.

By virtue of Articles 2 and 7 of their treaty signed at Tallinn (November 1, 1923),² M. Albert and M. Piip, the Latvian and Estonian Ministers for Foreign Affairs respectively, met at Tallinn at the end of April to discuss the Soviet offer, which had been verbally communicated to both. It was decided to send a joint reply, and this was despatched in identic form by both States on April 28th.³

This reply was conveyed in a seven-point Memorandum supplementing verbal conversations with the Soviet diplomatic representatives at Riga and Tallinn. The main points in the reply were :—

1. That the proposed convention should contain the obligation not only of non-aggression, but of abstention from "anything which might destroy the peaceful relations between the States,"

¹ See *European Economic and Political Survey*, No. 16, April 30, 1926. The English text of the treaty is also given there; the French version first appeared in *Le Messager Polonais*, April 20, 1926.

² See above, p. 84. (Tallinn is the Estonian name for Reval.)

³ For text of Latvian reply (identical with the Estonian), see *Sevodnia* (Riga), May 8, 1926. For English version, see *European Survey*, No. 18, p. 16.

and also a provision for the peaceful regulation of all disputes. In addition to this a draft definition of aggression was put forward; namely, that the State will be recognised as the aggressor which commences war against the other contracting party; and also that State which without declaration of war makes an aggression by violent means against the "territorial integrity and political independence" of the other party.

2. That nothing in the proposed convention should be in contravention of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Convention for the neutralisation of the Aaland Islands or of the Latvian-Estonian Alliance.
3. That the proposed convention should contain extensive provisions for the settlement of all disputes either by arbitration, conciliation, or juridical methods.
4. That the contracting States should undertake to forbid "all activity emanating from the territory of one country and conducted on the territory of another," and directed against the political and social order of that State. [This, of course, is particularly intended to bring to an end the energetic Communist propaganda campaign which has been carried on in the Baltic States for the past six years.¹]
5. That the convention should not limit the freedom of action of the contracting parties in concluding agreements with third parties, provided that these were not directed against other of the contracting parties.
6. The proposed convention should contain no limitation of action of its contracting States in the event of one of them being guilty of aggression against a second signatory State in violation of the convention.
7. The proposed convention should be open to the adherence of any other Government, with the consent of all the signatory States.

Immediately after conferring with M. Albert at Tallinn, M. Piip went to Helsingfors to consult the Finnish Foreign Minister. The Finnish reply to the Soviet Government was despatched on May 5th, and was in principle identical with those of the Estonian and Latvian Governments.² Later in the month (May 18-20, 1926), President Tschakste of Latvia

¹ It will be remembered that the Soviet refusal to agree to a similar undertaking was one of the most important reasons for the failure of the Moscow Conference.

² For text see *Sevodaia*, May 7, 1926. English version in *European Survey*, No. 18, p. 16.

paid a visit to President Relander of Finland, and the general policy of the Baltic States towards the proposals of the U.S.S.R. was still further discussed. The spirit of the policy decided upon is expressed in the words of M. Relander: "The responsibility for the security of the vital interests of our nations lies on each of us separately and on all of us together."¹

The greatest direct success achieved by Soviet diplomacy was in the case of Lithuania. It has been seen that Moscow considered that "the interests of general peace in Eastern Europe would be greatly promoted by a more definite settlement of our relations with Lithuania." Early in April of 1926 conversations were opened between Kovno and Moscow for the conclusion of a Soviet-Lithuanian treaty on the model of that already made with Turkey. It is noticeable that the other Baltic Governments in their replies favour a convention on the lines of the Pact of Non-aggression of which the draft was approved at the Moscow Conference, rather than series of neutrality treaties such as those recently concluded by the Soviet Government.

Lithuania, of all the Baltic States, is most friendly to the U.S.S.R. by reason of their common hatred of Poland, and this same reason alienates Lithuania from the Baltic group, which to a great extent, though not very willingly, is dominated by Warsaw. Trading upon this, the ever-astute M. Chicherin offered Lithuania, in addition to a non-aggression pact, the guarantee to her of Vilna and Memel in exchange for a promise not to enter a Baltic alliance.² Professor Reinys, Lithuanian Foreign Minister, in a statement to the Press, admitted that negotiations with Moscow were in an advanced stage, and that he had no objection to a treaty provided that some sort of treaty was also arrived at between the U.S.S.R. and the other Baltic States.³

The Soviet proposals for a security pact were the subject

¹ See the *Rigasche Rundschau*, May 18, 1926.

² See *Times*, April 31, 1926.

³ See *Poslednia Izvestia* (Tallinn), April 24, and *Izvestia* (Moscow), April 25, 1926.

of a further conference at Tallinn between the Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish Ministers for Foreign Affairs during July 1926, and their deliberations resulted in replies being sent to Moscow substantially reiterating their Notes of the previous May, and suggesting the formation of a commission of representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the Baltic States to work out a treaty on the lines laid down therein.¹

The three States were, however, considerably alarmed at the success which had attended the independent negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Lithuania. Accordingly M. Ulmanis, Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, went to Kovno on July 27th to conclude a treaty of commerce and arbitration with Lithuania and to attempt to win her back to the general Baltic *bloc*.²

Although M. Ulmanis was unsuccessful in his initial object, the signing of the commercial agreement, his visit to Kovno drew from M. Zalewski, Polish Foreign Minister, a statement to the Press to the effect that Poland was ready to resume diplomatic relations with Lithuania at any time.³ This tendency towards a Polish-Lithuanian *rapprochement*, and indeed the whole progress of an Eastern non-aggression pact, received a definite check in the refusal of the U.S.S.R. Government to countenance the Baltic suggestion for a joint preparatory commission.⁴ Lithuania seized this opportunity to continue the negotiations already opened independently with Moscow in April and May; she declared herself in agreement with the suggested joint commission, but would not press any point which would prove an obstacle to negotiations with the U.S.S.R.; at the same time Lithuania renewed her right of a free hand as regards contact with other interested States.⁵

Partly because of the independent action of Lithuania,

¹ See *Times*, July 26, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, July, 28 and 29, 1926.

³ See *ibid.*, August 4, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, August 11, 1926.

⁵ See *Scotsman*, August 21, 1926.

and partly on account of a genuine desire to have the question of Eastern European security settled finally and satisfactorily, the remaining Baltic Governments—Estonia, Latvia, and Finland—agreed to waive their stipulation for a preliminary commission and assented to the Soviet proposals for a separate pact.¹ Their replies were published in Moscow on August 26th, and in each case renewed, as Lithuania had done, the right to a freedom of contact with their immediate neighbours.² The Soviet Government instructed its diplomatic representatives at Tallinn, Riga, and Helsingfors to open direct negotiations without delay.

A final item was added to the score of preliminary successes for Soviet diplomacy when, just before his departure to attend the League Assembly at Geneva, M. Zalewski, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, agreed to receive a draft of a prepared Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact.³

The first tangible result of the Soviet negotiations was the signature on September 28, 1926, at Moscow of the non-aggression treaty with Lithuania. As was expected, the text was modelled on those already concluded with Germany and Turkey. M. Chicherin had, however, kept his promise made in his original Note of April, in recognising the Lithuanian claim to Vilna.⁴ This promise was made good in Article 1 of the treaty, which recognised the Soviet-Lithuanian frontier as that laid down in the treaty signed between the two States on July 12, 1920.⁵ This statement definitely ignored the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors taken in March 1921, which confirmed Poland in her *de facto* possession of the Province and City of Vilna.

In order that no doubt should be left as to the attitude of the U.S.S.R. in this matter, a supplementary declaration was handed to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, to the effect that "the U.S.S.R. Government will not allow the infringe-

¹ *Times*, August 23, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, August 27, 1926.

³ See *Times* and *Scotsman* of August 31, 1926.

⁴ See above, p. 179.

⁵ See above, pp. 73-74.

ment of the Lithuanian frontier, which took place against the will of the Lithuanian people, to influence the attitude of the U.S.S.R. with reference to the question of Lithuanian territorial sovereignty."¹

This new feature resulted in the fall of the Bartel Government in Warsaw and the return to direct and active control by Marshal Pilsudski. It may be said that the Polish security negotiations with Moscow at least will be allowed to lapse, though the remaining Border States, especially Estonia, have not interrupted their previous policy.

Thus, at the end of 1926, the Moscow Government could look back with a period of justifiable complacency upon some months during which the Soviet diplomacy had proved conspicuously successful. The new policy of treaties of neutrality had secured definite agreements with Turkey, Germany and Persia, and had done much to bring the problem of Eastern European security into the way of solution, and this had been achieved practically on Moscow's own terms, negotiations being in progress at each of the five capitals concerned.

As an offset against these successes in the field of security must be recorded the mutual pact between France and Rumania, and the renewal and strengthening of the alliance already existing between the latter country and Poland.

Though it would seem that the question of non-aggression between the Baltic States and the U.S.S.R. is at least within the realm of negotiation, there yet remains the problem of the settlement of disputes between themselves and with Poland. Should the system of Soviet pacts prove fruitful, it will be necessary to elaborate the machinery for security provided in the Warsaw Agreement of 1921, and this instrument will have to be made acceptable both to Finland (who refused to ratify) and to Lithuania (who was not represented at the Warsaw Conference).

If some such arrangement is not made there will be the

¹ See *Times*, October 4, 1926.

danger, not only of the overlapping, but of the definite clashing of security pacts in Eastern Europe—the alliances between Poland and Rumania, and of France with both countries, coming into collision with the non-aggression pacts now being negotiated by the U.S.S.R. and the Border States.

PART VI

**SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE, THE NEAR, MIDDLE AND
FAR EAST, AND ELSEWHERE**

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE LITTLE ENTENTE

WHEN a great homogeneous empire becomes disintegrated into a number of succession States, it is in the natural course of things for these States so formed to take steps to guarantee their continued independence and to render impossible their return to foreign domination. It is a situation such as this which formed both the background and the *raison d'être* for the Little Entente, perhaps the most important of post-war alignments, with the exception of the Locarno *bloc*, which comes under a separate category.

Of the succession States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, those who acquired most territory were Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Rumania; and of these Czechoslovakia was placed in the most critical position of all, lying as it does surrounded on three sides by the formerly hostile States of Germany, Austria, and Hungary. It became at once imperative that these three States should take some common action to protect their territorial gains, for, as in the case of France's attitude towards the Rhine frontier, the guarantees offered by the Covenant of the League of Nations were considered insufficient, if for no other reason, because they were unproved.

The immediate dangers which faced these three States at the Peace Conference were twofold: first, and this was shared to a very large degree by both France and Italy, the possibility of an ultimate union between Germany and Austria; secondly, a restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy in Hungary.

The united efforts of the three States, with the support of France and Italy, secured the insertion in both the German and Austrian Treaties of Peace of a definite statement that "the independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than

with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.”¹ As both France and Italy were permanent members of that body and decisions of this nature required unanimity, there was no immediate proximity of this danger. In addition to this Germany was too embarrassed financially and economically to encumber herself with a partner in a worse state of bankruptcy than herself.

Having achieved their first object, the three principal succession States took steps to secure themselves against the second danger. In the words of the introduction to the Czechoslovak White Book on the Little Entente² :—

It was inevitable that they should continue to work together, not only when the boundaries and the responsibilities of the new States were being discussed at the Peace Conference, but later as well. It was essential to demonstrate the vitality of the new Central European system set up by the peace treaties; it was necessary to strengthen this system, above all, by economic co-operation; it was finally most urgent that it be so strongly established as to become a firm foundation for peace in Europe.

The immediate danger, that of a Hapsburg restoration, was complicated and increased by the Magyar theory of the integrity of Hungary. An illustration of this may be gathered from the practice in many local schools of parading the children each day before a map of the dismembered Hungary and teaching them to recite a *credo* beginning with “*I believe in the justice of God*” and concluding “*I believe in the resurrection of Hungary.*” A “resurrected” Hungary would entail the retrocession of Transylvania by Rumania and the greater part of the territory gained by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in the Peace Settlement.

The initiative in forming the inevitable alliance was taken by M. Benès, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, in January 1920, when he opened conversations with M. Vaida Voievod, the Rumanian Premier, himself by birth a Tran-

¹ See Treaty of Versailles (Art. 80) and Treaty of St. Germain (Art. 88).

² See *Documents diplomatiques relatifs aux conventions d'alliance conclues par la République Tchéchoslovaque avec la Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et la Royaume de Roumanie, décembre 1919-août 1921*. Prague, 1923.

sylvanian.¹ M. Benès also approached Belgrade in February of the same year.² These negotiations proceeded rapidly for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the Kapp *Putsch* and the threatened monarchist restoration in Germany, and a "convention of defensive alliance" was signed between Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on August 14, 1920, at Belgrade. The treaty took the form of an Alliance directed defensively against Hungary. Should this State attack either of the contracting parties, the other would at once come to its assistance (Art. 1). To facilitate this the General Staffs of the two Powers were to decide by mutual agreement upon the necessary steps to be taken (Art. 2).³ It was mutually agreed that neither party should enter into alliance with a third Power without the consent of the other, and that the convention should remain in force for a period of two years (Arts. 3 and 4). The text was to be immediately communicated to the League of Nations (Art. 5).⁴

M. Benès went on from Belgrade to Bucharest, where he arranged with M. Také Jonescu, Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, for a provisional agreement for mutual defence in the event of a Hungarian attack, until a more definite arrangement could be arrived at.⁵ Thus the first step was taken towards the formation of the Little Entente and the way was prepared for the second. The plans of the two statesmen were not entirely successful, however, for it had been intended that M. Jonescu's visit to Warsaw in November 1920 should bring Poland into the general scheme of things for Central Europe; this was impossible to achieve, but, as has been seen, the visit paved the way for the Alliance between Poland and Rumania.

The next step was one in which Czechoslovakia was not directly implicated. On November 12, 1920, Italy and Yugoslavia, having adjusted their frontier disputes and

¹ See *Documents diplomatiques*, etc., Document 2.

² *Ibid.*, Document 3.

³ This military convention was concluded on August 1, 1921.

⁴ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vi, No. 209.

⁵ Czechoslovak White Book, Document 27.

established the future status of Fiume (where, incidentally, Signor Gabriele d'Annunzio was still defying both of them), signed a defensive agreement on the lines of that already concluded between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The two States undertook to "watch over" the maintenance of the Treaties of St. Germain and the Trianon, and to take concerted action against the restoration of the Hapsburgs (Art. 1). To do this they agreed to lend one another the necessary diplomatic and political (but not military) assistance (Art. 2). Any action taken by Austria or Hungary against the one was to be communicated to the other (Art. 3), and it was agreed that, Italy having been officially informed of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav pact, the present treaty, which was to extend for a period of two years, was to be communicated to Czechoslovakia (Arts. 4 and 5).¹ This was carried out in an exchange of Notes between M. Benès and Count Sforza on the occasion of the former's visit to Rome on February 8, 1921, and two days later the ratifications of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty were exchanged, bringing it into operation.

The first attempt of ex-King Carl to re-establish his throne in Hungary (March 27-April 7, 1921) proved that the fears of the Little Entente Powers were not ill-founded. Its conclusion marked a period of increased energy and anxiety to fortify further themselves against a second attempt. On April 21st a treaty was signed at Bucharest between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, identical with the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav pact, with the addition of a special provision (Art. 4) that the two countries should pursue a common policy with regard to Hungary.²

Meanwhile M. Také Jonescu had approached Belgrade, with the result that a treaty was signed on June 7, 1921, between Rumania and the Triune Kingdom, on exactly the same model as the two previous conventions, only that its

¹ *Documents diplomatiques, etc.*, Document 34. See also *Negoziati diretti fra il Governo italiano e il Governo serbo-croato-sloveno per la pace adriatica*, p. 39.

² For text of the treaty see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vi, No. 155. It was ratified on May 27, 1921, and the military convention provided for in Article 2 was signed July 2nd.

provisions were extended to include aggression on the part of Bulgaria, from whom both had received territory as a result of the Peace Settlement.¹

During August and September 1921 an attempt was made by M. Benès to arrive at a better understanding with Austria and Hungary, but this was brought to a sudden stop by the reappearance of Carl in Hungary (October 20–November 1, 1921).

In this crisis the value of the Little Entente as a factor for security was clearly and forcefully illustrated. At the suggestion of M. Benès, the presence of Carl on Hungarian soil was declared a *casus belli*, and mobilisation was ordered in all three States. Their action was endorsed and supported by the Principal Allied Powers, who, through the Conference of Ambassadors, demanded the immediate surrender of Carl to the commanding officer of the British Danube flotilla; should this not be complied with, they declared their inability to accept any "responsibility regarding the intervention of the States bordering on Hungary or for the resulting consequences."² The Hungarian Government, on October 29th, accepted all the demands of the Conference of Ambassadors and virtually appealed for protection against the Little Entente. The ex-King was forthwith surrendered on November 1st.

Having achieved this success, the Little Entente statesmen proceeded to press home their advantage. With the approval of the Conference of Ambassadors, they demanded that the Hungarian Government should guarantee the passage through the National Assembly of such legislation as was necessary to secure the deposition both of Carl and the whole Hapsburg dynasty. This was achieved within ten days of Carl's surrender.

Apart from the diplomatic victory thus attained their successful handling of the Hapsburg incident brought a fresh

¹ See Czechoslovak White Book, Document 72.

² See *Documents diplomatiques concernant les Tentatives de la Restoration des Habsburgs sur le trône de Hongrie, avril 1919–novembre 1921*. Czechoslovak White Book II, Document 42.

supporter to the Little Entente. On October 24th the Polish Government had declared itself as generally in sympathy with the Little Entente's Hungarian policy, and as soon as his hands were free the energetic M. Benès at once set about cementing this declaration with a formal alliance. On November 6th a political convention was signed at Prague between Poland and Czechoslovakia. This agreement was not of the same nature as those forming the Little Entente, and the general relations between the two countries were too hostile to allow of its ratification. The provisions for security were contained in the first two articles, in which the two States guaranteed to one another their mutual territorial integrity and agreed that each, in the event of an attack by a neighbouring State, would maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the State attacked.

A more important agreement was reached by M. Benès with Austria when he took up the negotiations where they had been dropped the previous October. The two States, in a political convention signed at Prague on December 16, 1921, pledged themselves to respect and carry out the Treaties of St. Germain and the Trianon (Art. 1), and to guarantee to one another the integrity of their frontiers as fixed by these treaties (Art. 2). In a war of defence each promised benevolent neutrality to the one attacked (Art. 3), and pledged themselves not to allow upon their territories any organisation or propaganda directed against the other and to co-operate against any attempt to restore the pre-war régime (Art. 4). As regards security, the only other important provision was in Article 7, to the effect that all disputes should, if need be, be referred either to arbitration or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The convention was ratified on March 15, 1922.

Having in two years formed themselves into a definite and efficient factor for security, through which they had been able to withstand and frustrate two attempted Hapsburg restorations, the Little Entente States had leisure during the ensuing years of 1922-1923 to consolidate their position by

the renewal of their fundamental treaties of alliance, and by a system of periodic conferences at which common policy with regard to common interests was discussed. The Little Entente was also accorded its opportunity to show its influence in European politics by its participation in the Conferences of Genoa and The Hague and in the Assemblies of the League of Nations. Moreover, the admittance of Hungary to League membership in September 1922 greatly bettered the relations between her and the Little Entente—a fact which was proved later in 1924, when Czechoslovakia signed the Protocol for the Economic Reconstruction of Hungary.

The Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Pact was renewed on August 31, 1922, for a further period of five years. The two States took official cognisance of each other's agreements with other Central European States (Art. 2), and renewed their mutual pledge to take joint action in the event of their common interests being threatened (Art. 4). For this purpose provision was made for the conclusion of a further military convention (Art. 5).¹ The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on October 3, 1922, so that a further renewal is due in October 1927. On May 27, 1923, a joint protocol was signed at Bucharest prolonging the Czechoslovak-Rumanian Treaty for a further three years—from June 14, 1923, the date on which ratifications were exchanged.²

As from January 1924, however, the history of Central European security enters upon a new phase, in which it still remains in 1926, and which is governed by three important factors :—

1. The efforts made by France to bind the Little Entente still closer to her own policy.
2. The entry of Italy as a rival to France in this matter and the consequent diplomatic struggle between the two Powers for the dominating influence in Central Europe.
3. The reawakened fear in the chancelleries of France, Italy, and the Little Entente of the imminent danger of the Austro-German *Anschluss*.

¹ See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xiii, No. 354.
² Ibid., vol. xviii, No. 455.

We have already dealt with the first of these factors—namely, the negotiations by M. Poincaré for a Franco-Czechoslovak alliance, finally signed on January 25, 1924, and of the munitions credits granted by France to others of the Little Entente in the hope that other alliances might be forthcoming.¹ But the entry of Italy into the field was a definite blow to this policy.

For a variety of reasons, notably rivalry in the Mediterranean and in Northern Africa, not to mention the attitude of the French representative on the Council of the League of Nations during the Italo-Greek crises over Corfu in September 1923, Italy had been growing gradually hostile to France, and Signor Mussolini, having by the beginning of 1924 successfully established Fascism as the Italian form of Government, was free to attempt to oust his rival from the position of protector of the Little Entente.

Thus, on January 27, 1924, two days after the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak Pact, there was signed at Rome an Italo-Yugoslav agreement, concluded simultaneously with the treaty by which the two States finally settled the vexed question of Fiume to their mutual satisfaction.² This was followed some six months later, on July 5, 1924, by a Pact of Cordial Collaboration between Italy and Czechoslovakia.³ Ratifications of these agreements were exchanged respectively on April 7 and July 14, 1924.

These treaties were identical in character with the exception of Article 2 of the Italo-Yugoslav Pact, which provided for neutrality of one party in the event of the other's being the victim of an unprovoked attack. But should the interests of one party be menaced by "forcible invasions from without," the other guaranteed to "afford political and diplomatic support in the form of friendly co-operation for the purpose of assisting to remove the external cause of such threat." This article does not occur in the Italo-Czechoslovak treaty.

¹ See above, Part I, pp. 66-67.

² See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxiv, No. 596.

³ Ibid., vol. xxvi, No. 637.

For the rest, the treaties, though aiming at the maintenance of the *status quo* created by the treaties of St. Germain, the Trianon and Neuilly, were not as definite as those of the Little Entente, nor did they include the explicit provision contained in Article 3 of the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty for the consultation of the contracting parties as to the measures to be taken in the case of any infraction of the principles of Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain.¹ The Italian treaties resemble that concluded between Czechoslovakia and Austria rather than any other Central European agreement. Having made the initial declaration regarding the maintenance of the *status quo*, they continue to provide for consultation as to what action shall be taken in the event of a menace to their common interest arising. Both treaties were concluded for a period of five years. Their importance lies not so much in their provisions as in the fact that their negotiation partook of the nature of an Italian challenge to French influence in Central Europe.

The Hungarian menace of Hapsburg restoration having virtually vanished with the death at Madeira of the ex-King Carl on April 1, 1922, the Little Entente were able to face the remaining prospect of the *Anschluss* without fear of complications.

This question of an Austro-German union had by the beginning of 1925 taken on a new and more disturbing aspect. It will be remembered that in October 1922 Austria, then reeling on the brink of national bankruptcy, had, thanks to the good offices of the League of Nations, entered upon a period of international financial control, in view of which her whole reparation debt had been forgone by her creditor Powers.

The instrument embodying the plan of Austrian financial and economic reconstruction was accompanied by a Protocol

¹ Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain reads: "The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any other means whatever compromise her independence; particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power."

of Guarantee, signed on October 4, 1922, by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, to which Belgium and Spain subsequently adhered. In this Protocol the Powers agreed that, while assisting Austria in the problem of her financial and economic reconstruction, they would among other things respect her political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and would not contract any special economic agreement which took advantage of her impoverished condition. On her part Austria formally renewed her pledge of Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain not to alienate her independence, and undertook not to enter into negotiations, political, financial, or economic, which might compromise her independence.¹

By 1925 the financial system introduced under League supervision had proved so successful that the Budget was not only balancing but showing a satisfactory surplus, and Austria was, relatively, back on the road to prosperity. Simultaneously the Dawes Plan had been introduced in Germany, with similar results that the currency had been re-established, trade and commerce restarted, and, despite her heavy burden of Reparations, Germany was enabled to enter the economic field on equal terms with other Powers.

It was, then, no longer a question of two bankrupt nations refusing to shoulder one another's burden, but rather of two prosperous neighbours who, having recently passed through a period of financial stress, now look forward to a beneficial partnership. In both countries there was a revival (for even at the darkest period in the history of both countries it had never ceased to exist) of the *Anschluss* movement. Visits to Berlin and Vienna were exchanged by Monsignor Seipel, former Federal Chancellor of Austria, and by Herr Loeb,

¹ See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xii, No. 334.

On March 14, 1924, a similar agreement was entered into by Great Britain, France, Italy, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Czechoslovakia with regard to Hungarian reconstruction. In this case Hungary undertook to fulfil her obligations under the Treaty of the Trianon, emphasis being laid on the immediate execution of the military clauses, and also to carry out all her other international engagements. For text see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxv, No. 633.

President of the German Reichstag, and all that propaganda and personal contact could do were utilised to stimulate the national German feeling in Austria.

Thus the danger of such a union to France, Italy, and the Little Entente, of which the Peace Conference had been fully aware, was now intensified by the fact that both Austria and Germany were in a considerably better financial and economic state than in 1919. It was very strongly felt that Austria, even in the disarmed condition in which the Treaty of St. Germain had left her, would be a considerable reinforcement to Germany's military strength ; while Germany, with her territory extended to the Danube basin, would constitute a powerful wedge threatening the peace of Central Europe and cutting off Czechoslovakia and Poland from their more powerful Western European Allies.

Though the question of the *Anschluss* was to a great extent eclipsed by the Western security negotiations during 1925, once these had ended in the signing of the Locarno Agreements in December, the Central European Powers began at once to fortify themselves against its materialisation.

In January 1926 M. Nintchitch, Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, approached the French and Italian Governments with a plan for a Central European pact on the lines of the Locarno Agreement which should include a mutual guarantee of the *status quo*. His suggestions were received sufficiently well to warrant their being followed up by personal conversations, and accordingly M. Nintchitch arrived in Berne late in February. Here he was met by Signor Mussolini, with a suggested extension of Article 3 of the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty of January 27, 1924 (that providing for consultation in the event of common interests of the two parties being threatened by international complications), to include a mutual undertaking for the prevention of the *Anschluss*. To this M. Nintchitch agreed, and suggested that France should be invited to become a party to such a pact.

It was just here that Italian and French rivalry prevented an agreement. Signor Mussolini would not consent to the

inclusion of France in a Central European pact, and M. Nintchitch continued on his way, treaty-less, to Paris. Here he related the story of Signor Mussolini's attitude to M. Briand, who at once saw and grasped the opportunity of completing the structure of Central European alliances of which the foundation had been laid by M. Poincaré in 1924. In March 1926 he and M. Nintchitch signed a Franco-Yugoslav accord modelled upon the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance in January 1924.

Simultaneously with the conclusion of this agreement, and certainly not unconnected with it, Italy reached an accord with the remaining partner of the Little Entente, Rumania, in the shape of a treaty on the lines of the Italoczechoslovak and Yugoslav conventions of cordial co-operation. This move on the part of Signor Mussolini did not, however, entail the ratification by Italy of the Bessarabian Treaty of October 1920.¹

Not to be outdone, M. Briand at once opened negotiations with Rumania for the conclusion of a treaty similar to those already signed by France with Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. These negotiations proved successful after the replacement at Bucharest of the Liberal Bratiano Administration by the Nationalist and pro-French Government of General Averescu, and the treaty was finally signed on June 10, 1926. On June 12, 1926, just prior to the Conference of Bled between the three States, the Yugoslav, the Rumanian, and the Czechoslovak-Rumanian Treaties were prolonged for a further period of three years.

Such, then, is the somewhat tangled and tortuous history of Central European security for the past six years. It begins with the formation of the Little Entente for the definite purpose of opposing a Hapsburg succession, and deteriorates into a struggle between France and Italy for a controlling influence. The predominating feature remains, the fear of

¹ This Treaty was not definitely signed until September 1926. A similar agreement was signed during the same month between Poland and Yugoslavia.

the *Anschluss*, and to combat this the Little Entente States must either work unitedly for a Central European Pact or throw in their lot either with Paris or Rome. It is probable that the adoption of either of the latter alternatives would end in the disintegration of the Entente, since there is no marked unity of policy towards either of the two great neighbouring Powers.¹ It is to be hoped, however, that when certain of the fundamental treaties come up in due course for renewal a triumph will result for the Central European Pact policy, and that some agreement may be reached which will embrace not only the Little Entente, France, and Italy, but also Austria and Hungary, and possibly Poland.²

¹ The above is necessarily only a brief survey of one aspect of the policy and diplomatic activity of the Little Entente. An excellent account of the whole history of this most interesting political alignment will be found in the *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-1923, pp. 287-303, and 1924, pp. 440-457.

² The Treaty signed between Italy and Spain on August 7, 1926, contained an article providing for neutrality in the event of one or other being attacked by a third party.

II

SECURITY IN THE EAST

1. THE NEAR EAST AND LAUSANNE.

THE Freedom of the Straits, so outstanding a tenet of British Near Eastern policy for more than half a century, became an historical fact on July 24, 1923. On that day, simultaneously with the Treaty of Lausanne, eight of the most interested Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey, signed the convention relating to the régime of the Straits.¹

The preamble to the Convention gives the number of contracting States as ten, but, though thus listed, the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State refused either to be party to the general treaty of peace or to any of its complementary instruments.

In order to ensure the freedom of transit and "with a view to maintaining the Straits free from any obstacle to free passage and navigation," the Convention made provision (Art. 4) for the demilitarisation of certain zones, islands, and waters in the Sea of Marmora, the Ægean Sea, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus. These were as follows:—

1. The Dardanelles.

On the north-west the whole Gallipoli Peninsula, together with a small additional area. On the south-east a zone twenty kilometres from the sea.

2. The Bosphorus.

On either shore a zone fifteen kilometres deep.

3. All the islands in the Sea of Marmora with the exception of that of Emir Ali Adasi.

4. In the Ægean Sea the Islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and the Rabbit Isles.

¹ *Treaty of Peace with Turkey*, British Treaty Series (Blue Book), No. 16, 1923, Cmd. 1929.

With the exception of Constantinople—in which, together with Stamboul, Pera, Galata, Scutari, and the Island of Prinkipo, a force of not more than 12,000 men, an arsenal and naval base were allowed to be maintained (Art. 8)—these zones were to be absolutely free from fortifications, coast artillery, “submarine engines of war,” aerial and naval bases. Nor might armed forces be stationed in them, except gendarmerie, whose armament was strictly limited (Arts. 6 and 7).

Certain modifications were made in favour of Turkey, who may transport troops *through* the demilitarised zones and whose aeroplanes may fly *over* them. Greece and Turkey are allowed to anchor warships in the territorial waters surrounding their respective demilitarised islands, and may similarly in their respective zones organise any system of observation and communication (Art. 6).

The authority to execute this régime was vested in an International Straits Commission composed of representatives of the signatory Powers, whose functions are laid down in Articles 10–16 of the Convention.¹

Having thus established the freedom of the Straits by the process of demilitarisation, the Contracting Powers proceeded to make provision for the guarantee of the security of this freedom; such a guarantee is contained in Art. 18 of the Convention:—

Should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the security of the demilitarised zones be imperilled by a violation of the provisions relating to freedom of passage² or by a surprise attack or some act of war or threat of war, the High Contracting Parties, and *in any case* France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, acting in conjunction, will meet such a violation, attack, or other act of war, or threat of war, by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose.

Nor was it intended that any act of war should terminate the new régime. It is expressly stated that once peace has

¹ See *International Administration*, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Bulletin No. 12 of the Reference Service on International Affairs, Paris.

² See Article 2 of the Convention and the annexed Rules for the passage of Commercial Vessels and Aircraft and of War Vessels and Aircraft through the Straits.

been restored after any such joint action as that provided for above, or after any war in which either Greece or Turkey are involved, and which has entailed the modification of the Convention in pursuance of the rights of belligerents, the régime as laid down in the Convention shall be re-established as soon as possible (Arts. 9 and 18).

Thus, when the ratifications of the requisite number of Powers were deposited and the Treaty of Lausanne was put into operation, the first Guarantee Pact of modern history was launched into activity.

It is of interest to compare these security provisions with those which would have come into force had the ill-fated Treaty of Sèvres been ratified.

That treaty as a whole¹ was, of course, very much harder upon Turkey than its successor, for in 1920 the Allied Powers still preserved some semblance of unity, and had only to deal with an effete Government at Constantinople instead of the virile Nationalist body at Angora. In consequence of this the demilitarised zones were considerably larger and more clearly defined (Art. 179). In them and in the demilitarised islands Great Britain, France, and Italy had the right to maintain such forces, both military and aerial, as they considered sufficient to prevent any action being taken which might prejudice the freedom of the Straits (Art. 178 (4)). Should such an action in the opinion of the Commission (which under the Treaty of Sèvres was a much more important body, having its own flag and police, and being responsible only to the Powers) have taken place, the Commission was to inform the representatives of the three Allied Powers, who in their turn would confer with the military and naval commanders of the occupying forces as to what should be done to oppose such an action (Art. 44).

In 1920, moreover, the statesmen of the world were still sceptical of the League of Nations as a piece of practical political machinery. It is interesting, therefore, to find that

¹ See *Treaty of Peace with Turkey*, British Treaty Series (Blue Book), No. 11, 1920, Cmd. 964.

when three years later they again met to settle the peace with Turkey, the Council of the League, and not the diplomatic representatives and naval and military commanders of these great Powers, was the agency through which the decision must come as to the action to be taken. This is an illustration of the rise which the League had made in the opinion of international statesmen. Under the Lausanne provisions, too, the guarantee of Japan is added to that of Great Britain, France and Italy, and the remaining members of the Commission may also be called upon to furnish their quota for the defence of the freedom of the Straits.

2. THE MIDDLE EAST AND MOSUL.

In the Middle East the situation is complicated by a species of "absentee landlordship," in that beside the countries directly interested, that is to say, Turkey, Persia, Iraq, and Syria, European interests are involved through the presence in the Middle East of Great Britain and France as Mandatory Powers for Iraq and Syria respectively. Thus no agreement for security can be effective without the participation of these two Powers, who exercise guidance over the conduct of the foreign relations of their mandates.

No general agreement provides for security in the Middle East. It is dependent upon three treaties which have been signed from April to June 1926 by Turkey with the States immediately contiguous to her, and with the Mandatory Powers involved. These treaties are with Persia, signed on April 22nd; with France, initialled in February and signed on June 1st; and with Great Britain and Iraq, on June 6th.

Of the French Treaty little is known as yet, as the text has not been made public, but it is expected that it will both confirm and extend the provisions of that agreement concluded between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Mustapha Kemal Pasha in 1921.

The Persian and Anglo-Iraq Treaties are really part of the

same settlement, since all these Powers are contiguous to one another. In dealing with the question of security it is necessary to take into consideration the special factor which in each particular case may make for war, and then to make provision for its circumvention. Between Turkey and Iraq this factor, as is so often the case, was one of the settlement of a frontier, the disputed boundary of the *vilayet* of Mosul.

Very briefly the history of the dispute is this. By the Treaty of Lausanne¹ the possession of the *vilayet* of Mosul was not settled, but it was agreed that if within nine months after the ratification of the treaty Great Britain and Turkey could not arrive at some peace settlement, the matter should come before the League of Nations. Accordingly, though abortive negotiations proceeded at Constantinople and Angora from October 1923–July 1924, the Council of the League became seized of the question at their Thirtieth Session, September 1924.² It was agreed to send a Commission of Experts to examine and report on the spot, and meanwhile the Council at its Session at Brussels (October 29, 1924)³ drew up a provisional frontier, known as the Brussels Line, beyond which the two disputants might not pass until the report of the Commission of Enquiry had been received. This report was presented to the Council at its Thirty-fifth Session during the Sixth Assembly in September 1925, and was found substantially to confirm the Brussels Line.⁴ During the ensuing meetings of the Council a diplomatic duel was fought between Mr. Leopold Amery, the British Secretary of State for the Dominions and Colonies, and Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which the latter offered as part of the settlement a Middle Eastern Pact, drawn up on the lines of the then pending Locarno Agreements and embracing Great Britain, Turkey,

¹ See Treaty of Lausanne, Article 3, par. 2.

² See Minutes of the Thirtieth Session, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Fifth Year, No. 10, October 1924, pp. 1291–1292, 1318–1324, 1337–1338, 1358–1360.

³ See Minutes of the Thirty-first Session, *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1924, No. 11, pp. 1648–1654, 1659–1662, 1670–1671.

⁴ See Report. See also Minutes of Thirty-fifth Session.

Persia, and Iraq for the mutual guarantee of the security and protection of their respective frontiers.¹

This was at the time warmly taken up by Persia, who at once expressed her willingness to take part, but was coldly viewed by the British delegates, who regarded it as a red-herring drawn cleverly across the path of the major issue of the frontier settlement.

With various side issues, such as the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice, of the interpretation of Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne and the ensuing question of unanimity voting on the Council of the League,² and the Laidoner Report on the treatment of Christian minorities by Turkey, the Mosul dispute came to an end at the Session of the Council of the League held in December 1925. The Brussels Line was declared to be the *de jure* frontier between Turkey and Iraq. The final settlement of the dispute took the form of direct negotiations between the British Ambassador at Constantinople, the Iraq Government, and the Turkish Government at Angora. Great Britain further agreed to prolong her mandate over Iraq for a further period of twenty-five years unless the latter became a member of the League of Nations within that time.

These negotiations began early in 1926, and up to within a very short time of their termination both Press and Public in Great Britain imagined that their ultimate conclusion would take the form of a security pact. In actual fact, however, this idea would seem to have been dropped at an early stage in the proceedings, for on April 22nd a Treaty of Friendship and Security was signed between Turkey and Persia which removed the Security arrangements in the Middle East from the general to the particular.

It is easy to trace the influence of the Soviet-Turkish agreement in this new treaty with Persia, but in a number of instances the general neutrality *motif* is elaborated and

¹ See Minutes of the Thirty-seventh Session, *League of Nations Official Journal*.

² See *The World Court in 1925*, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett (association for International Understanding), 1926, pp. 19-22.

emphasised. Moreover, the treaty is more than a neutrality convention, and is designed to alleviate the general situation left unsettled by the treaties of 1639, 1828, and 1848. Provision is also made for better co-operation in consular, tariff, postal, telegraphic, and commercial relations.

The treaty itself is of eleven articles,¹ by the first of which "an indestructible peace and lasting friendship" is declared to exist between the two countries. Then, as in the previous Soviet agreements with Turkey and Germany, follow the neutrality provisions (Arts. 2 and 3), but a diversion is made in Article 4, where both Powers are bound, in the execution of the two previous articles, to protect their neutrality by force of arms against any sort of form of violation, whether directly by invasion or indirectly by the inciting of their population to revolt on the part of one or more third Powers. To ensure the "security and tranquillity of the peoples along their frontier regions," each of the Powers undertakes not to allow in their territory any organisation or group planning to modify the government or otherwise effect an *action de lutte* against the other; and they further agree to take all possible measures, either jointly or separately, to stop such acts either in their own territory or among the border tribes along the frontier (Arts. 5 and 6). Article 7 provides for the conclusion within six months of the coming into force of the treaty conventions concerning Customs, tariffs, etc.; and Article 8 for the provision of some new form of settling disputes arising between the Contracting Powers and not regulated by the usual methods. Article 9 allows full liberty of action to Turkey and Persia on all matters outside the scope of the present treaty, and the two remaining articles contain the usual arrangements for the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, which, however, comes into force on the date of its signature and remains so for a period of five years.

Meanwhile the Anglo-Turkish negotiations continued to

¹ For French text see *Echo de Turquie*, June 16, 1926. For English text see Special Supplement to vol. ii, No. 15, of the *Bulletin of International News*, July 12, 1926, and *European Survey*, vol. i, No. 2021.

pursue the tortuous path that all Oriental discussion must inevitably follow. Finally, however, on June 5, 1926, at midnight, a treaty was signed at Angora between the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, together with the Iraq Minister of Defence, Colonel Nouri Said.

As is natural, much of the treaty is concerned with the frontier settlement, which, with a few modifications, is agreed to be that laid down by the League Council at Brussels.¹ The Contracting Parties, moreover, accepted this line as definitive and inviolable, and undertook not to make any attempt to alter it (Art. 5).

For the purpose of this book, however, general interest in the treaty centres around chapter ii (Arts. 6-13), entitled "Neighbourly Relations." The negotiators realised that in dealing with a problem such as Turko-Iraq security it was necessary, in the words of Sir Austen Chamberlain, to make "special arrangements in order to meet special needs"; and in this case the special need was to devise some way of dealing with the danger of brigandage and frontier raids which have always proved the chief danger to Middle Eastern security. This chapter ii of the treaty definitely sets out to do, and begins at once by a mutual undertaking to oppose by all possible means "any preparations made by one or more armed individuals with the object of committing acts of brigandage or pillage in the neighbouring frontier zone and to prevent their crossing the frontier" (Art. 6). The zone referred to is the whole Turko-Iraq frontier and 75 kilometres on either side (Art. 10). To facilitate this measure the two Powers concerned appointed their competent authorities for the organisation of general co-operation and responsibility for the measures to be taken, and for the exchange of local information and urgent communication (Art. 11). When these authorities learn of preparations likely to bring about such acts as are contemplated in Article 6, or that such acts have definitely been com-

¹ For text of Anglo-Turkish Treaty see British White Paper, *Turkey*, No. 1, 1926, Cmd. 2679.

mitted, they must inform one another immediately and take all possible measures either to prevent the acts taking place, or, in the event of their having already happened, to prevent the perpetrators from crossing the frontier (Arts. 7 and 8). Should the perpetrators of such acts cross the frontier they must immediately be arrested by the authorities on the one side and handed over to the authorities of the party whose nationals they are, for justice, together with their booty and arms (Art. 9). Turkish and Iraq authorities agree not to have any communication with the chiefs and sheikhs, or members of tribes nationals of the other State which are actually within the territory of that State, and, furthermore, not to allow within the frontier zone any organisation for propaganda directed against either State (Art. 12). In order to facilitate the execution of the foregoing provisions and generally to maintain good neighbourly relations along the frontier, a permanent Frontier Commission is set up under Article 13, composed of equal numbers of Turkish and Iraq officials appointed by their respective Governments. The duty of this Commission, which must meet at least once in six months alternatively in Turkey and Iraq (having its first session at Zakho, in Iraq, within two months of the coming into force of the treaty), is to settle amicably all questions concerning the execution of the provisions contained in chapter ii, and any other frontier question which cannot be settled by the authorities constituted under Article 11. Since no provision is made elsewhere in the treaty for appeal from this Commission, its decision may be deemed to be final. The treaty, which is of permanent duration, was ratified by the Turkish National Assembly on June 7th and by the Iraq Parliament on June 14th.

It is to be hoped that these three treaties will prove a further example of how security may be ensured, and that a series of treaties, such as has been negotiated by Turkey with her neighbours, may prove as efficacious as a mutual pact.

3. THE U.S.S.R. AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

The Middle East had been, however, during 1926 the scene of another series of security negotiations.

The U.S.S.R. was anxious to extend further in the Middle East the system of neutrality and non-aggression treaties so successfully initiated with Turkey in December 1925. Accordingly the Soviet diplomatic representatives in Angora, Teheran, and Kabul were instructed to prepare the way for further progress.

The *venue* chosen for these activities was especially calculated to inconvenience Great Britain both in relations through Iraq with Turkey and through India with Afghanistan, and this was consistent with the announcement of the Soviet chiefs that the British Empire was the principal obstacle and opponent to Bolshevism.

Success attended the efforts of Soviet diplomacy, for on August 31, 1926, a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression closely following the lines of those already concluded was signed with great pomp at the Amir of Afghanistan's summer residence of Pagman.¹

The Moscow Government had, however, a more extensive plan in view. Non-aggression treaties already existed between Russia and Turkey, and Turkey and Persia, while between Russia and Persia there was the Treaty of February 26, 1921, which provides for the diplomatic settlement of all disputes arising between the two countries. It was, therefore, proposed by the U.S.S.R. to elaborate these treaties into a tripartite pact, which would provide for the compulsory neutrality on the part of each of the contracting parties should either of the other two parties be attacked. At the present moment (October 1926) nothing definite has emerged, but negotiations have progressed sufficiently to allow of direct conversations between M. Chicherin and Memduh Shevket Bey and Mirzah Khan Timurtash, the Turkish and Persian diplomatic representatives respectively.² The treaty itself

¹ *Scotsman*, September 2, 1926.

² *Times*, September 3, 1926.

may be said to be on the point of conclusion, and it will be of interest to see to what extent the original Soviet-Turkish agreement, which doubtless will provide the formula, has been changed. Will Persia make the same reservations as Herr Stresemann in view of her League obligations; or will the new triple pact include the provision contained in the Turko-Persian treaty for the compulsory defence of neutrality on the part of the contracting parties, even if necessary by force of arms?

The year 1926 will undoubtedly go down in the annals of Soviet diplomacy as the treaty-making year, and the month of October closed with security negotiations still in progress in six capitals on Russia's western, and two on her southern, frontier.

4. THE FAR EAST AND WASHINGTON.

The Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament and the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions, November 1921–February 1922, provides security or non-aggression pacts as part of the solution for each of the problems with which it was called to deal. These were (a) the Four Powers Pacific Pact and (b) the Nine Powers Pact of non-aggression against China.

(a) *The Pacific Pact.*

The first point of interest about the treaty is that it provides the first, and at present the only, instance in history of a bi-lateral treaty of alliance being superseded by a mutual pact of guarantee between three or four States outside the two original contracting parties.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902 and renewed in 1911 for a period of ten years, was directed against the Eastern expansion schemes of Germany and Russia. But it was a defensive alliance, as was shown by the fact that Great Britain was not involved as a result of it in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The Great War removed some of its original *raisons d'être*. Germany by the Treaty of Versailles ceased to be a Colonial Power, and hence a rival to

Great Britain, and Japan had not only demonstrated her capability to look after her own affairs in the East, but as a result of the Russian *débâcle* had succeeded in taking possession of most of her coveted points.

Japan, however, proved even more aggressive than her predecessors in the Far East, and American opinion became exercised very deeply both over her policy in Manchuria and in Siberia, and over the relations of the British Empire with her through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was considered that a continuation of this alliance with Japan would be a threat by Great Britain to the United States, who alone were capable of combating Japanese imperialism in the Far East. There was a further point. Both Japan and Great Britain were members of the League of Nations, and Article 20 of the Covenant automatically abrogates all international obligations which are not compatible with its spirit;¹ and on July 8, 1920, the two Powers informed the League that if the Alliance were continued beyond 1921 it must be in a form consistent with the letter of the Covenant. When, therefore, the time came in July 1921 for the further renewal of the alliance there was found to be a definitely hostile public feeling against such a step throughout the Empire. The Dominions declared against it because of the concentrated opposition in the United States. Mr. Massey, Premier of New Zealand, declared that a war between Great Britain and the United States would "smash the Empire into smithereens," while the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, confessed that he greeted with joy every battleship laid down in American shipyards. The Australian Federation of Labour, through the Melbourne *Labour Call*, proclaimed that "it is the beginning of the end of a white race or tribe when they have to seek protection from or owe their existence to a foreign coloured

¹ Article 20 of the Covenant: "The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any member of the League shall, before becoming a member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations."

race." Mr. Meighen, Prime Minister of Canada, said more guardedly that he was opposed to any pact which would injure the friendship of the British Empire with the United States. These views were re-expressed and emphasised at the Imperial Conference in the summer of 1921. The British Government bowed before the storm and found shelter and excuse for pleasing both parties in the declaration that the Alliance would remain binding for one year after it was denounced.¹ This was tantamount to the renewal of it for one year, or until July 1922; and to square their action with the Covenant the two Governments formally notified the League of Nations:—

That they were agreed that if any situation arises whilst the Agreement remains in force in which the procedure described by the terms of the Agreement is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League, then the procedure prescribed by the said Covenant shall be adopted and shall prevail over that prescribed by the Agreement.²

Thus matters stood at the opening of the Washington Conference on November 22, 1921.

From the outset the leaders at Washington were fully aware that the success of their labours depended upon their finding some alternative to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and accordingly they gave this problem their first attention, though their discussions were held in secret and did not form part of the Conference's committee work. Hence no official record of the negotiations exists.

It seems, however, that the first solution was presented by Mr. Balfour in the form of a Draft Three-Power Pacific Agreement, consisting of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, who would guarantee to one another their possessions in the Far East. To this, however, neither the American nor the Chinese Delegations would agree—the United States because she feared to be out-voted by the two former partners on any questions which affected their common interests; China

¹ See *The Washington Conference*, by Raymond L. Buell, pp. 130-133. Appleton, New York, 1922.

² See *League of Nations Monthly Summary*, August 1921. League of Nations Secretariat, Geneva.

because she would not agree to any Pacific Alliance to which she was not a party.¹

It remained, therefore, for Mr. Hughes, United States Secretary of State, to provide the successful formula which should solve the problem. This he did by proposing a Four-Power Pact, including France, and eliminating the question of guarantee in respect of the Far East. This was formally adopted by all parties and became the genesis of the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, between Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan.

This treaty is an instrument of four articles, in the first of which the four Powers agree to "respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific." Moreover, should any dispute arise between them regarding these rights, it must, if unsettled by diplomatic methods, be referred to a Conference of all four Powers for "consideration and adjustment." On the other hand, should these rights be the subject of external aggression, the Powers decided to communicate with one another in order to agree upon the measures to be taken against the aggression, and whether these measures should be taken jointly or separately (Art. II). The treaty, which was to remain in operation for ten years, took effect on the deposit of ratification (August 17, 1923), upon which same date the most important provision of all came into operation, namely, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Arts. III and IV).²

In signing the treaty the Powers added an important two-point declaration:—

1. That the scope of the treaty was extended to the Pacific mandates, though this did not imply American assent to the mandate system, nor the preclusion of any agreements at which the United States had arrived with the Mandatory Powers.
2. That the disputes referred to in Article I did not include questions which, "according to principles of international law," are exclusively of a domestic nature.

¹ See Buell, pp. 174-177.

² See Senate Document, No. 124, Sixty-seventh Congress, Second Session.

This last provision was inserted as a safeguard for the United States and the British Pacific Dominions against the raising by Japan of the question of migration.¹

The treaty was presented to and adopted by the Conference on December 10th, and signed three days later. On December 16th, however, a new development arose in the unofficial announcement² that the term "insular possessions and insular dominions" was interpreted by Japan as including the homeland islands of the Japanese Empire. This put a new appearance on the treaty, for it not only rendered Japan immune from attack by the United States (the agreement not being reciprocal), but pledged to some degree the three remaining Powers to assist Japan in any attack upon her by Russia or China. These two States might attempt to drive Japan from the mainland of Asia, but once this attempt developed into an invasion of Japan proper the provisions of the treaty might be invoked.

So greatly was public opinion in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and, indeed, to some extent in Japan itself, against such an interpretation, that on February 6, 1922, a supplementary treaty was signed by the four Contracting Powers. This treaty limited the term "insular possessions" as far as Japan was concerned to Karafuto (or the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the Japanese mandates, and definitely excluded the homeland of Japan.

Previous to this, on February 4th and 6th, the four Powers made an identic statement to the Netherlands and Portuguese Governments respectively, assuring them that the principles of the Pacific Pact would apply also to their insular possessions, although these had not been included in the treaty.

The substitution of the Pacific Pact for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance undoubtedly contributed very greatly to the maintenance of the peace of the Far East. Henry Cabot Lodge,

¹ See Senate Document, No. 125, Report of the United States Delegation.

² *New York Times*, December 16, 1921; also Buell, pp. 179-181, and *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-23, p. 497.

speaking in the United States Senate on March 8, 1922, said : "In my judgment the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the most dangerous element in our relations with the Far East and with the Pacific . . . it caused a growing feeling of suspicion not only in the United States, but in Canada . . . it tended to give a background to Japan which encouraged the war spirit and large preparations both by land and sea for future conflicts. It immobilised England, and prevented the exercise of her influence in the East for the cause of peace."¹

Here, then, is a concrete case of a Four-Power treaty of mutual "respect" replacing, and dispelling, the suspicion caused by a rather sinister, bi-lateral agreement; of a treaty of security supplanting an old, pre-war, political alliance.

(b) *The Chinese Non-Aggression Treaty.*

One of the principal objects of the Washington Conference was to devise a system by which China could secure a square deal from all other Powers, who, in their turn, should meet with equal treatment in China. It was generally felt that China had too long been exposed to a system of land-grabbing, and of having her territory fought over by other Powers, as in the case of Russia and Japan for the possession of Port Arthur (1904-1905) and Germany and Japan for possession of Tsingtao in 1914.

China had come to the Washington Conference with a programme which included complete tariff autonomy and tariff increases to make the creation of a strong central Government possible; the economic as well as the political control over Shantung and the fixing of a date by which all Japanese troops throughout China must be withdrawn. In none of these objects was she entirely successful, a fact which may be attributed to the opposition of Japan, who stood for the negation of all these points.²

There was, however, drawn up by the Conference, and signed on February 6, 1922, by the representatives of the United States,

¹ *New York Times*, March 9, 1922.

² Buell, p. 314.

British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, a "Treaty relating to the Principles and Policies to be followed in matters concerning China."

The Signatory Powers in Article 1 laid down four cardinal points on which the rest of the treaty, and indeed their own future policies, were to be based.

These were as follows :—

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Previous to this, on November 22, 1921, China had made a separate declaration pledging herself not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any Power.

The Powers further agreed that they would not enter into any treaty or understanding among themselves or with any other Power which would infringe in any way the principles of Article 1 (Art. 2). This provision aimed at preventing the negotiation of any further agreements, such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance or the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. In pursuance of the Open Door policy envisaged in paragraph 3 of Art. 1, the Powers agreed not to encourage their respective nationals in seeking certain advantages which would impair it. China, on her side, undertook not to grant such advantages to the nationals of the Powers (Art. 3). The Powers further undertook not to support any arrangements between their respective nationals for creating spheres of influence in Chinese territory (Art. 4).¹ China undertook not to exercise

¹ Articles 3 and 4 of this treaty were supplemented by a resolution adopted by the Conference on the same date as the signing of the treaty,

or permit unfair discrimination (the meaning of which was defined) on any railway in her territory, while the other parties undertook a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals had control (Art. 5). In order to prevent any repetition of such violation of Chinese territory as was committed by Japanese troops in the campaign around Tsingtao in 1914, Article 6 placed the Signatory Powers under an obligation to respect China's rights—a neutral in time of war to which China was not a party—and China agreed to observe under the same circumstances the full obligations of neutrality. There followed a provision identical with that of Article 1 of the Pacific Pact, for the exchange of full and frank communication between the Powers whenever a situation occurs which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the treaty (Art. 7). This, as Professor Toynbee points out,¹ is designed to secure all the advantages of Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provides for the friendly right of each member to call the attention of the Council or the Assembly to any event which threatens to disturb the "good understanding between the nations on which peace depends," while advocating the commitments of the following Articles. Finally, in Article 8 it was decided to invite the adhesion of such non-signatory Powers which had Governments recognised by the signatories (thus ruling out Russia, whose Government was not then recognised by the British Empire, and is still not recognised by the United States), and had treaty relations with China.²

The treaty remained inoperative until October 19, 1925, when France, who had for a variety of reasons delayed her

to the effect that there should be established in China a Board of Reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of these Articles may be referred for investigation and report. The Board is to be established by the International Tariff Conference provided for in Article 11 of the Nine-Power Tariff Treaty of the same date. As ratification of both this and the treaty under discussion was delayed until late in 1925, the International Tariff Conference only met at the beginning of 1926, and owing to the disordered state of China at the present moment has had no opportunity either of adopting a report or of formulating a constitution for the Board of Research.

¹ See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1920-23, p. 478, footnote 2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 477, 478; and Buell, p. 317.

ratification, communicated to the Department of State at Washington, thereby putting the treaty into execution.

The treaty itself has in many aspects points in common with the Reconstruction Protocols in the case of Austria (1922) and Hungary (1924), more especially in the provision for the non-alienation of territory. These three instruments show a remarkable development in post-war politics, wherein a number of States agree with reference to another State, so to say, "in a bad way financially," that they will not take advantage of its financial or economic embarrassment for securing political or commercial gains which they would not have been able to obtain under other circumstances.

III

A BALKAN PACT

WITH the latest Balkan dispute only a year away it may seem somewhat premature to speak of a Balkan Pact of Security. Despite appearances to the contrary, however, a growing tendency has manifested itself in that stormy south-east corner of Europe towards the development of a plan by which the continuous quarrels which have made the Balkans notorious may be amicably settled, if not altogether obviated.

Balkan leagues and associations have not in past years been of long duration, nor have they been distinguished by good intentions. The last of these experiments, the Balkan League of 1912-1913, a weapon forged by M. Venizelos for the final liberation of the Balkan peoples from Turkish suzerainty, fell to pieces as soon as its purpose had been achieved. Not only this, but it greatly lessened the chances of future combination by the alarming outcrop of nationalist divergencies which it left behind it. The endless round of frontier disputes and incidents which have continued among the Balkan States for the past twelve years, besides providing the *casus belli* for the Great War, have been a continual source of anxiety and disquietude to the Chancelleries of the Powers and a lasting obstacle to the progress of security and disarmament.

Now, however, even the Balkan peoples themselves have revolted against the continual programme of assassination, murder and guerilla warfare, and the foundations are being laid for a more lasting league than has hitherto existed.

To this end the system adopted closely resembles that of the Western Pact of Security initialled at Locarno. Just as the *Entente Cordiale* formed the original basis of negotiations, first for an Anglo-French Pact directed against Germany, and finally for a wider Treaty of Guarantee, so the negotiations for the renewal of the Greco-Serbian Alliance of 1913 (suspended

in 1915 owing to the policy of King Constantine), though first directed against Bulgaria, paved the way for a possible system of arbitration treaties upon which a permanent Balkan Pact could be based.

Negotiations opened between Athens and Belgrade in March 1925, and had three definite subjects of discussion :—

- (1) Mutual guarantee of assistance between Greece and Yugoslavia in the event of any aggression on the part of Bulgaria.
- (2) Guarantee of moral and possibly physical support of Greece by Yugoslavia in the event of Bulgarian aggression.
- (3) Peaceful liquidation of the Greco-Yugoslav dispute as to an outlet to the *Aegean Sea*.

Such an alliance was directed manifestly against Bulgaria, but in addition to this there were other influences which made for a united policy. The common fear of Turkey, with the exception of Germany the one enemy Power to come out of the War still a factor of political importance, drove Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia into opening informal conversations for a Balkan *entente* directed against Turkish aggression.

Again, the effect of continual Soviet threatenings to invade Bessarabia inclined Rumania to look southward to her Balkan neighbours for an alliance against Bolshevism, which had already made a compact with the Macedonian Liberation Movement. Bulgaria was beginning to feel the effects of that insidious Communist propaganda which culminated in the attempted assassination of King Boris and the dynamiting of Sofia Cathedral, so that she, too, was not unattracted by the idea of "common action against a common foe."

Thus an inherent dread of their two remaining powerful neighbours, Turkey and Russia, drove the Balkan States in upon themselves for mutual protection. Nor was this opportunity allowed to slip by unseized. In Athens a group of influential newspaper editors and others founded an "Association for Balkan *rapprochement*," and simultaneously corresponding organisations were started in Bucharest and Belgrade. The object of these societies was to create an interest in Balkan culture, and in fact to emphasise the Balkan interests.

which the peninsular States possessed in common. So successful was the movement that it was hoped to hold a Pan-Balkan Conference in Athens during the summer of 1925, and though this never took place, partly owing to the rapidity with which negotiations for a Pact of Security developed in Western Europe, and partly because of the June revolution in Athens, considerable progress was made and plans laid for the holding of the conference during 1926. And meanwhile the Greco-Yugoslav negotiations continued, albeit despairingly.

Then there occurred an event which seemed at first to have utterly destroyed all chances of a Balkan arrangement. On June 25, 1925, a *military coup d'état* in Athens brought back to power the militarist and reactionary creators of the Greek Republic, General Pangalos and Admiral Hajikyriakos, at the head. For the moment it looked as if all hope of Balkan peace must die, but Europe was startled, and greatly surprised in fact, when in the following month the Foreign Minister, M. Rentis, declared the proposed foreign policy of the new Government, which definitely visualised a Balkan Security Pact and did not encourage a further alliance with Belgrade.

The failure of his predecessors to secure this latter had convinced M. Rentis of the great divergency in the opinions of the two countries. "An alliance between Athens and Belgrade is no longer possible in its former shape and must be replaced by a different understanding. This very naturally leads to the thought of a pact of guarantee on the lines of the one now being evolved by the Western Powers."

To this end M. Rentis cast about for some one State with whom he could open fresh negotiations. Yugoslavia had demonstrated her inability to see the Greek point of view; Bulgaria was still suspect to a certain extent, and events were too near to Smyrna and Lausanne to treat with Turkey. There remained Rumania, who had no cause for dispute with Greece, owing to the fact that they have no common frontier. With the object of laying the foundations for a general Balkan understanding, M. Rentis opened conversations with Bucharest which were warmly received by the Rumanian Government.

Three main points constitute the basis of these conversations :—

- (1) That Rumania and Greece should mutually agree to fight side by side for the maintenance of the treaties constituting the present Balkan *status quo*.
- (2) That the two countries should guarantee to each other assistance in maintaining the freedom of the Straits.
- (3) That Rumania should have a free zone in the port of Salonika similar to that already granted to Yugoslavia.

As regard the first two points, no difficulty in agreement arose, but as to the third there was a certain hesitancy, for, although the Yugoslav zone was inaugurated in October 1925, the Greek Government had a plan for the creation of an international zone in Salonika in which all States engaged in *Ægean* trade would enjoy equal rights. The effect on Yugoslavia has, however, been a good one, calculated to improve relations between the two States both nationally and internationally.

With Turkey M. Rentis was able to conclude a reasonably good treaty, and one which rectified their common frontier to the satisfaction of both Governments ; Turkey expressed herself as agreeable to the idea of a pact of guarantee.

Before he was able to complete his establishment of friendly relations with Belgrade and Sofia, M. Rentis, owing to a disagreement with the Premier, resigned, but not before he had placed on record the remainder of his plan for the maintenance of Balkan peace. He was succeeded as Foreign Minister by the less conciliatory Admiral Hajikyriakos.

In the middle of October 1925 the frontier dispute between Greece and Bulgaria, which had smouldered since 1923, flamed up into an “incident” which only great rapidity of action and firm handling on the part of the Council of the League of Nations prevented from becoming an active war invasion. This reversion to the old Balkan policy brought matters to a head, and at the Council meeting in Paris Mr. Austen Chamberlain demonstrated the appreciation of the Western Powers for M. Rentis’ efforts. He emphasised the absolute necessity

for some definite agreement between the Balkan States which would render such incidents as the Greco-Bulgarian dispute, just settled, a matter for instant action by the other States in the peninsular. Following upon this came General Hajikyriakos' announcement of November 5th that Greece was desirous of securing a permanent Balkan pact, and was in favour of an agreement providing for compulsory arbitration among the Balkan States.

Clearly this announcement is based upon that part of M. Rentis' plan which his sudden departure from office prevented his carrying out. The pact of guarantee outlined by M. Rentis was one which should bind the six Balkan States, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and Albania, mutually to guarantee one to another their existing frontiers ; not to attack one another ; and to unite in attacking an aggressor. Such a treaty of mutual guarantee would be supplemented by a system of compulsory arbitration which should come into operation whenever the provisions of the pact become inapplicable.

Such an agreement would have the effect of stereotyping the Treaties of Neuilly and Lausanne, which would then be recognised as the treaties constituting the Balkan Statute, the defence of which figured so prominently in the Greco-Rumanian proposals.

It is worth considering what would have happened had the Rentis plan been in force when the recent Greco-Bulgarian dispute had arisen. Bulgaria (or Greece) being deemed the aggressor, would automatically have found herself threatened with a war with Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Turkey, as well as Greece (or Bulgaria) arrayed against her, and would have been forced to have had recourse to some such system of arbitration as that provided for in the Locarno Treaties.

This, then, is the plan of M. Rentis, a valuable foundation for any builder who might come after him, and one which will doubtless play its part in the final form of Balkan Pact to be evolved.

CONCLUSION

SECURITY, it has been said, is a state of mind and therefore there is no restriction upon the number of methods of obtaining it. "Special arrangements must be made to meet special needs," and these arrangements vary in form from a bi-lateral alliance to a general international agreement. Indeed, so infinite is their variety that a list of them is an interest, if not a necessity. Proceeding, therefore, from the particular to the general, the following types may be noticed:—

1. *A bi-lateral alliance directed against a Power from whom aggression is anticipated.* The Tripartite Pact of Guarantee and the proposed Anglo-French Pact were on these lines. The most important instance of such an alliance now in force is the Polish-Rumanian Alliance directed at once against Germany and Russia.
2. *A bi-lateral treaty of permanent neutrality* such as those initiated by the Soviet Government with Germany and Turkey.
3. *An alliance between two or more Powers to preserve the "status quo" created by a general peace settlement.* The Little Entente and the treaties between its States and France and Italy are examples of this, as is also the guarantee contained in the Straits Convention.
4. *A series of treaties between the States situated in a certain area calculated to ensure the general security of that area.* The Turkish treaties with France, Persia, and Iraq are illustrative of this method.
5. *An agreement between two or more Powers to guarantee the territorial integrity of a third party during a period of economic or financial reconstruction.* Such are the Austrian and Hungarian Reconstruction Protocols and the Chinese Non-aggression Pact signed at Washington.
6. *A direct agreement between the Powers concerned to respect mutually the integrity of their possessions in one specified area.* The Four-Power Pacific Pact is the only example of this.
7. *A pact between two or more contiguous Powers to respect their mutual frontier and the participation in such a pact of other Powers, not necessarily contiguous, as guarantors, all agreeing to support any signatory State who is the subject of an act of aggression on the part of another signatory State.* The Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is, of course, the classic instance

of this variety, but its principles are likely to be the basis of any Security Pact which may be concluded in the future.

8. *A general international agreement under which all contracting States are automatically at war with an aggressor State.* This principle was the foundation upon which the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol were based.

In dealing with the future it must be remembered that while security is only a means to an end, and that end disarmament, the past six years have proved it to be a delicate plant of slow growth and dangerously susceptible to the cold winds of suspicion and distrust. It is believed now that it has taken firm root through the Locarno Agreement in the soil of mutual understanding, but its growth is still uncertain and may easily be halted through lack of attention, or even through over-zealous care.

Since security is, at first at least, of an essentially local nature, it is probable and desirable that local fears should be allayed by local arrangements, preferably, though not necessarily, conducted within the scope of the League of Nations, but certainly within the spirit of the Covenant. This principle has been followed in the case of the Locarno Agreement, and will doubtlessly dominate subsequent security negotiations. Then, when mutual trust has been established locally, an opportunity will arise for some such instrument as the Geneva Protocol, which, taking advantage of the trust thus established, may provide that extra degree of general security necessary to bring about that sensible policy of the reduction of armaments upon which, Lord Cecil declares, depends our chief hope of extirpating the curse of war.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TEXTS TO ILLUSTRATE PART I

1. TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND FRANCE RESPECTING ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE IN THE EVENT OF UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION BY GERMANY. SIGNED AT VERSAILLES, JUNE 28, 1919.

WHEREAS there is a danger that the stipulations relating to the Left Bank of the Rhine contained in the Treaty of Peace signed this day at Versailles may not at first provide adequate security and protection to the French Republic ; and

WHEREAS His Britannic Majesty is willing, subject to the consent of His Parliament and provided that a similar obligation is entered into by the United States of America, to undertake to support the French Government in the case of an unprovoked movement of aggression being made against France by Germany ; and

WHEREAS His Britannic Majesty and the President of the French Republic have determined to conclude a treaty to that effect and have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose, that is to say :

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA :

The Right Honourable David Lloyd George, M.P., First Lord of His Treasury and Prime Minister ;

The Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., His Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC :

M. Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War ;

M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;

WHO having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have AGREED AS FOLLOWS :—

Article I.

In case the following stipulations relating to the Left Bank of the Rhine contained in the Treaty of Peace which Germany signed at Versailles the 28th day of June, 1919, by the British Empire, the French Republic, and the United States of America among other Powers :—

Article 42.—Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43.—In the area defined above the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44.—In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world

—may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France, Great Britain agrees to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.

Article 2.

The present treaty, in similar terms with the treaty of even date for the same purpose concluded between the French Republic and the United States of America, a copy of which treaty is annexed hereto, will only come into force when the latter is ratified.

Article 3.

The present treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations and must be recognised by the Council, acting if need be by a majority, as an engagement which is consistent with the Covenant of the League ; it will continue in force until on the application of one of the Parties to it the Council, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

Article 4.

The present treaty shall before ratification by His Majesty be submitted to Parliament for approval.

It shall before ratification by the President of the French Republic be submitted to the French Chambers for approval.

Article 5.

The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned.

The present treaty shall be ratified, and shall, subject to Articles 2 and 4, come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Germany of even date comes into force for the British Empire and the French Republic.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty, drawn up in the English and French languages.

Done in duplicate at Versailles, on the twenty-eighth day of June, 1919.

(*Seal*) D. LLOYD GEORGE.
 (*Seal*) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.
 (*Seal*) G. CLEMENCEAU.
 (*Seal*) S. PICHON.

**2. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE REGARDING
ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE IN THE EVENT OF UNPROVOKED
AGGRESSION BY GERMANY. SIGNED AT VERSAILLES, JUNE 28,
1919.**

WHEREAS the United States of America and the French Republic are equally animated by the desire to maintain the Peace of the world so happily restored by the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles the 28th day of June, 1919, putting an end to the war begun by the aggression of the German Empire and ended by the defeat of that Power ; and,

WHEREAS the United States of America and the French Republic are fully persuaded that an unprovoked movement of aggression by Germany against France would not only violate both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles to which the United States of America and the French Republic are parties, thus exposing France anew to the intolerable burdens of an unprovoked war, but that such aggression on the part of Germany would be and is so regarded by the Treaty of Versailles as a hostile act against all the Powers signatory to that treaty, and as calculated to disturb the Peace of the world by involving inevitably and directly the States of Europe and indirectly, as experience has amply and unfortunately demonstrated, the world at large ; and,

WHEREAS the United States of America and the French Republic fear that the stipulations relating to the left bank of the Rhine contained in the said Treaty of Versailles may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France, on the one hand, and the United States of America, as one of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, on the other :

THEREFORE, the United States of America and the French Republic having decided to conclude a treaty to effect these necessary purposes, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States, specially authorised thereto by the President of the United States, and Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War, and Stéphen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, specially authorised thereto by Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, have agreed upon the following articles :—

Article 1.

In case the following stipulations relating to the Left Bank of the Rhine, contained in the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, by the United States of America, the French Republic, and the British Empire among other Powers :—

Article 42.—Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43.—In the area defined above, the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and

military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44.—In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world

—may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.

Article 2.

The present treaty, in similar terms with the treaty of even date for the same purpose concluded between Great Britain and the French Republic, a copy of which treaty is annexed hereto, will only come into force when the latter is ratified.

Article 3.

The present treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, and must be recognised by the Council, acting if need be by a majority, as an engagement which is consistent with the Covenant of the League. It will continue in force until on the application of one of the Parties to it the Council, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

Article 4.

The present treaty will be submitted to the Senate of the United States at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles is submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It will be submitted before ratification to the French Chamber of Deputies for approval. The ratifications thereof will be exchanged on the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles at Paris or as soon thereafter as shall be possible.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit: On the part of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson, President, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States; and on the part of the French Republic, Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of War, and Stéphen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, have signed the above articles both in English and French languages, and they have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at the City of Versailles, on the twenty-eighth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, and the one hundred and forty-third of the Independence of the United States of America.

(*Seal*) WOODROW WILSON.

(*Seal*) ROBERT LANSING.

(*Seal*) CLEMENCEAU.

(*Seal*) S. PICHON.

3. No. 449.—POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND POLAND.
SIGNED AT PARIS, FEBRUARY 19, 1921.

The registration of this agreement took place July 2, 1923. Ratifications exchanged at Paris, June 27, 1922.

Translation.

(1) In order to co-ordinate their endeavours towards peace, the two Governments undertake to consult each other on all questions of foreign policy which concern both States, so far as those questions affect the settlement of international relations in the spirit of the treaties and in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(2) In view of the fact that economic restoration is the essential preliminary condition of the re-establishment of international order and peace in Europe, the two Governments shall come to an understanding in this regard, with a view to concerted action and mutual support.

They will endeavour to develop their economic relations and for this purpose will conclude special agreements and a commercial treaty.

(3) If, notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful views and intentions of the two Contracting States, either or both of them should be attacked without giving provocation, the two Governments shall take concerted measures for the defence of their territory and the protection of their legitimate interests within the limits specified in the preamble.

(4) The two Governments undertake to consult each other before concluding new agreements which will affect their policy in Central and Eastern Europe.

(5) The present agreement shall not come into force until the commercial agreements now in course of negotiation have been signed.

4. BRITISH DRAFT OF TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, HANDED BY MR. LLOYD GEORGE TO M. BRIAND, JANUARY 12, 1922.

WHEREAS the soil of France has been twice invaded by Germany within living memory, and is still suffering deeply from the devastation wrought by the enemy ; and

WHEREAS the peoples both of France and of the British Empire have paid a heavy toll of their manhood and their wealth in overcoming the German armies of invasion ; and

WHEREAS the welfare of the European peoples and the economic structure of the world have been profoundly disturbed by the protracted ordeal of war through which they have lately passed ; and

WHEREAS guarantees of the security of France against any future invasion by Germany are indispensable to the restoration of European stability, the safety of Great Britain, and the peace of the world ; and

WHEREAS the following safeguards contained in the Treaty of Versailles :—

Article 42.—Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43.—In the area defined above the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44.—In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world

—may not sufficiently provide for the defence of the essential common interests of the High Contracting Parties and the maintenance of peace in Western Europe: His Britannic Majesty and the President of the French Republic having, etc., etc., etc., have agreed as follows :—

Article 1.

In the event of a direct and unprovoked aggression against the soil of France by Germany, Great Britain will immediately place herself at the side of France with her naval, military, and air forces.

Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties reassert their common interest in Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, and will consult together should any breach of them be threatened or any doubt arise as to their interpretation.

Article 3.

The High Contracting Parties undertake further to concert together in the event of any military, naval, or air measures inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles being taken by Germany.

Article 4.

The present treaty shall impose no obligations upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Dominion concerned.

Article 5.

This treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years, and shall, if approved by both parties, be renewable at the end of that period.

5. ANNEXE À LA DÉPÈCHE ADRESSÉE À L'AMBASSADEUR DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE À LONDRES, LE 23 JANVIER, 1922.

Projet de Traité entre les Gouvernements de l'Empire britannique et de la République française.

Considérant que le sol de la France a été deux fois envahi par l'Allemagne de mémoire d'homme vivant, et qu'il souffre encore profondément de la dévastation qui lui a été infligée par l'ennemi ;

Considérant que la population de la France et celle de l'Empire britannique ont l'une et l'autre payé un lourd tribut de vies humaines et de richesses en répoussant l'invasion des armées allemandes ;

Considérant que la prospérité des peuples européens et l'organisation économique du monde ont été profondément troublées par l'épreuve de guerre prolongée par laquelle ils viennent de passer ;

Considérant que des garanties réciproques de sécurité contre une future agression de l'Allemagne sont indispensables à la restauration de la stabilité en Europe, à la sécurité de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, et à la paix du monde ;

Considérant que les mesures de sécurité suivantes contenues dans le Traité de Versailles, savoir :—

Art. 42.—Il est interdit à l'Allemagne de maintenir ou de construire des fortifications, soit sur la rive gauche du Rhin, soit sur la rive droite, à l'Ouest d'une ligne tracée à 50 kilomètres à l'Est de ce fleuve.

Art. 43.—Sont également interdits, dans la zone définie à l'Article 42, l'entretien ou le rassemblement de forces armées, soit à titre permanent, soit à titre temporaire, aussi bien que toutes manœuvres militaires, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, et le maintien de toutes facilités matérielles de mobilisation.

Art. 44.—Au cas où l'Allemagne contreviendrait, de quelque manière que ce soit, aux dispositions des Articles 42 et 43, elle serait considérée comme commettant un acte hostile vis à-vis des Puissances signataires du présent traité et comme cherchant à troubler la paix du monde

—peuvent ne pas pourvoir suffisamment à la défense des intérêts communs essentiels des Hautes Parties contractantes, ainsi qu'au maintien de la paix en Europe occidentale.

SA MAJESTÉ BRITANNIQUE

et

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, ETC.,

lesquels ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1.

Dans le cas d'une agression non provoquée de l'Allemagne contre la France, la Grande-Bretagne se rangera immédiatement aux côtés de la France avec ses forces navales, militaires et aériennes.

Réciproquement, dans le cas d'une agression non provoquée de l'Allemagne contre la Grande-Bretagne, la France, se rangera immédiatement aux côtés de la Grande-Bretagne avec des forces militaires navales et aériennes.

Article 2.

Les deux Hautes Parties contractantes affirment de nouveau l'intérêt commun que présentent pour elles les Articles 42 et 43 du Traité de Paix de Versailles. Elles sont d'accord pour considérer, conformément à l'Article 44 dudit traité, qu'une violation quelconque desdits articles par l'Allemagne constituerait un acte d'agression contre la France et la Grande-Bretagne.

Elles se concerteront s'il y avait une menace d'une violation quelconque desdits articles, ou si un doute venait à d'élever quant à leur interprétation, ainsi qu'au cas où des mesures militaires, navales ou aériennes quelconques incompatibles avec le Traité de Versailles seraient prises par l'Allemagne.

Article 3.

Une entente constante sera maintenue entre les États-Majors respectifs des deux Hautes Parties contractantes en vue d'assurer éventuellement aux dispositions que précédent leur efficacité.

Article 4.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique conviennent de se concerter sur toute question de nature à mettre la paix en danger ou à porter atteinte à l'ordre général établi par les Traité de Paix dont ils sont signataires. Ils examineront en commun les mesures propres à en assurer rapidement un règlement pacifique conforme à l'équité.

Article 5.

Le présent traité n'imposera aucune obligation à l'un quelconque des Dominions de l'Empire britannique, avant qu'il ait été approuvé par le Dominion intéressé.

Article 6.

Le présent traité restera en vigueur pendant une période de trente années et sera, d'un commun accord, renouvelable à la fin de cette période.

Le présent accord sera ratifié aussitôt que faire se pourra, etc.

APPENDIX B

TEXTS TO ILLUSTRATE PART II

1. TREATY OF GUARANTEE BETWEEN THE POLISH REPUBLIC AND THE KINGDOM OF RUMANIA. SIGNED AT BUCHAREST ON THE 26TH MARCH, 1926.¹

THE President of the Polish Republic and His Majesty the King of Rumania, noting the happy consolidation of the guarantees for general peace in Europe, and being anxious to satisfy the desire for security which animates their peoples,

Desirous of seeing their countries save themselves from war,

And being equally animated by a sincere desire to give their peoples complementary guarantees within the bounds of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties to which they are signatory,

Have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect . . . (and the signatories have) agreed to the following provisions :—

Article 1.

Poland and Rumania undertake mutually to respect and to maintain their territorial integrity and existing political independence against all foreign aggression.

Article 2.

In case either Poland or Rumania is the object of an unprovoked attack contrary to the obligations imposed by Articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Poland and reciprocally Rumania, acting by virtue of the application of Article 16 of the League of Nations, undertake immediately to render each other aid and assistance (*aide et assistance*).

The means of execution of the foregoing stipulations shall be the object of technical arrangements.

Article 3.

If, in spite of their pacific efforts, the two States find themselves in a state of defensive war under the terms of Articles 1 and 2, each undertakes not to negotiate nor to conclude an Armistice or a peace without the participation of the other State.

Article 4.

In order to co-ordinate their efforts to maintain peace, both Governments undertake to consult together on such questions of foreign policy as may be of interest to the two Contracting Parties.

¹ Translated from the French text in *Le Messager Polonais*, April 20, 1926.

Article 5.

Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to conclude an alliance with a third Power without having previously obtained the consent of the other Party.

Alliances with a view to the maintenances of treaties already signed jointly by both Poland and Rumania are excepted from this provision. Such alliances must, however, be notified.

Article 6.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to submit to a procedure of conciliation or arbitration the questions which may arise between them or which may be found impossible of settlement through ordinary diplomatic means. The nature of this procedure of pacific settlement shall be the object of a special Convention which shall be concluded as soon as possible.

Article 7.

The duration of the present treaty shall be five years from the date of signature, but either Government shall be at liberty to denounce it after two years, on giving the other State six months' notice.

2. PACT OF NON-AGGRESSION ACCEPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMITTEE OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE (at which were representatives of the Soviet, Poland—representing both herself and Rumania—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), DECEMBER 9, 1922.

League of Nations Document C.59. 1923 IX, C.T.A. 205.

Article I.

The High Contracting Parties solemnly and mutually agree to refrain from any act of armed aggression in their respective territories as fixed by the Peace Treaties, or other agreements for the delimitation of frontiers, concluded between the neighbouring countries, so far as such treaties are already in existence, and in accordance with the present *status quo* so far as Peace Treaties or other agreement for the delimitation of frontiers have not yet been concluded.

Article II.

The High Contracting Parties solemnly and mutually agree to give no support to any third State whatsoever which is not a party to the present agreement, should such State commit an act of armed aggression in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties.

Article III.

Should the present pact be violated by one of the High Contracting Parties, that is to say, should one of the Contracting Parties attack the others, the other Contracting Parties agree to give no aid or support to the attacking State, and are freed from their engagements towards the attacking State under the present pact.

Article IV.

The High Contracting Parties declare that they will decide by peaceful means all disputes and conflicts which may arise among them.

Article V.

The High Contracting Parties agree that, should disputes arise among them for reasons not included in the questions which are regulated by the Peace Treaty or in the questions raised by the present territorial position, the question in dispute shall be submitted to arbitration. The methods of application of the present article shall be laid down in a further agreement.

Article VI.

States which are not parties to the present pact may adhere thereto with the consent of the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII.

The present pact shall be ratified by the Parliaments or other legislative bodies of the States signatories of the pact. Ratification shall take place within three months from the date of the signature of the present pact.

Article VIII.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited at Christiania. The Norwegian Government shall inform the other Contracting Parties of the deposit of instruments of ratification. The present pact shall come into force fifteen days after the deposit of the last instruments of ratification, independently of the conclusion of the Agreement provided for in Article V of the present Pact.

APPENDIX C.

TEXTS TO ILLUSTRATE PART III

1. DRAFT TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE.¹

Preamble.

The High Contracting Parties, being desirous of establishing the general lines of a scheme of mutual assistance with a view to facilitate the application of Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of a reduction or limitation of national armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the covenant "to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations," agree to the following provisions :

Article I (Pact of Non-Aggression).

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission.

A war shall not be considered as a war of aggression if waged by a State which is party to a dispute and has accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Council, the verdict of the Permanent Court of International Justice, or an arbitral award against a High Contracting Party which has not accepted it, provided, however, that the first State does not intend to violate the political independence or the territorial integrity of the High Contracting Party.

Article II (General Assistance).

The High Contracting Parties, jointly and severally, undertake to furnish assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, to any one of their number should the latter be the object of a war of aggression, provided that it has conformed to the provisions of the present treaty regarding the reduction or limitation of armaments.

Article III.

In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being of opinion that the armaments of any other High Contracting Party are in excess of the limits fixed for the latter High Contracting Party under the provisions of the present treaty, or in the event of it having cause to

¹ In certain cases a brief summary of an article is given instead of the full text.

apprehend an outbreak of hostilities, either on account of the aggressive policy or preparations of any State party or not to the present Treaty, it may inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that it is threatened with aggression, and the Secretary-General shall forthwith summon the Council.

The Council, if it is of opinion that there is reasonable ground for thinking that a menace of aggression has arisen, may take all necessary measures to remove such menace, and in particular, if the Council thinks right, those indicated in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of the second paragraph of Article V of the present treaty.

The High Contracting Parties which have been denounced, and those which have stated themselves to be the object of a threat of aggression, shall be considered as especially interested, and shall therefore be invited to send representatives to the Council in conformity with Articles 4, 15, and 17 of the Covenant. The vote of their representatives shall, however, not be reckoned when calculating unanimity.

Article IV.

In the event of one or more of the High Contracting Parties becoming engaged in hostilities, the Council of the League of Nations shall decide, within four days of notification being addressed to the Secretary-General, which of the High Contracting Parties are the objects of aggression and whether they are entitled to claim the assistance provided under the treaty.

The High Contracting Parties undertake that they will accept such a decision by the Council of the League of Nations.

The High Contracting Parties engaged in hostilities shall be regarded as especially interested, and shall therefore be invited to send representatives to the Council (within the terms of Articles 4, 13, and 17 of the Covenant) the vote of their representative not being reckoned when calculating unanimity; the same shall apply to States signatory to any partial agreements involved on behalf of either of the two belligerents, unless the remaining members of the Council shall decide otherwise.

Article V.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to furnish one another mutually with assistance in the case referred to in Article II of the treaty in the form determined by the Council of the League of Nations as the most effective, and to take all appropriate measures without delay in the order of urgency demanded by the circumstances.

In particular, the Council may:—

- (a) Decide to apply immediately to the aggressor State the economic sanctions contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant, the members of the League not signatory to the present treaty not being, however, bound by this decision, except in the case where the State attacked is entitled to avail itself of the articles of the covenant;

- (b) Invoke by name the High Contracting Parties whose assistance it requires. No High Contracting Party situated in a continent other than that in which operations will take place shall, in principle, be required to co-operate in military, naval, or air operations;
- (c) Determine the forces which each State furnishing assistance shall place at its disposal;
- (d) Prescribe all necessary measures for securing priority for the communications and transport connected with the operations;
- (e) Prepare a plan for financial co-operation among the High Contracting Parties with a view to providing for the State attacked, and for the States furnishing assistance, the funds which they require for the operations;
- (f) Appoint the Higher Command and establish the object and the nature of his duty.

The representatives of States recognised as aggressors under the provisions of Article IV of the treaty shall not take part in the deliberations of the Council specified in this article. The High Contracting Parties who are required by the Council to furnish assistance, in accordance with sub-paragraph (b), shall, on the other hand, be considered as especially interested, and, as such, shall be invited to send representatives, unless they are already represented, to the deliberations specified in sub-paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (f).

Article VI (Complementary Defensive Agreements).

For the purpose of rendering the general assistance mentioned in Articles II, III, and V immediately effective, the High Contracting Parties may conclude, either as between two of them or as between a larger number, agreements complementary to the present treaty exclusively for the purpose of their mutual defence and intended solely to facilitate the carrying out of the measures prescribed in this treaty, determining in advance the assistance which they would give to each other in the event of any act of aggression.

Such agreements may, if the High Contracting Parties interested so desire, be negotiated and concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations.

Article VII.

Complementary agreements, as defined in Article VI, shall, before being registered, be examined by the Council with a view to deciding whether they are in accordance with the principles of their treaty and of the covenant.

In particular, the Council shall consider if the cases of aggression contemplated in these agreements come within the scope of Article II and are of a nature to give rise to an obligation to give assistance on the part of the other High Contracting Parties. The Council may, if necessary, suggest changes in the texts of agreements submitted to it.

When recognised, the agreements shall be registered in conformity with Article 18 of the Covenant. They shall be regarded as complementary to the present treaty, and shall in no way limit the general obligations of the High Contracting Parties nor the sanctions contemplated against the aggressor of State under the terms of this treaty.

They will be open to any other High Contracting Party with the consent of the signatory States.

Article VIII.

The States parties to complementary agreements may undertake in any such agreements to put into immediate execution, in the cases of aggression contemplated in them, the plan of assistance agreed upon. In this case they shall inform the Council of the League of Nations, without delay, concerning the measures which they have taken to ensure the execution of such agreements.

Subject to the terms of the previous paragraph, the provisions of Articles IV and V above shall also come into force both in the cases contemplated in the complementary agreements, and in such other cases as are provided for in Article II but are not covered by the agreements.

Article IX.

[Provides for the establishment of demilitarised zones.]

Article X.

[Provides that the aggressor shall pay for the cost of intervention.]

Article XI (Disarmament).

The High Contracting Parties, in view of the security furnished them by this treaty and the limitations to which they have consented in other international treaties, undertake to inform the Council of the League of the reduction or limitation of armaments which they consider proportionate to the security furnished by the general treaty or by the defensive agreements complementary to the general treaty.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate in the preparation of any general plan of reduction of armaments which the Council of the League of Nations, taking into account the information provided by the High Contracting Parties, may propose under the terms of Article 8 of the Covenant.

This plan should be submitted for consideration and approved by the Governments, and, when approved by them, will be the basis of the reduction contemplated in Article II of this treaty.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to carry out this reduction within a period of two years from the date of the adoption of this plan.

The High Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, to make no

further increase in their armaments, when thus reduced, without the consent of the Council.

Article XII.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to furnish to the military or other delegates of the League such information with regard to their armaments as the Council may request.

Article XIII.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the armaments determined for each of them, in accordance with the present treaty, shall be subject to revision every five years, beginning from the date of the entry into force of this treaty.

Article XIV.

[Makes reservation for certain existing treaties.]

Article XV (Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Court).

The High Contracting Parties recognise from to-day, as *ipso facto* obligatory, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice with regard to the interpretation of the present treaty.

Article XVI (Signature, Adhesion, Ratification, Denunciation).

The present treaty shall remain open for the signature of all States Members of the League of Nations or mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant.

States not members shall be entitled to adhere with the consent of two-thirds of the High Contracting Parties with regard to whom the treaty has come into force.

Article XVII.

Any State may, with the consent of the Council of the League, notify its conditional or partial adherence to the provisions of this treaty, provided always that such State has reduced, or is prepared to reduce, its armaments in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty.

Article XVIII.

[Provides for the ratification of the treaty.]

Article XIX.

[Provisions for denunciation.]

NOTE ON ARTICLES XVIII AND XIX.

M. Benès, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of Czechoslovakia, in presenting this Draft Treaty to the Fourth Assembly of the League

of Nations, made the following reservation in regard to the two remaining articles (XVIII and XIX) :

"The Committee has been confronted with the legal and political difficulties raised by the questions of the ratification and denunciation of the treaty. After studying suggestions put forward by the Committee of Jurists, the Committee, rather than propose a definite text, has decided to add to its draft two articles (XVIII and XIX) which respectively deal with these two questions, but merely as an indication of subject-matter requiring further study by those Governments to which the draft is submitted with a view to arriving at a satisfactory and definite text."

September, 1923.

2. PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.¹

Animated by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of general peace and the security of nations whose existence, independence, or territories may be threatened ;

Recognising the solidarity of the members of the international community ;

Asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime ;

Desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between States and of ensuring the repression of international crimes ; and

For the purpose of realising, as contemplated by Article 8 of the Covenant, the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations ;

The undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, agree as follows :

Article 1 (Protocol and Covenant).

The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the covenant of amendments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following articles.

They agree that, as between themselves, these provisions shall be binding as from the coming into force of the present Protocol and that, so far as they are concerned, the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations shall thenceforth have power to exercise all the rights and perform all the duties conferred upon them by the Protocol.

Article 2 (Pledges against War).

The signatory States agree in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a State which, if the occasion arises, accepts all

¹ Unanimously approved by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, October 2, 1924.

the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant and of the present Protocol.

Article 3 (Compulsory Jurisdiction of Court).

The signatory States undertake to recognise as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the cases covered by paragraph 2 or Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, but without prejudice to the right of any State, when acceding to the special protocol provided for in the said article and opened for signature on December 16, 1920, to make reservations compatible with the said clause.

Accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on December 16, 1920, must be given within the month following the coming into force of the present Protocol.

States which accede to the present Protocol, after its coming into force, must carry out the above obligation within the month following their accession.

Article 4 (Arbitration Procedure).

With a view to render more complete the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant, the signatory States agree to comply with the following procedure :—

- (1) If the dispute submitted to the Council is not settled by it as provided in paragraph 3 of the said Article 15, the Council shall endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration.
- (2) (a) If the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall, at the request of at least one of the parties, be constituted a Committee of Arbitrators. The Committee shall so far as possible be constituted by agreement between the parties.
- (b) If within the period fixed by the Council the parties have failed to agree, in whole or in part, upon the number, the names and powers of the arbitrators and upon the procedure, the Council shall settle the points remaining in suspense. It shall with the utmost possible despatch select in consultation with the parties the arbitrators and their President from among persons who by their nationality, their personal character and their experience, appear to it to furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality.
- (c) After the claims of the parties have been formulated the Committee of Arbitrators, on the request of any party, shall, through the medium of the Council, request an advisory opinion upon any points of law in dispute

from the Permanent Court of International Justice, which in such case shall meet with the utmost possible despatch.

- (3) If none of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall again take the dispute under consideration. If the Council reaches a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, the signatory States agree to comply with the recommendations therein.
- (4) If the Council fails to reach a report which is concurred in by all its members, other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, it shall submit the dispute to arbitration. It shall itself determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of Arbitrators and, in the choice of the arbitrators, shall bear in mind the guarantees of competence and impartiality referred to in paragraph 2 (b) above.
- (5) In no case may a solution, upon which there has already been a unanimous recommendation of the Council accepted by one of the parties concerned, be again called in question.
- (6) The signatory States undertake that they will carry out in full good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may be rendered, and that they will comply, as provided in paragraph 3 above, with the solutions recommended by the Council. In the event of a State failing to carry out the above undertakings, the Council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance therewith. If it fails therein, it shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto, in accordance with the provision contained at the end of Article 13 of the Covenant. Should a State in disregard of the above undertakings resort to war, the sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, interpreted in the manner indicated in the present Protocol, shall immediately become applicable to it.
- (7) The provisions of the present article do not apply to the settlement of disputes which arise as the result of measures of war taken by one or more signatory States in agreement with the Council or the Assembly.

Article 5 (Domestic Jurisdiction).

The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article 15 of the Covenant shall continue to apply in proceedings before the Council.

If in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated by Article 4 above, one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof, arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this point take the advice of the Permanent Court of International Justice through the medium of the Council. The opinion of the Court shall be binding

upon the arbitrators, who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall confine themselves to so declaring in their award.

If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the Council or by the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant.

Article 6 (Reference to Assembly).

If in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant a dispute is referred to the Assembly, that body shall have for the settlement of the dispute all the powers conferred upon the Council as to endeavouring to reconcile the parties in the manner laid down in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and in paragraph 1 of Article 4 above.

Should the Assembly fail to achieve an amicable settlement :

If one of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall proceed to constitute the Committee of Arbitrators in the manner provided in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 2 of Article 4 above.

If no party asks for arbitration, the Assembly shall again take the dispute under consideration and shall have in this connection the same powers as the Council. Recommendations embodied in a report of the Assembly, provided that it secures the measure of support stipulated at the end of paragraph 10 of Article 15 of the Covenant, shall have the same value and effect, as regards all matters dealt with in the present protocol, as recommendations embodied in a report of the Council adopted as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 4 above.

If the necessary majority cannot be obtained, the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration, and the Council shall determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of Arbitrators as laid down in paragraph 4 of Article 4.

Article 7 (Military Preparations).

In the event of a dispute arising between two or more signatory States, these States agree that they will not, either before the dispute is submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such proceedings, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which might modify the position established by the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments provided for by Article 17 of the present Protocol, nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air, industrial, or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute to render it more acute.

It shall be the duty of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant, to take under consideration any complaint as to infraction of the above undertakings which is made to it by one or more of the States parties to the dispute. Should the Council be of opinion that the complaint requires investigation, it shall, if it deems it expedient, arrange for enquiries and investigations in one or more of

the countries concerned. Such enquiries and investigations shall be carried out with the utmost possible despatch, and the signatory States undertake to afford every facility for carrying them out.

The sole object of measures taken by the Council as above provided is to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes, and they shall in no way prejudge the actual settlement.

If the result of such inquiries and investigations is to establish an infraction of the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article, it shall be the duty of the Council to summon the State or States guilty of the infraction to put an end thereto. Should the State or States in question fail to comply with such summons, the Council shall declare them to be guilty of a violation of the Covenant or of the present Protocol, and shall decide upon the measures to be taken with a view to end as soon as possible a situation of a nature to threaten the peace of the world.

For the purposes of the present article decisions of the Council may be taken by a two-thirds majority.

Article 8.¹

[Deals with abstention from aggression.]

Article 9.

[Provides for certain demilitarised zones.]

Article 10 (Tests of Aggression).

Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor. Violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war.

In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall be presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the Council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare :

- (1) If it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific settlement provided by Articles 13 and 15 of the Covenant as amplified by the present Protocol, or to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of the Council, or has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council, a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognising that the dispute between it and the other belligerent State arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter State ; nevertheless, in the last case the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly, in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant.

¹ In the case of this and certain other articles it should be noted that a summary and not the full text is given.

(2) If it has violated provisional measures enjoined by the Council for the period while the proceedings are in progress as contemplated by Article 7 of the present Protocol.

Apart from the cases dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article, if the Council does not at once succeed in determining the aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution.

Any belligerent which has refused to accept the armistice or has violated its terms shall be deemed an aggressor.

The Council shall call upon the signatory States to apply forthwith against the aggressor the sanctions provided by Article 11 of the present Protocol, and any signatory State thus called upon shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent.

Article 11 (Sanctions).

As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 of the present Protocol, the obligations of the said States in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant, will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor.

Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant, the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened State.

If both parties to the dispute are aggressors within the meaning of Article 10, the economic and financial sanctions shall be applied to both of them.

Article 12 (Economic and Financial Measures).

In view of the complexity of the conditions in which the Council may be called upon to exercise the functions mentioned in Article 11 of the present Protocol concerning economic and financial sanctions, and in order to determine more exactly the guarantees afforded by the present Protocol to the signatory States, the Council shall forthwith invite the economic and financial organisations of the League of Nations to consider and report as to the nature of the steps to be taken to give

effect to the financial and economic sanctions and measures of co-operation contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant and in Article 11 of this Protocol.

When in possession of this information, the Council shall draw up through its competent organs :—

- (1) Plans of action for the application of the economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor State ;
- (2) Plans of economic and financial co-operation between a State attacked and the different States assisting it ;

and shall communicate these plans to the Members of the League and to the other signatory States.

Article 13 (Prior Undertakings and Partial Agreements).

In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant and by Article 11 of the present Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol.

Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 above, the said States may, in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces.

The agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be registered and published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. They shall remain open to all States Members of the League which may decide to accede thereto.

Article 14 (Cessation of Sanctions).

The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established.

Article 15.

[Provides that the Aggressor shall pay for the cost of operations, but without loss of independence.]

Article 16.

[Deals with disputes with non-members on the lines of Article 17 of the Covenant.]

Article 17 (Armaments Conference).

The signatory States undertake to participate in an International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments which shall be convened

by the Council and shall meet at Geneva on Monday, June 15th, 1925. All other States, whether Members of the League or not, shall be invited to this Conference.

In preparation for the convening of the Conference, the Council shall draw up, with due regard to the undertakings contained in Articles 11 and 13 of the present Protocol, a general programme for the reduction and limitation of armaments, which shall be laid before the Conference and which shall be communicated to the Governments at the earliest possible date, and at the latest three months before the Conference meets.

If by May 1, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited by at least a majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten other Members of the League, the Secretary-General of the League shall immediately consult the Council as to whether he shall cancel the invitations or merely adjourn the Conference until a sufficient number of ratifications have been deposited.

Article 18 (Council Voting).

Wherever mention is made in Article 10, or in any other provision of the present Protocol, of a decision of the Council, this shall be understood in the sense of Article 15 of the Covenant, namely, that the votes of the representatives of the parties to the dispute shall not be counted when reckoning unanimity or the necessary majority.

Article 19 (Relation to Covenant).

Except as expressly provided by its terms, the present Protocol shall not affect in any way the rights and obligations of Members of the League as determined by the Covenant.

Article 20 (Interpretation of Protocol).

Any dispute as to the interpretation of the present Protocol shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Article 21.

[Provisions for ratification.]

APPENDIX D

TEXTS TO ILLUSTRATE PART IV

I. FINAL PROTOCOL OF THE LOCARNO CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1925.

Translation.

The representatives of the German, Belgian, British, French, Italian, Polish and Czechoslovak Governments, who have met at Locarno from the 5th to 16th October, 1925, in order to seek by common agreement means for preserving their respective nations from the scourge of war and for providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes of every nature which might eventually arise between them.

Have given their approval to the draft treaties and conventions which respectively affect them and which, framed in the course of the present Conference, are mutually interdependent:—

Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy (Annex A).

Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium (Annex B).

Arbitration Convention between Germany and France (Annex C).

Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland (Annex D).

Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia (Annex E).

These instruments, hereby initialled *ne varietur*, will bear to-day's date, the representatives of the interested parties agreeing to meet in London on the 1st December next, to proceed during the course of a single meeting to the formality of the signature of the instruments which affect them.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France states that as a result of the draft arbitration treaties mentioned above, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have also concluded at Locarno draft agreements in order reciprocally to assure to themselves the benefit of the said treaties. These agreements will be duly deposited at the League of Nations, but M. Briand holds copies forthwith at the disposal of the Powers represented here.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain proposes that, in reply to certain requests for explanations concerning Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations presented by the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, a letter, of which the draft is similarly attached (Annex F) should be addressed to them at the same time as the formality of signature of the above-mentioned instruments takes place. This proposal is agreed to.

The representatives of the Governments represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation

of the tension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that, in strengthening peace and security in Europe, it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

They undertake to give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement.

Done at LOCARNO, the 16th October, 1925.

DR. LUTHER.
STRESEMANN.
EMILE VANDERVELDE.
ARI. BRIAND.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.
AL. SKRZYNSKI.
DR. EDUARD BENES.

ANNEX A

TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE BETWEEN GERMANY, BELGIUM, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY (INITIALED AT LOCARNO, OCTOBER 16, 1925.)

Translation.

The President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy;

Anxious to satisfy the desire for security and protection which animates the peoples upon whom fell the scourge of the war of 1914-18;

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium, and conscious of the necessity of ensuring peace in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts;

Animated also with the sincere desire of giving to all the signatory Powers concerned supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties in force between them;

Have determined to conclude a treaty with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :—

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany, and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by, or in pursuance of, the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty concerning the demilitarised zone.

Article 2.

Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of :—

1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary.
2. Action in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.

Article 3.

In view of the undertakings entered into in Article 2 of the present Treaty, Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means, and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy :

Any question with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.

All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation commission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settlement are the subject of special agreements signed this day.

Article 4.

1. If one of the High Contracting Parties alleges that a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present Treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

3. In case of a flagrant violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or of a flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the High Contracting Parties, each of the other Contracting Parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the Party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression, and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities, or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the High Contracting Parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the Parties which have engaged in hostilities.

Article 5.

The provisions of Article 3 of the present Treaty are placed under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided by the following stipulations :—

If one of the Powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision, and commits a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty, or a breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 shall apply.

Where one of the Powers referred to in Article 3 without committing a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision, the other Party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken ; the High Contracting Parties shall comply with these proposals.

Article 6.

The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Treaty of Versailles or under arrangements supplementary thereto, including the agreements signed in London on the 30th August, 1924.

Article 7.

The present Treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance of peace and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

Article 8.

The present Treaty shall be registered at the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting on a request of one or other of the High Contracting Parties notified to the other signatory Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a two-thirds' majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties; the Treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.

Article 9.

The present Treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such Dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof.

Article 10.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva in the archives of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

It shall enter into force as soon as all the ratifications have been deposited and Germany has become a member of the League of Nations.

The present Treaty, done in a single copy, will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and the Secretary-General will be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Locarno, the 16th October, 1925.

LUTHER.
STRESEMANN.
EMILE VANDERVELDE.
A. BRIAND.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

II. TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND POLAND.

The President of the French Republic and the President of the Polish Republic ;

Equally desirous to see Europe spared from war and by a sincere observance of the undertakings arrived at this day with a view to the maintenance of general peace ;

Have resolved to guarantee their benefits to each other reciprocally by a treaty concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the treaties existing between them ;

And have to this effect nominated for their plenipotentiaries :

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC :

M. Aristide Briand, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC :

Count Alexandre Skrzynski, Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions :—

Article I.

In the event of Poland or France suffering from a failure to observe the undertakings arrived at this day between them and Germany with a view to the maintenance of general peace, France, and reciprocally Poland, acting in application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, undertake to lend each other immediately aid and assistance, if such a failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms.

In the event of the Council of the League of Nations, when dealing with a question brought before it in accordance with the said undertakings, being unable to succeed in making its report accepted by all its members other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute, and in the event of Poland or France being attacked without provocation, France, or reciprocally Poland, acting in application of Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, will immediately lend aid and assistance.

Article II.

Nothing in the present Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as Members of the League of Nations, or shall be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

Article III.

The present Treaty shall be registered with the League of Nations, in accordance with the Covenant.

Article IV.

The present Treaty shall be ratified. The ratifications will be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratifications of the Treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, and the ratifications of the Treaty concluded at the same time between Germany and Poland.

It will enter into force and remain in force under the same conditions as the said Treaties.

The present Treaty, done in a single copy, will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations and the Secretary-General of the League will be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the High Contracting Parties.

Done at LOCARNO the 16th October, 1925.

ARI. BRIAND.
AL. SKRZYNSKI.

APPENDIX E

TEXT TO ILLUSTRATE PART V

1. THE SOVIET-TURKISH TREATY.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Turkish Republic, recognising that the interests of the two Contracting Parties require definition in exact terms tending to the strengthening of stable and normal relations between them and the friendship uniting them, have appointed in view of this George Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R and Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, who have agreed on the following points:—

Article 1.

In the event of military action directed against either of the Contracting Parties on the part of one or several other countries, the other Contracting Party undertakes to remain neutral in relation to the first.

Note.—The expression “military action” does not apply to military manoeuvres, which do not occasion any losses to the other Party.

Article 2.

Each Contracting Party undertakes to refrain from any attack against the other Party and not to participate in any alliance or agreement of a political character with one or more third Powers directed against the other Contracting Party. Moreover, each Contracting Party undertakes not to participate in any hostile act on the part of one or several Powers against the other Contracting Party.

Article 3.

The present agreement will enter into effect immediately after its ratification and will remain in force for a term of three years. At the end of three years the present agreement shall automatically be prolonged annually if neither Contracting Party expresses six months before the expiry its desire to declare it void.

Signed in PARIS, December 17, 1925.

*Signatures : CHICHERIN.
T. RUSHDI.*

APPENDIX F

TEXTS TO ILLUSTRATE PART VI

1. CONVENTION OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF RUMANIA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, SIGNED AT BUCAREST ON THE 23RD APRIL, 1921.¹

Firmly resolved to maintain the peace obtained by so many sacrifices, and provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as the situation created by the treaty concluded at Trianon on June 4th, 1920, between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Hungary on the other,

the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and His Majesty the King of Rumania, have agreed to conclude a defensive Convention . . . (and the signatories) have agreed as follows :—

Article 1.

In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary against one of the High Contracting Parties, the other Party agrees to assist in the defence of the Party attacked, in the manner laid down by the arrangement provided for in Article 2 of the present Convention.

Article 2.

The competent Technical Authorities of the Czechoslovak Republic and Rumania shall decide by mutual agreement and in a Military Convention to be concluded, upon the provisions necessary for the execution of the present Convention.

Article 3.

Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall conclude an alliance with a third Power without preliminary notice to the other.

Article 4.

For the purpose of co-ordinating their efforts to maintain peace, the two Governments undertake to consult together on the question of foreign policy concerning their relations with Hungary.

Article 5.

The present Convention shall be valid for two years from the date of the exchange of ratifications. On the expiration of this period, each

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations from the Official French text registered with the League of Nations on August 30, 1921. This treaty was renewed by a Protocol signed on May 7, 1923. The text of the Protocol is printed in the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vi, p. 216.

of the Contracting Parties shall have the option of denouncing the present Convention. It shall, however, remain in force for six months after the date of denunciation.

2. TURKEY—PERSIA. TEXT OF TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND SECURITY.

Turkey, on the one part, and Persia, on the other, in conformity with the necessities and the obligations that the contemporary period imposes upon the two nations, and convinced of the necessity of consolidating the existing fraternity and friendship, have desired to conclude a pact of friendship and security in order to determine the material conditions of their amicable relations, and, agreeing upon this point, to name the City of Teheran as the place of negotiations, have designated as plenipotentiaries :

For the Turkish Republic : His Excellency Mempech Sherket Bey, Turkish Ambassador in Persia, Plenipotentiary Extraordinary ;

For His Majesty the Shah of Persia : His Highness The Prime Minister Muhammed Ali Khan, and Mirza Dadud Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of interim, who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be regular, have agreed as follows :

Article 1.

An indestructible peace and lasting friendship shall reign between the Republic and the Persian Government, as well as between the nationals of the two countries.

Article 2.

In case one of the Contracting Parties should be exposed to a military operation on the part of one or more third Powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain neutrality *vis-à-vis* the first.

Article 3.

Each of the Contracting Parties agrees not to enter upon any aggression against the other, and not to participate in any alliance or political, economic, or financial agreement concluded by one or more third Powers and directed against one or the other of the two Parties or against their military and naval security. Moreover, each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to participate in any hostile undertaking whatever directed against one or the other.

Article 4.

In case one or more third Powers undertaking military operations or hostile acts against one of the contracting parties should wish, in the course of these operations, to transport armed troops and munitions across the territory of the other Party, or to procure animals and to assure its provisioning on this territory, or to profit by the existing facilities for the transport and the passage of its troops in retreat, or finally, to incite the population to rebel in order to serve its own pur-

poses, and to undertake scouting of a military nature, and thus violate the neutrality of the last named country, that country is bound to take up arms to defend its neutrality against these enterprises.

Article 5.

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to permit on its territory the presence or organisation of individuals or groups planning to modify the form of government or to disturb the tranquillity of the territory of the other Party, and not to tolerate the presence of individuals or organisations making on its own territory propaganda or attempting by other means hostile action against the other Party.

Article 6.

The Contracting Parties, with the purpose of ensuring the security and tranquillity of the peoples along the frontier regions, shall take all useful measures to stop such organisations and criminal acts as are likely to trouble the tranquillity of the two countries and of the tribes in the regions bordering on the frontier. These measures shall be taken either separately by each of the Governments of the Contracting Parties or jointly by the two Governments if they judge this useful.

Article 7.

Within six months from the date of the conclusion of the present treaty the Contracting Parties are in agreement to conclude commercial, consular, customs, postal, and telegraphic agreements, as well as residence and extradition conventions. The Delegates of the Parties shall meet at Teheran for the purpose of concluding these agreements.

Article 8.

The Contracting Parties shall determine upon the method to follow in order to settle ordinary differences which may arise between them and which cannot be regulated by diplomatic channels.

Article 9.

It is understood that each of the Contracting Parties maintain full liberty of action as concerns its relations with other Powers, other than the reciprocal pledges which have been specified in the present treaty.

Article 10.

The present treaty is drawn up in Turkish, Persian, French. In case of dispute the French text shall prevail.

Article 11.

The present treaty comes into force on the date of its signature, and as soon as possible shall be submitted for ratification to the national assemblies of the two Contracting Parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Teheran.

The present treaty shall remain in force for five years. In case it should not be denounced by one of the contracting Parties with a notification six months in advance, it shall be automatically renewed at the end of this period for a new period of one year. The treaty loses its effect only after the expiration of the notice of six months by which it may have been denounced.

The plenipotentiaries of the two Parties, accepting and approving the provisions of the eleven articles given above, have signed and affixed their seals to the present treaty.

Done in duplicate, at TEHERAN, on April 22, 1926.

3. TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, AND JAPAN, RELATING TO THEIR INSULAR POSSESSIONS AND INSULAR DOMINIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 13, 1921.

(The registration of this treaty took place April 16, 1924. Ratifications had been deposited at Washington, August 17, 1923.)

I.

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II.

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III.

This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.

IV.

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at

Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan,⁹ which was concluded at London on the 13th July, 1911, shall terminate. The Government of the United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present treaty, in French and in English, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

4. A DECLARATION ACCOMPANYING THE FOUR-POWER TREATY RELATING TO INSULAR POSSESSIONS.

In signing the Treaty this day between the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, it is declared to be the understanding and intent of the signatory Powers :

(1) That the Treaty shall apply to the mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean ; provided, however, that the making of the Treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between the United States of America and the Mandatory Powers, respectively, in relation to the mandated Islands.

(2) That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers.

WASHINGTON, D.C., 13th December, 1921.

APPENDIX G

SECURITY TREATIES, 1919-1926

WESTERN EUROPE	1. The Triple Pact (British Empire, United States of America and France)	June 28, 1919.
	2.*The Franco-Belgian Military Convention	Sept. 7, 1920.
	3.*France and Poland	Feb. 19, 1921.
	4. The Cannes Pact (British Empire and France)	Jan. 12, 1922.
	5. The Poincaré Draft (British Empire and France)	Jan. 23, 1922.
	6.*The Treaty of Mutual Assistance (British Empire, France, Belgium, Germany and Italy) .. .	Oct. 16, 1925.
	7.*Franco-Polish Guarantee, Franco-Czechoslovak Guarantee .. .	Oct. 16, 1925.
EASTERN EUROPE	1.*Polish-Rumanian Treaty .. .	March 3, 1921.
	2.*The Warsaw Pact (Poland, Finland,† Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and U.S.S.R.)	March 17, 1922.
	3. The Moscow Non-Aggression Pact (Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and U.S.S.R.)	Dec. 8, 1922.
	4.*The Estonian-Latvian Treaty .. .	Nov. 1, 1923.
	5.*The U.S.S.R.-German Treaty .. .	April 1926.
	6. The U.S.S.R. Lithuanian Treaty .. .	Sept. 28, 1926.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS	1. The Réquin Draft Treaty .. .	Sept. 1922.
	2. The Cecil Draft Treaty	Dec. 1922.
	3. The Cecil-Réquin Draft Treaty .. .	July 1923.
	4. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance	Sept. 1923.
	5. The Shotwell Draft Treaty .. .	June 1924.
	6. The Draft Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes	Sept. 1924.

* Signifies that the treaty is in force.

† Not ratified by Finland.

CENTRAL
AND
SOUTHERN
EUROPE

1.*The Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Treaty	Aug. 14, 1920.
2.*The Czechoslovak-Rumanian Treaty	April 23, 1921.
3.*The Czechoslovak-Austrian Treaty	Dec. 16, 1921.
4.*The Austrian Protocol	Oct. 4, 1922.
5.*The Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty ..	Jan. 25, 1924.
6.*The Italo-Yugoslav Treaty ..	Jan. 27, 1924.
7.*The Hungarian Protocol ..	March 14, 1924.
8.*The Italo-Czechoslovak Treaty	July 5, 1924.
9.*The Franco-Yugoslav Treaty ..	March 1926.
10.*The Polish-Rumanian Treaty ..	March 1926.
11. The Franco-Rumanian Treaty ..	June 10, 1926.
12.*The Italo-Spanish Treaty ..	Aug. 1926.
13. The Italo-Rumanian Treaty ..	Sept. 1926.
14. The Yugoslav-Polish Treaty ..	Sept. 1926.

THE
NEAR AND
MIDDLE
EAST

1.*The Straits Convention	Feb. 1923.
2. The Iraq-Nejd Treaty	Nov. 1925.
3.*U.S.S.R.-Turkish Treaty ..	Dec. 1925.
4. The Turco-French Treaty	Feb. 1926.
5.*The Turco-Persian Treaty ..	May 1926.
6.*The Mosul Pact (Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq)	June 1926.
7. The U.S.S.R.-Afghan Treaty ..	Aug. 31, 1926.
8. The Middle Eastern Pact (U.S.S.R.-Turkey-Persia) ..	Under negotia- tion.

THE FAR
EAST

1.*The Washington Non-Aggression Pact (Great Britain, U.S.A., France, Japan)	Dec. 13, 1921.
2.*The Chinese Non-Aggression Pact (Great Britain, U.S.A., France, Belgium, China, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Portugal) ..	Feb. 6, 1922.

* Signifies that the treaty is in force.

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